h  Congress 
1st  Session 


NATE 


Document 
No.  506 


*••••*•  ••  #  \ 

ALLEGED 

DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS 
OF  UNITED  STATES  NAVA" 


LETTERS  AND  PAPERS  RELATING  TO 
ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS 
IN  BATTLE  SHIPS  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  NAVY 


PRESENTED  BY  MR.  HALE 
May  22,  1908. — Ordered  to  be  printed 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1908 


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TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 


1.  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  May  19,  1908,  transmitting  com¬ 

ments  of  the  Board  on  Construction  on  the  report  of  Rear-Admiral  Evans, 

U.  S.  Navy,  dated  March  6,  1908,  and  on  the  report  of  Naval  Constructor 
R.  H.  Robinson,  TJ.  S.  Navy,  dated  March  4,  1908 .  5 

2.  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  March  9,  1908,  referred  to  in 

the  above-noted  letter  of  May  19,  1908 .  6 

3.  Communication  from  the  Board  on  Construction,  dated  May  19,  1908,  sub¬ 

mitting  general  comments  upon  the  above-noted  reports  of  Rear-Admiral 
Evans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson .  9 

4.  Report  of  Rear-Admiral  R.  D.  Evans,  U.  S.  Navy,  dated  March  6,  1908..  15 

5.  Report  of  Naval  Constructor  R.  H.  Robinson,  TJ.  S.  Navy,  dated  March 

4,  1908  .  31 

6.  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  April  15,  1908,  transmitting  sup¬ 

plementary  statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor  of  April  13,  1908,  con¬ 
cerning  alleged  defects  in  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy .  49 

7.  Supplementary  statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor,  dated  April  13,  1908. .  50 

8.  Letter  of  Capt.  R.  R.  Ingersoll,  U.  S.  Navy,  dated  April  16,  1908 .  59 

9.  Interview  with  Sir  William  White  as  published  in  the  Boston  Transcript 

of  April  21,  1908 .  59 

10.  Editorial  from  the  Scientific  American  of  May  2,  1908,  concerning  Sir  Wil¬ 

liam  White’s  interview  on  the  American  Navy .  63 

LI,  Editorial  from  the  Engineering  News  of  April  16,  1908 .  64 


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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2018  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/allegedstructuraOOhale 


Navy  De jpa rtm’en  t  .  ’ ' 

Washington,  May  19,  1908. 

My  Dear  Senator  Hale:  Referring  to  my  letter  of  April  15,  1908, 
ransmitting  the  supplementary  statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor 
a  relation  to  certain  alleged  defects  in  battle  ships  of  the  United 
Itates  Navy,  and  the  “  reports  of  Admiral  Evans  and  Naval  Con- 
tructor  Robinson  concerning  the  behavior  of  vessels  of  the  Atlantic 
fleet  during  the  voyage  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena  Bay,” 
dso  their  comments  for  the  information  of  the  Department  in  con- 
lection  with  future  design  work,  etc.,  I  beg  to  forward  herewith  the 
general  comment  of  the  Board  on  Construction  on  the  above-noted 
•eports  of  Admiral  Evans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson. 

While  there  was  much  detailed  criticism  in  the  reports  of  Admiral 
£vans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  above  referred  to,  which 
vould  not  under  ordinary  circumstances  be  published  and  which 
vas  intended  solely  for  the  information  of  the  Department  and  its 
bureaus,  it  is  believed  that  the  publication  of  these  reports  in  their 
entirety  would  not  be  prejudicial  to  the  best  interests  of  the  service, 
[f  the  criticisms  contained  in  these  reports  are  considered  in  con- 
lection  with  the  other  reports  submitted  upon  the  same  subject, 
Re  comments  of  the  Board  on  Construction,  and  my  letter  of  March 
),  1908,  there  should  remain  no  doubt  whatever  in  the  minds  of 
mpartial  critics  that  the  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy 
ire  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  battle  ships  of  foreign  navies  of  cor¬ 
responding  date  of  design. 

It  should  also  be  quite  evident  to  those  who  are  interested  in  the 
general  subject  of  ship  design  in  the  United  States  Navy  that  the 
nevitable  changes  in  naval  material  render  quite  valueless  any 
comparison  on  equal  terms  of  battle  ships  of  latest  design  with  battle 
Rips  designed  several  years  ago.  It  should  likewise  be  quite  evident 
that  in  the  latest  designs  the  experience  derived  under  actual  service 
conditions  from  battle  ships  of  earlier  date  of  design  is  fully  utilized. 

Having  just  returned  from  a  personal  inspection  of  the  Atlantic 
Battle  Ship  Fleet,  and  having  had  opportunity  to  converse  with 
some  of  the  ranking  officers  of  the  fleet  concerning  those  features 
:>f  ship  design  which  have  recently  been  in  controversy,  it  is  with 
special  satisfaction  that  I  can  reaffirm  the  Department’s  views  with 
respect  to  the  designs  of  the  Delaware  and  Michigan  classes  set 
forth  in  my  letter  of  March  9,  1908,  as  well  as  other  expressions  of 
opinion  of  the  Department  concerning  the  general  character  of  the 
vessels  of  our  battle  ship  fleet.  I  therefore  have  no  hesitancy  in 
fully  concurring  in  the  previously  expressed  opinions  of  some  of  the 


o 


6 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


most  eminent  American  and  foreign  authorities  on  war  ship  con¬ 
struction,  viz,  that  the  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy  are 
equal,  and  in  some  respects  superior,  to  foreign  battle  ships  of  the 
same  period  of  design. 

Very  truly,  yours,  V.  H.  Metcalf, 

Secretary. 

Hon.  EuGene  Hale, 

Chairman  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs, 

United  States  Senate. 


2. 

Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  concerning  development  of  designs 
of  naval  vessels,  with  particular  reference  to  the  designs  of  the  Dela¬ 
ware  and  North  Dakota. 

Navy  Department,  March  9,  1908. 
My  Dear  Senator  Hale  :  Referring  to  my  conversation  with  you 
on  Saturday,  I  consider  it  advisable  that  the  Naval  Committee  should 
be  clearly  advised  as  to  the  actual  circumstances  under  which  the 
plans  for  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  were  officially  approved  by 
the  Department  and  the  unanimity  with  which  the  salient  features  of 
these  vessels  were  approved  by  the  board  on  construction,  the  special 
board  on  designs,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation,  and  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet. 

As  you  may  recall,  the  plans  for  these  vessels  were  prepared  in 
competition  with  those  submitted  by  naval  architects  not  connected 
with  the  Navy  Department,  this  competition  having  been  provided 
for,  specifically,  by  the  act  of  Congress  approved  June  29,  1906. 

After  the  designs  had  been  thoroughly  considered  by  the  board  on 
construction  (more  than  twenty  tentative  designs  having  been  con¬ 
sidered  by  that  board  preliminary  to  the  selection  of  the  one  finally 
approved) ,  these  plans  and  all  other  plans  submitted  to  the  Depart¬ 
ment  in  competition  were  referred  to  a  special  board  under  the  presi¬ 
dency  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Hon.  Truman  H. 
Newberry.  The  other  members  of  this  board  were  Rear-Admiral 
Merrell,  Captain  Rodgers,  and  Captain  Wainwright,  who  were  at 
that  time  members  of  the  general  board,  the  chief  constructor,  the 
engineer  in  chief,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  so  that 
a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  board  had  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  designs  of  the  vessel  submitted  by  the  board  on  construction. 

The  features  of  the  various  designs  submitted  were  carefully  exam¬ 
ined  by  this  board,  and  my  predecessor,  Mr.  Secretary  Bonaparte, 
in  his  report  for  the  fiscal  year  1906,  states  as  follows: 

In  accordance  with  the_  proviso  attached  to  the  last  naval  appropriation  bill,  the 
plans  for  the  battle  ship  authorized  by  the  said  bill  are,  simultaneously  with  this 
report,  transmitted  to  Congress.  These  plans  were  selected  by  a  board  of  officers, 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Assistant  Secretary,  after  a  very  careful  consideration  of 
various  designs  submitted  by  different  naval  constructors  in  the  United  States  and 
one  in  England  and  by  the  board  on  construction  of  the  Department.  The  type  of 
vessel  selected  has  a  length  of  510  feet.  In  the  language  of  the  board :  “  It  will  carry 
as  heavy  armor  and  as  powerful  armament  as  any  known  vessel  of  its  class;  it  will 
have  a  speed  which  is  believed  to  be  the  highest  practicable  for  a  vessel  of  this  type 
and  class,  in  the  present  state  of  knowledge;  it  will  have  the  highest  practicable  radius 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


t 


of  action,  and  can  be  built  within  the  limit  of  cost  fixed  by  the  act  of  Congress.  ’  ’  This 
plan,  therefore,  complies  in  all  respects,  in  the  judgment  of  this  highly  competent 
board,  with  the  terms  of  the  authorization,  and  the  Department  has  no  hesitation  in 
approving  the  report  of  the  board. 

In  due  course,  the  report  of  this  special  board  and  the  approved 
plans  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  were  transmitted  to  Congress, 
and  the  naval  appropriation  bill  approved  March  2,  1907,  contained 
the  following  proviso : 

That,  for  the  purpose  of  further  increasing  the  naval  establishment  of  the  United 
States,  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  have  constructed,  by  contract  or  in  navy- 
yards,  as  hereinafter  provided,  one  first-class  battle  ship  to  cost,  exclusive  of  armor 
and  armament,  not  exceeding  six  million  dollars,  similar  in  all  essential  character¬ 
istics,  and  additional  to,  the  battle  ship  authorized  by  the  act  making  appropriations 
for  the  naval  service  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and 
seven,  plans  and  specifications  for  which  last-named  vessel  have  already  been  pre¬ 
pared  and  submitted  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  the  information  of  Congress, 
as  required  by  the  provisions  of  the  aforesaid  act. 

It  is  thus  obvious  that  the  designs  of  these  vessels  received  the 
fullest  consideration  and  were,  in  effect,  approved  by  Congress. 

Shortly  after  my  assumption  of  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  however,  it  was  brought  to  my  attention  by  an  officer  attached 
to  the  general  board  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  armor  belt  on  the  Dela¬ 
ware  and  North  Dakota  should  be  raised  30  inches.  This  officer  sub¬ 
sequently  made  a  formal  statement  to  that  effect.  His  communica¬ 
tion  was  referred  to  the  board  on  construction  and  was  given  most 
careful  consideration,  and  the  board  on  construction  promptly  and 
unanimously  submitted  its  report  recommending,  in  the  most  definite 
terms,  that  no  change  whatever  be  made  in  the  designs  as  approved, 
since,  in  their  judgment,  the  armor  belt  was  properly  placed. 

The  officer  making  the  original  statement  that  the  location  of  the 
armor  belt  was  in  error  was  permitted  to  see  the  report  of  the  board 
on  construction  and  made  rejoinder  thereto.  While  the  Department 
had  no  doubt  whatever  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  judgment  of  the 
board  on  construction  in  this  instance,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to 
obtain  the  opinion  of  the  then  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation, 
Rear-Admiral  Brownson,  and  the  present  commander  in  chief  of  the 
Atlantic  Fleet,  Rear-Admiral  Evans.  Rear-Admiral  Brownson,  after 
carefully  looking  into  the  matter,  stated  specifically  that  the  location 
of  the  water-line  belt  armor  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota,  as 
decided  upon  by  the  board  on  construction,  was  entirely  correct, 
and  that,  in  his  judgment,  no  change  should  be  made.  Rear-Admiral 
Evans,  who  had  previously  made  a  statement  that,  in  his  judgment, 
the  armor  belt  was  too  low,  entirely  changed  his  mind  after  fully 
considering  the  plans  of  those  vessels,  informing  me,  in  effect,  that 
he  had  previously  been  misinformed  as  to  conditions,  and  that  after 
actual  examination  he  entirely  approved  of  the  armor  protection  of 
the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  and  its  location  as  determined  by  the 
board  on  construction.  Admiral  Evans,  so  I  am  informed,  made 
substantially  the  same  statement  to  Rear-Admiral  Converse,  the 
president  of  the  board  on  construction,  and  to  Rear-Admiral  Capps, 
the  chief  constructor,  as  he  did  to  me  in  reference  to  his  concurrence 
in  the  opinion  of  the  board  on  construction  with  respect  to  the  loca¬ 
tion  of  the  water-line  belt  on  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota. 

I  also  submitted  the  question  of  the  location  of  the  water-line 
belt  armor  and  armor  protection  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota 
^.0  many  other  officers  of  the  service,  and,  with  but  one  exception,  they 


8 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


all  informed  me  that  these  ships,  namely,  the  Delaware  and  North 
Dakota ,  were  amply  protected;  in  fact,  better  protected  than  the  ships 
of  any  other  service,  the  only  criticism  being  that  if  the  water-line 
belt  armor  was  raised  a  few  inches  it  would  reduce  the  weight  of  the 
armor  and  increase  the  carrying  capacity  of  coal  and  ammunition, 
an  obviously  impossible  gain  since  all  available  space  had  already 
been  devoted  to  such  purposes. 

While  the  Department  can  not  for  one  instant  permit  the  assump¬ 
tion  that  such  vital  questions  affecting  ship  design  can  be  determined 
by  popular  vote  among  the  officers  of  the  service,  and  while  the 
Department  is  most  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  its  highly  trained  and 
legally  appointed  official  advisers  should  have  the  dominating  influ¬ 
ence  in  all  matters  connected  with  the  design  of  naval  vessels,  it 
appears  to  me  that  in  this  question  of  the  location  of  water-line 
armor  belt  the  Department  has  gone  out  of  its  way  to  obtain  opinions 
from  the  highest  possible  authorities  among  the  seagoing  branch  of  the 
Navy,  and  that  there  is  really  no  ground  for  further  contention  with 
respect  to  the  matter  of  the  water-line  belt  armor  on  the  Delaware 
and  North  Dakota  or  on  the  South  Carolina  and  Michigan,  whose 
armor  belts  are  very  similar  in  location  and  character. 

It  also  seems  proper  in  this  connection  to  note  that  the  officer 
who  has  taken  the  most  active  interest  in  agitating  this  subject  of 
alleged  erroneous  location  of  water-line  armor,  originally  recom¬ 
mended  in  his  letter  of  June  15,  1907,  that  the  water-line  belt  be 
raised  30  inches.  In  a  subsequent  letter  he  recommended  that  it  be 
raised  20  inches.  In  his  recent  testimony  before  your  committee  he 
recommended  that  it  be  raised  10  inches.  I  think  no  better  illustra¬ 
tion  could  be  had  of  the  unreliable  character  of  recommendations 
of  this  kind,  since  the  original  proposition  of  30  inches  is,  within 
less  than  a  year,  reduced  to  10  inches. 

As  the  only  point  criticised  in  the  designs  of  the  Delaware  class 
is  that  of  water-line  armor  distribution,  and  since  this  criticism  has 
been  disposed  of  by  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  most  competent 
authorities  upon  whom  the  Department  must  rely  in  matters  of  this 
kind,  I  am  convinced  that  there  is  no  ground  whatever  for  further 
criticism  or  justification  for  any  change  m  the  essential  seagoing  and 
military  characteristics  of  the  vessels  of  the  Delaware  class. 

In  view  of  my  recent  conversation  with  you,  I  think  the  above  state¬ 
ment  very  important,  and  request  that  it  be  laid  before  your  com¬ 
mittee  at  such  time  as  you  may  consider  proper. 

I  also  deem  it  necessary  to  point  out  that  practically  none  of  the 
unfavorable  criticism  which  has  recently  been  directed  at  certain 
vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy  is  applicable  to  battle  ships  designed 
during  the  past  four  years,  and,  so  far  as  concerns  location  of  water¬ 
line  armor,  is  really  inapplicable  to  those  designed  since  the  Virginia 
class,  the  contracts  for  which  were  signed  more  than  seven  years  ago. 
The  reports  of  Rear-Admiral  Converse  and  the  chief  constructor 
give  extensive  and  detailed  comparison  between  the  battle  ships  of 
the  United  States  Navy  and  those  of  foreign  navies  of  the  same 
period  of  design,  and,  after  a  careful  perusal  of  these  reports,  I  am 
wholly  convinced  that  the  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy  are 
in  no  sense  inferior,  type  for  type,  in  their  own  period  of  design  to 
those  of  any  other  nation  in  the  world;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  con¬ 
cur  in  the  opinion  of  certain  foreign  critics  that  our  battle  ships  have 
a  certain  measure  of  definite  superiority. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


9 


In  conclusion,  and  as  indicating  the  character  of  work  performed 
by  the  board  on  construction,  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  perform¬ 
ance  of  a  new  type  of  vessel,  whose  designs  were  prepared  by  that 
board.  I  refer  to  the  recent  trial  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Chester.  This  ves¬ 
sel  was  designed  to  meet  certain  requirements  of  the  general  board 
for  a  vessel  of  high  speed  and  great  endurance  which  could  be  used 
for  scouting  purposes.  The  Chester,  Birmingham,  and  Salem  were, 
in  a  measure,  an  answer  to  foreign  vessels  of  that  class  which  had  been 
designed  tQ  make  25  knots  speed.  The  American  designers  insisted  on 
having  a  vessel  sufficiently  large  to  maintain  a  good  average  speed  in 
all  ordinary  weather,  and  that  she  should  have  a  much  larger  coal 
endurance  than  any  foreign  vessels  of  this  type.  In  the  recent  official 
trials  the  scout  cruiser  Chester  maintained  an  average  speed  of  26.52 
knots  for  four  hours,  and  had  in  her  bunkers  during  that  trial  an 
amount  of  coal  practically  equal  to  that  carried  by  the  fastest  foreign 
scout  cruisers  when  their  bunkers  were  full,  and  the  Chester  actually 
had  on  board  during  the  trial  three  times  the  amount  of  coal  carried 
by  the  largest  and  fastest  of  her  foreign  rivals  at  the  time  of  their 
speed  trials. 

Very  truly,  yours,  V.  H.  Metcalf, 

Secretary. 

Hon.  Eugene  Hale, 

Chairman  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs, 

United  States  Senate. 


3. 

Navy  Department, 

Board  on  Construction, 

Washington,  May  19,  1908. 

Sir:  The  Board  on  Construction  has  the  honor  to  submit  below 
brief  general  comment  upon  the  recent  reports  of  Rear-Admiral 
R.  D.  Evans,  U.  S.  Navy,  and  Naval  Constructor  R.  H.  Robinson, 
U.  S.  Navy,  commenting  upon  the  behavior  of  vessels  of  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  during  the  passage  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena  Bay, 
also  inviting  attention  to  various  features  of  the  vessels  of  the  fleet, 
for  the  information  of  the  Department  in  connection  with  future 
design  work. 

The  Board  has  carefully  considered  the  suggestions  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Evans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson,  and  finds  itself  in 
general  agreement  with  the  very  large  majority  of  such  suggestions. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  comments  of  the  commander  in 
chief  and  the  naval  constructor  attached  to  his  staff  were  made  upon 
battle  ships  the  most  recent  of  which  was  designed  more  than  six 
years  ago,  and  nearly  all  the  criticisms  made  by  them  are  therefore 
inapplicable  to  battle  ships  recently  designed.  The  comments  here¬ 
inafter  made  by  the  Board  on  Construction  relate  chiefly  to  the  most 
important  features  considered  in  the  reports  of  Rear-Admiral  Evans 
and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson. 

homogeneity. 

Views  similar  to  those  submitted  by  Admiral  Evans  and  Naval 
Constructor  Robinson  with  respect  to  the  necessity  of  homogeneity  in 
type  of  battle  ships  have  long  since  been  accepted  as  fundamentally 


10 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


correct  by  Navy  Department  officials  responsible  for  new  design  work, 
and,  so  far  as  legislative  and  other  conditions  have  permitted,  homoge¬ 
neity  of  type  has  been  given  special  consideration.  Indeed,  with  the 
sole  exception  of  the  Idaho  and  Mississippi,  the  designers  of  the  Navy 
Department,  during  the  past  seven  years,  have  given  special  attention 
to  the  desirability  of  homogeneity,  as  is  fully  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  there  are  five  Virginias ,  six  Connecticut^ ,  four  Tennessees,  and  six 
Colorados.  The  South  Carolina  and  Michigan  are,  so  far  as  concerns 
maneuvering  power,  speed,  and  other  characteristics,  except  battery 
arrangement,  capable  of  being  placed  in  the  same  tactical  group  as  the 
vessels  of  the  Connecticut  class.  The  conditions  under  which  the 
South  Carolina  and  Michigan  were  designed,  the  limitation  imposed  by 
Congress  upon  their  size,  and  the  desirability  of  completing  a  group  of 
eight  vessels  of  the  same  general  maneuvering  characteristics  as  the 
Connecticut  class,  have  already  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Department  in  various  official  communications.  The  conditions 
under  which  the  designs  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  were  devel¬ 
oped  are  too  well  known  to  require  further  elaboration  in  this  report. 
The  two  battle  ships  authorized  in  this  year’s  appropriation  bill,  so 
far  as  concerns  maneuvering  qualities,  general  arrangement  of  battery, 
etc.,  will  be  quite  similar  to  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota,  so  that 
these  two  battle  ships  and  the  two  battle  ships  just  authorized  can  be 
considered  as  a  group  of  four  homogeneous  vessels. 

FREEBOARD. 

It  may  be  accepted  as  an  axiom  in  the  development  of  battle  ships 
that  freeboard  in  excess  of  that  absolutely  required  for  seaworthiness 
and  the  proper  working  of  the  battery  is  not  only  undesirable  but  a 
definite  disadvantage,  as  it  increases  the  target  area  and  raises  the 
center  of  gravity,  making  the  vessel  more  liable  to  be  hit,  and  consid¬ 
erably  decreasing  the  stability  under  damaged  conditions.  The  in¬ 
crease  of  length  and  speed  of  battle  ships,  and  the  fine  lines  forward 
and  aft,  in  conjunction  with  the  concentration  of  weight  near  the 
extremities  of  the  latest  battle  ships,  has  made  it  advisable  to  increase 
the  height  of  freeboard  forward.  Even  in  this  respect,  however, 
Japan,  which  has  certainly  had  very  considerable  experience  of  fight¬ 
ing  under  modern  conditions,  has,  in  its  latest  ships,  adhered  to  a  for¬ 
ward  freeboard  of  moderate  height,  the  forward  freeboard  of  the  Aki 
and  Satsuma i  being  reported  as  practically  the  same  as  our  Connecticut 
class. 

HEIGHT  OF  BROADSIDE  GUNS. 

The  comments  with  respect  to  the  inability  to  fight  the  weather 
broadside  guns  under  certain  conditions  of  weather  are  fully  appreci¬ 
ated,  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  for  ships  now  with  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  the  broadside  battery  can  not  well  be  disposed  in  any  other  man¬ 
ner  than  the  one  adopted — a  disposition,  be  it  noted,  which  is  practi¬ 
cally  identical  with  that  of  the  battle  ships  of  England,  Germany,  and 
Japan  of  the  same  period  of  design. 

Indeed,  the  heights  of  the  axes  of  the  broadside  guns  of  United 
States  battle  ships  are,  as  a  rule,  from  1  to  2  feet  higher  above  water 
than  corresponding  guns  in  British  battle  ships.  The  broadside 
batteries  of  United  States  battle  ships  now  in  course  of  construction 
are  purely  for  torpedo  defense,  and  as  all  available  battery  space 
on  the  upper  deck  has  been  preempted  by  heavy  gun  turrets,  any 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


11 


other  system  of  mounting  than  that  adopted  would  be  wholly  im¬ 
practicable.  The  location  of  guns  of  the  secondary  battery  on  top 
of  turrets  was  considered  many  years  ago,  and  such  a  location  has 
several  times  been  indicated  on  the  plans  of  battle  ships.  So  far, 
however, no  guns  have  been  actually  so  mounted,  since  there  is  very 
good  reason  to  believe  that  they  would  not  be  available  for  repelling 
torpedo  boats  after  any  general  engagement  on  account  of  injuries 
received  in  action.  This  matter  was  carefully  considered  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  designs  of  the  South  Carolina  and  Delaware  classes, 
and  at  that  time  the  disadvantages  of  mounting  guns  on  top  of 
turrets  were  believed  to  be  greater  than  the  advantages. 

ARMOR  AT  BOW. 

With  fine  bow  lines  and  consequent  small  displacement  of  this 
portion  of  the  vessel,  the  devotion  of  any  considerable  amount  of 
weight  to  armor  at  the  bows  of  battle  ships  has  been  considered 
unnecessary,  especially  when  the  water-line  armor  is  extended  over 
so  great  a  proportion  of  the  length  of  the  ship  as  in  the  case  of  the 
South  Carolina  and  Michigan  and  Delaware  and  North  Dakota.  The 
very  great  extension  of  the  heavy  water-line  armor  on  these  vessels 
in  connection  with  the  transverse  armored  bulkheads  and  the  ar¬ 
mored  deck  forward  of  the  side  armor,  and  extensive  compartmental 
subdivision,  with  cofferdams  filled  with  cellulose,  is  believed  to  pro¬ 
vide  a  very  much  better  protection  to  the  buoyancy  and  would  pre¬ 
vent  change  trim  of  the  vessel  due  to  water-line  damage  in  a  much 
more  efficient  degree  than  has  been  possible  with  the  arrangement 
previously  adopted  in  the  case  of  battle  ships  whose  thin  side  armor 
wTas  continued  to  the  bow. 

LOCATION  OF  WATER-LINE  ARMOR. 

From  the  comments  contained  in  the  accompanying  reports  of 
Rear-Admiral  Evans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  it  is  obvious 
that  in  the  moderate  weather  experienced  during  the  passage  of  the 
fleet  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena  Bay  there  were  numerous 
occasions  upon  which  the  lower  edge  of  the  main  armor  belt  was 
exposed,  and  this  under  the  unusually  deep-laden  condition  of  the 
vessels  of  the  fleet,  some  of  these  vessels  carrying  as  much  as  800 
tons  of  fresh  water  in  their  double  bottoms  and  having  on  board 
large  quantities  of  excess  stores,  ammunition,  etc.  Therefore  the 
statements  in  these  reports  as  to  the  undesirability  of  raising  the 
lower  edge  of  the  belt  armor,  when  taken  in  connection  with  the 
very  positive  statement  made  in  the  communication  of  Captain 
Ingersoll  in  his  letter  of  April  16,  1908,  fully  confirm  the  Board  in 
its  opinion,  already  expressed,  as  to  the  desirability  of  making  no 
change  in  the  location  of  the  lower  edge  of  heavy  water-line  armor 
belts  of  our  battle  ships,  and  certainly  that  the  lower  edge  should 
not  be  raised.  The  distribution  of  armored  protection  on  battle 
ships,  like  so  many  other  questions  relating  to  battle-ship  design,  is 
necessarily  a  compromise,  and  the  fundamental  principles  governing 
such  distribution  which  have  heretofore  been  observed  are,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Board,  entirely  sound  and  should  be  adhered  to  in 
the  future. 


12 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


ELIMINATION  OF  BRIDGES. 

The  Board  heartily  concurs  in  the  suggestion  with  respect  to  the 
elimination  of  bridges  and  other  top-hamper  unnecessary  for  the 
handling  of  the  ship  in  action  and  under  ordinary  conditions  of  serv¬ 
ice,  and  the  designs  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota,  whose  prin¬ 
cipal  characteristics  were  determined  upon  more  than  two  years  ago, 
have  fully  embodied  this  principle.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  desire 
for  additional  bridges  and  top-hamper  has  come  from  officers  of  the 
fleet  rather  than  from  designers,  and  it  is  only  recently  that  officers 
of  the  fleet  appear  to  have  fully  realized  the  benefits  which  would 
result  from  eliminating  all  bridges,  deck  erections,  and  unnecessary 
weights  of  every  description. 

CONNING  TOWERS  AND  FLAGSHIPS. 

In  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  provision  has  already  been 
made  for  handling  the  ship  from  the  conning  tower,  and  the  other 
suggestions  contained  in  the  reports  with  respect  to  the  fittings  of 
conning  tower  have  already  received  and  will  continue  to  receive 
the  most  careful  consideration.  For  many  years  past  the  Board  on 
Construction  and  the  bureaus  concerned  have  recommended  that 
the  number  of  flagships  be  reduced,  and  in  view  of  the  large  number 
of  flagships  already  existing  no  battle  ships  designed  during  the  past 
four  years  have  been  fitted  as  flagships.  The  battle  ships  covered 
by  the  current  appropriation  bill  will,  however,  be  designed  as 
flagships. 

DOORS  IN  TRANSVERSE  BULKHEADS. 

With  respect  to  the  omission  of  doors  below  the  protective  deck 
in  main  transverse  water-tight  bulkheads,  the  Board  is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  United  States  Navy  has  taken  the  lead  in  such  matters,  the 
designs  of  battle  ships  of  four  years  ago  embodying  this  principle, 
which  is  now  being  generally  adopted,  so  far  as  the  Board  is  aware, 
by  foreign  navies.  It  undoubtedly  introduces  an  element  of  incon¬ 
venience  in  visiting  the  various  compartments  of  the  vessel,  but  has 
very  great  advantages  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  the  vessel’s 
water-tight  subdivision. 


TURRETS. 

With  respect  to  the  comments  concerning  turrets  and  turret  fit¬ 
tings,  it  maybe  noted  that  sighting  hoods  have  been  omitted  from 
the  turrets  of  battle  ships  designed  during  the  past  four  years.  Pro¬ 
vision  has  already  been  made  to  supply  for  the  turrets  of  battle 
ships  now  under  construction  turning  gear  of  efficiency  equal  to  that 
referred  to  as  having  been  installed  on  the  Maine  and  Illinois. 
Steps  have  also  been  taken  to  supply  similar  gear  to  vessels  of  the 
fleet  whenever  such  vessels  are  available  for  this  installation.  Pro¬ 
vision  has  also  been  made  in  the  turrets  of  vessels  now  under  construc¬ 
tion  to  obviate  the  “jumping  off”  criticised  in  the  accompanying 
reports.  For  the  turrets  of  vessels  now  under  construction  provision 
has  been  made  to  meet  all  reasonable  requirements  concerning  ammu¬ 
nition  hoists,  and  the  question  of  making  changes  in  the  ammunition 
hoists  of  vessels  of  the  fleet  has  also  been  fully  considered  by  the 
bureaus  having  cognizance  of  this  matter.  Provision  has  also  been 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


13 


made  in  the  turrets  of  vessels  now  under  construction  to  supplement 
the  gas-expelling  device  by  air  pressure  in  the  turrets  themselves. 
Hand  ammunition  hoists  have  also  been  provided  for  the  turrets  of 
vessels  under  construction.  Consideration  has  been  given  to  fitting 
the  tops  of  turrets  so  that  they  can  be  readily  removed  when  necessity 
therefor  arises. 


COAL  CAPACITY. 

Referring  to  the  coal  capacity  of  vessels  of  the  fleet,  it  is  unnecessary 
in  this  connection  to  outline  the  conditions  under  which  the  coal 
capacities  of  the  various  vessels  now  attached  to  the  fleet  were  deter¬ 
mined  upon.  Battle  ships  now  under  construction,  and  those  de¬ 
signed  during  recent  years,  have  sufficient  coal  capacity  to  insure 
the  radius  of  action  noted  in  the  reports  as  desirable.  In  this  con¬ 
nection  it  is  not  unworthy  of  note  that,  of  those  battle  ships  now 
attached  to  the  fleet,  the  Alabama  class,  whose  design  was  passed 
upon  by  a  special  board,  has  the  smallest  coal  capacity. 

MISCELLANEOUS . 

Experiments  are  now  in  progress  to  determine  the  efficiency  of 
elevated  towers  for  fire-control  stations;  also  as  to  the  best  arrange¬ 
ment  of  bulkheads  for  giving  efficient  protection  to  the  ship  against 
torpedo  attack. 

With  respect  to  the  standardization  of  machinery,  the  placing  of 
windlass  engine,  winches,  and'  other  auxiliary  machinery  behind 
armor,  etc.,  the  Board  considers  it  only  necessary  to  invite  attention 
to  the  fact  that  a  large  part  of  the  apparatus  connected  with  such 
engines  must  necessarily  be  exposed,  and  that,  while  the  placing 
of  the  actuating  machinery  behind  armor  would  probably  be  desirable, 
it  is  in  many  respects  impracticable. 

With  respect  to  the  comments  on  ventilation,  piping  systems,  inter¬ 
connection  of  salt  and  fresh  water  systems,  main  and  secondary 
drains,  scuppers,  etc.,  the  Board  begs  to  note  that  all  these  criticisms 
are  inapplicable  to  recent  designs,  since  in  these  designs  the  defects 
commented  upon  in  the  reports  have  been  corrected. 

In  concluding  its  brief  comments  upon  the  reports  of  Admiral 
Evans  and  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  the  Board  desires  to  invite 
particular  attention  to  the  fact  that  some  of  the  vessels  of  the  present 
Atlantic  Fleet  were  designed  more  than  twelve  years  ago,  and  those 
of  most  recent  design,  viz,  the  Connecticut  class,  were  designed  about 
six  years  ago.  It  is  therefore  entirely  obvious  that  many  of  the 
characteristics  of  battle  ships  now  composing  the  Atlantic  Fleet, 
as  well  as  their  fittings  and  appliances,  can  not  be  expected  to  con¬ 
form  to  the  latest  standard  with  respect  to  such  matters,  although 
the  Board  is  most  decidedly  of  the  opinion  that  they  are  fully  equal, 
and  in  some  respects  superior,  to  battle  ships  of  corresponding  dates 
of  design  in  other  navies.  It  is  also  obvious  that  without  an  unwar¬ 
ranted  expenditure  of  money  and  a  serious  interference  with  fleet 
drills,  etc.,  by  reason  of  the  withdrawal  of  ships  for  long  periods,  it 
is  quite  impracticable  to  bring  the  older  vessels  of  the  fleet  up  to 
date  in  all  their  important  features  and  fittings.  So  far,  however, 
as  may  be  practicable  changes  are  made  from  time  to  time  to  improve 
the  military  efficiency  of  all  ships  in  commission,  and  when  vessels 
of  the  fleet  are  laid  up  for  general  overhauling  such  extensive  military 


14 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


and  other  changes  are  made  as  may  appear  to  be  warranted  by  the 
conditions  then  existing. 

In  fact,  naval  material  is  subject  to  frequent  change  in  character 
and  quality,  and  in  order  that  the  Department’s  responsible  de¬ 
signers  may  incorporate  in  new  designs  such  changes  and  alterations 
in  existing  types  of  battle  ships  as  actual  experience  in  service  may 
have  demonstrated  to  be  necessary,  careful  record  is  kept  of  all  such 
desirable  alterations  and  additions  for  subsequent  use  in  connection 
with  new  design  work.  The  opinions  of  those  who  have  had  actual 
experience  in  command  of  battle  ships  or  who  have  served  in  other 
less  responsible  capacities  are  also  given  full  consideration.  In  the 
last  analysis,  however,  those  directly  responsible  for  the  design  of 
vessels  must  use  their  best  judgment,  based  upon  practical  experi¬ 
ence  with  the  vessels  of  our  own  Navy,  as  well  as  the  developments 
of  naval  design  in  foreign  services.  In  so  doing  the  experience  of 
the  past  indicates  clearly  that  compromises  must  be  made  and  that 
the  accepted  design  can  never  represent  the  ideal  development  of 
any  one  feature  without  injuriously  affecting  the  development  of 
other  and  equally  important  features.  For  this  reason  any  finally 
accepted  design,  while  expressing  the  unanimous  opinion  of  those 
directly  responsible,  and  who  have  given  the  matter  the  greatest  con¬ 
sideration,  can  never  be  expected  to  meet  the  unqualified  approval 
of  all  those  who  may  have  given  the  general  subject  of  ship  design 
casual  or  even  specific  attention. 

Finally,  it  seems  well  to  point  out  that  on  account  of  the  method 
of  making  appropriation  for  battle  ships  in  vogue  during  the 
earlier  part  of  the  twelve-year  period  covered  by  the  designs  of  the 
vessels  now  composing  the  Atlantic  Battle  Ship  Fleet  five  essentially 
dissimilar  designs  of  battle  ships  have  been  evolved,  this  being  an 
almost  necessary  consequence  of  a  procedure  which  does  not  con¬ 
template  a  continuous  naval  programme. 

The  Board  on  Construction  is  very  much  of  the  opinion  that  battle 
ships  should  be  built  in  “  classes,”  with  not  less  than  four  of  prac¬ 
tically  the  same  type  in  each  class.  This  opinion  has  been  held  by  the 
various  members  of  the  Board  for  many  years,  and  it  is  hoped  that  in 
all  future  programmes  of  battle  ships  for  the  United  States  Navy 
the  principle  of  building  in  groups  of  not  less  than  four  similar 
vessels  of  a  type  will  be  adhered  to. 

Very  respectfully, 

G.  A.  Converse, 

Rear-Admiral .  U.  S.  Navy ,  Retired ,  President  of  Board. 

W.  L.  Capps, 

Chief  Constructor ,  U.  S.  Navy , 

Chief  of  Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair ,  Member. 

N.  E.  Mason, 

Chief  of  Bureau  of  Ordnance ,  Member. 

Wm.  S.  Cowles, 

Chief  of  Bureau  of  Equipment ,  Member. 

A.  F.  Dixon, 

Captain ,  TJ.  S.  Navy , 

Acting  Chief  of  Bureau  of  Steam  Engineering ,  Member. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


15 


4. 

Office  of  Commander  in  Chief, 

United  States  Atlantic  Fleet, 

U.  S.  S.  Connecticut,  Flagship, 

At  sea ,  en  route  to  Magdalena  Bay ,  March  6 , 1908. 

Sir:  1.  I  inclose  herewith  a  report  from  Naval  Constructor  R.  H. 
Robinson,  U.  S.  Navy,  who  has  accompanied  this  fleet  from  Hampton 
Roads  to  Magdalena  Bay  for  the  purpose  of  observing  the  fleet  in 
service.  I  recommend  that  this  carefully  prepared  report  be  for¬ 
warded  to  the  Board  on  Construction,  in  order  that  the  suggestions 
contained  in  it  may  be  made  use  of  in  future  design  and  construction 
and  in  any  extensive  overhauling  of  the  old  ships  that  may  be  under¬ 
taken. 

2.  On  January  6,  1908,  at  the  suggestion  of  Naval  Constructor 
Robinson,  I  addressed  a  series  of  questions  relating  to  ship’s  design 
and  interior  arrangement  to  each  commanding  officer,  and  a  series  of 
questions  to  each  head  of  department  relating  to  matters  under  his 
own  cognizance.  By  my  direction  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  made 
a  careful  study  of  the  replies  to  these  queries  and  after  a  full  con¬ 
sideration  of  them  prepared  the  accompanying  report.  The  fact  that 
it  is  submitted  by  an  officer  of  his  high  professional  attainments  and 
general  good  judgment  and  open-mindedness,  and  is  based  on  per¬ 
sonal  observations  made  during  his  zealous  and  untiring  investiga¬ 
tions  during  a  long  cruise  with  the  battle-ship  fleet,  combined  with 
a  digest  of  the  opinions  of  a  large  number  of  seagoing  officers,  each 
referring  to  matters  in  his  own  department,  should  give  it  great 
weight,  and  I  trust  that  the  suggestions  contained  in  it  will  receive 
the  full  consideration  which  they  deserve. 

3.  Except  in  one  or  two  instances  noted  in  this  letter,  I  heartily 
approve  of  the  general  opinions  expressed  by  Naval  Constructor 
Robinson  in  his  report  and  the  recommendations  made  by  him,  but 
so  important  do  I  consider  some  of  the  questions  mentioned  in  his 
report  that  a  further  expression  of  my  views  seems  desirable.  In 
this  letter  I  shall,  therefore,  discuss  certain  subjects  covered  by  his 
report  in  the  same  order  in  which  they  occur  in  that  report.  The 
numbers  set  forth  in  the  parentheses  after  each  heading  below  refer 
to  the  paragraphs  of  his  report  which  touch  upon  the  same  subject. 

HOMOGENEITY  (5,  6,  7). 

4.  Nothing  less  than  actual  experience  with  a  fleet  of  vessels  in 
service  will  adequately  impress  upon  any  person,  officer  or  layman, 
the  importance  of  this  quality  as  a  common  attribute  of  the  vessels 
of  the  fleet  which  are  to  act  together.  This  cruise  has  particularly 
accentuated  the  importance  of  homogeneity  in  units  so  far  as  regards 
coal  consumption  and  capacity,  and  steaming  qualities,  but  few  op¬ 
portunities  for  tactical  maneuvering  have  presented  themselves,  and 
therefore  the  absolute  necessity  for  homogeneity  in  other  qualities 
has  not  been  so  clearly  brought  out.  These  qualities  must  be  pos¬ 
sessed  to  the  same  degree  by  ships  that  are  to  maneuver  successfully 
together,  and  of  them  I  would  particularly  designate  certain  features 
which  tactical  maneuvers  would  plainly  emphasize,  but  which,  from 


16 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


present  experience  only,  may  be  easily  overlooked,  and  in  regard  to 
which  even  sister  ships  sometimes  differ  widely.  All  ships  in  a  fleet 
can  of  course  be  assigned  a  standard  helm  angle,  corresponding  to  a 
standard  tactical  diameter,  but  the  variations  in  their  times  of  turn¬ 
ing,  and  in  transfer  and  advance  (few  turns  are  more  than  eight 
points),  is  frequently  sufficient  to  throw  a  perfect  line  into  a  very 
imperfect  and  ragged  column,  or  vice  versa.  The  tactical  defect 
consists  not  merely  in  the  difficulty  (amounting  almost  to  an  impos¬ 
sibility)  of  satisfactorily  drilling  a  fleet  of  such  ships,  but  in  the  fact 
that  in  the  probable  maneuver  of  going  from  line  into  column  before 
an  engagement  (the  fleet  would  open  fire  as  soon  as  this  change  of 
formation  is  completed)  the  formation  may  be  broken  to  the  extent 
of  having  one  ship  blank  the  fire  of  others.  How  far  it  is  practicable 
to  carry  this  homogeneity  of  tactical  and  steaming  qualities  must  of 
course  depend  on  circumstances.  (See  par.  47,  on  propelling  ma¬ 
chinery,  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  report,  in  this  connec¬ 
tion.)  It  is  my  duty  at  this  time  to  strongly  present  the  value  of 
this  feature  and  to  recommend  that  homogeneity  of  tactical  and 
steaming  qualities  be  given  to  units  of  four  vessels  as  a  minimum, 
but  all  ships  of  a  class  should  be  as  nearly  homogeneous  in  these  par¬ 
ticulars  as  practicable.  (A  special  report  will  soon  be  made  by  me 
on  the  bad  effects  on  the  fleet  of  the  Maine's  peculiar  and  inefficient 
steaming  qualities,  which  effects  are  so  destructive  of  fleet  efficiency 
that  I  am  compelled  to  urge  her  withdrawal  from  the  fleet  and  the 
general  reconstruction  of  her  boiler  plant.) 

5.  Homogeneity  in  arc  of  fire  is  also  important,  but  homogeneity  in 
the  caliber  of  guns,  design  of  turrets,  fittings,  etc.,  is  only  important 
to  the  extent  of  simplifying  ammunition  supply,  supply  of  spare 
parts,  etc.,  to  a  large  fleet,  and  is  therefore  of  secondary  importance 
as  compared  to  the  main  question  set  forth  above. 

FREEBOARD  AND  HEIGHT  OF  GUN  POSITIONS  (9  to  15,  inclusive). 

6.  Referring  to  the  subject  of  freeboard,  there  is  no  question  but 
that  the  intermediate-battery  guns  of  every  vessel  in  this  fleet  are 
too  low  for  efficiency.  When  steaming  at  10  knots,  with  an  ordinary 
trade  wind  anywhere  forward  of  the  beam,  it  is  necessary  for  com¬ 
fort  and  to  prevent  occasional  flooding  of  the  gun  deck  to  keep  the 
weather  guns  secured,  with  shutters  in  place.  Under  such  weather 
conditions  it  would  be  possible  to  fire  the  guns,  but  the  occasional 
seas  which  would  enter  first  one  gun  port,  then  another,  would  flood 
the  deck  to  such  an  extent,  combined  with  the  roll  of  the  ship,  to  run 
over  the  coamings  of  the  hoists,  flood  the  passages,  wet  the  powder, 
and  would,  in  short,  render  the  fighting  of  the  guns  impracticable. 
Aside  from  this,  these  conditions,  when  action  is  not  imminent,  would 
necessitate  keeping  shutters  in  place,  thereby  preventing  training  at 
the  guns,  without  which  they  would  be  of  little  use  in  battle.  If 
under  the  above  conditions  the  speed  were  increased  to  15  knots,  the 
guns  could  probably  not  be  fired  nor  the  shutters  cleared  away. 
Under  the  above  weather  conditions  the  turret  guns  can  nearly  always 
be  fired  at  a  10-knot  speed,  but  at  15  knots  it  is  possible  that  some 
difficulty  would  be  encountered. 

7.  As  future  ships  will  have  only  turret  guns  in  their  main  battery, 
the  point  loses  some  of  its  importance,  but  a  somewhat  higher  turret 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS.  17 

gun  forward  would  seem  necessary  to  fight  with  full  efficiency  at  15 
knots  in  a  trade-wind  sea,  or  at  10  or  12  knots  in  a  somewhat  heavier 
sea  than  that  which  is  ordinarily  encountered  in  the  trade  belt. 

LOCATION  OF  TORPEDO-DEFENSE  GUNS  ABOARD  THE  LATEST  SHIPS  (16  to  18, 

inclusive). 

8.  In  new  ships  the  question  of  the  height  of  broadside  guns  is 
transformed  into  a  consideration  of  the  height  of  torpedo-defense 
guns,  and  the  fact  that  in  case  of  a  torpedo  attack  a  commanding  officer 
is  not  at  liberty  to  choose  between  the  use  of  the  weather  or  of  the  lee 
battery  renders  it  important  that  at  least  some  of  these  guns  be  placed 
high  enough  to  be  used  efficiently  in  any  sea  in  which  a  torpedo  boat 
or  destroyer  could  operate. 

9.  In  this  connection  the  tops  of  the  two  higher  turrets,  suggested 
by  Lieutenant-Commander  Upham,  seem  to  be  ideal  positions  for  four 
of  these  guns.  A  torpedo  attack  would  usually  either  precede  or  fol¬ 
low  an  engagement,  or  else  would  be  an  isolated  attack  unaccompanied 
by  a  general  engagement,  and  there  would  therefore  be  little  proba¬ 
bility  that  these  guns  would  be  required  during  a  regular  action.  In 
fact,  in  recommending  this  position  for  a  portion  of  this  battery  it  is 
expected  that  these  guns  would  not  be  used  while  the  turret  guns  are 
firing.  When  this  is  taken  into  consideration  the  question  of  ammuni¬ 
tion  supply  is  at  once  simplified,  because  it  would  be  entirely  practica¬ 
ble  to  pass  it  up  by  hand. 

10.  The  exceptional  position  thus  offered  aboard  our  new  ships  for 
four  guns  with  very  large  arcs  of  fire,  and  in  a  commanding  position, 
available  for  use  at  all  times  except  during  a  general  engagement,  is 
too  valuable  to  be  neglected. 

11.  These  guns  would  probably  be  disabled  in  action;  in  fact,  the 
accounts  of  the  battle  of  Tsushima  indicate  that  nearly  every  second¬ 
ary  battery  gun  on  certain  ships  (as  would  be  natural  to  expect)  was 
so  disabled.  This,  therefore,  suggests  the  desirability  of  protecting 
by  armor  or  otherwise  some  torpedo- defense  gun  expressly  for  use 
after  an  engagement.  I  therefore,  in  addition  to  recommending  the 
utilization  of  the  tops  of  turrets  for  a  portion  of  this  battery,  approve 
the  recommendation  made  by  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  that,  if 
practicable,  a  certain  other  portion  of  this  battery  be  so  mounted 
that  the  guns  would  remain  housed  behind  armor  during  action,  and 
would  be  available  to  be  quickly  thrown  into  battery  and  used  to  repel 
an  attack  following  an  engagement. 

armor  belt  (16  to  21,  inclusive) . 

12.  Judging  from  the  figures  contained  in  the  several  replies  from 
commanding  officers  which  relate  to  this  subject,  it  would  appear  that 
better  protection  might  have  been  afforded  had  these  belts  been  origi¬ 
nally  placed  between  6  inches  and  1  foot  higher ;  this  on  the  theory 
that  the  commanding  officer  would  admit  sufficient  water  before  an  ac¬ 
tion  to  sink  the  belt  to  within  about  18  inches  above  the  water  line,  but 
even  this  is  open  to  question,  for  it  has  been  noted  that  even  when  heavy 
laden  and  in  the  smooth  to  moderate  seas,  which  have  thus  far  char¬ 
acterized  this  cruise,  the  ships  frequently  expose  their  entire  belt 

S.  Doc.  506,  60-1 - 2 


18 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


and  the  bottom  plating  beneath  it.  It  must  be  remembered  that  even 
a  5  or  a  6  inch  shell  (of  which  there  would  be  a  great  number)  could 
inflict  a  severe  and  dangerous  injury  if  it  struck  below  the  belt, 
while  otherwise  the  water  line,  even  with  the  belt  entirely  submerged, 
is,  on  account  of  the  casemate,  armor,  and  coal,  immune  to  all  except 
the  heaviest  projectiles.  The  fact  is  that  under  the  sea  conditions  in 
which  battles  may  be  fought  a  belt  of  8  feet  in  width,  if  considered 
alone,  is  too  narrow  to  afford  the  desired  protection,  wherever  it 
may  be  placed;  and  the  question  becomes  an  academic  discussion, 
with  certain  arguments  on  each  side.  It  is  understood  that  on  the 
latest  ships  this  question  is  of  little  import,  as  the  citadel  armor  is 
but  1  inch  less  in  thickness  than  that  on  the  water  line,  and  for  those 
ships  already  built  it  is  believed  that  if  bridges  are  removed  and 
all  weights  which  will  be  landed  when  war  breaks  out  are  taken  into 
consideration,  the  ship  will  rise  the  6  or  12  inches  which  is  believed 
to  be  the  maximum  that  it  should  be  desired  to  raise  them. 

13.  In  this  connection  I  desire  to  comment  particularly  on  the  dis¬ 
position  of  armor  on  the  bows  of  the  ship.  When  a  ship  is  steaming 
even  at  10  knots  the  armor  at  the  stem  is  submerged  2  or  3  feet  by  the 
bow  wave,  and  at  15  knots  to  a  much  greater  depth.  There  is  ordi¬ 
narily  no  armor  above  the  water  line  in  this  part  of  the  ship,  thus 
rendering  it  vulnerable  to  5  or  6  inch  shells,  and  if  these  enter,  the 
pitching  and  ascending  would  soon  fill  the  decks  forward  with  water, 
put  the  ship  down  by  the  head,  tend  to  expose  her  screws  and  rudder, 
and  render  steering  erratic. 

14.  The  suggested  curving  the  entire  water-line  belt  up  at  the 
bows  and  covering  both  sides  in  the  forward  portion  of  the  ship, 
say  as  far  aft  as  frame  17,  with  2  or  3  inch  armor  as  protection  against 
smaller  caliber  shells,  seems  pertinent  and  worthy  of  consideration. 

15.  The  importance  of  thorough  protection  of  the  steering  gear 
is  suggested  by  Naval  Constructor  Robinson.  The  necessity  of  thor¬ 
ough  protection  of  all  parts  of  this  gear  is  accentuated  by  the  fact 
that  several  ships  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war  were  either  defeated 
or  seriously  injured  by  having  their  steering  gear  disabled.  In  every 
“  soft-bowed  ”  ship  the  degree  of  protection  to  steering  gear,  when 
she  is  down  by  the  head  as  the  result  of  injury  forward,  should  be 
carefully  considered. 

BRIDGES  AND  SUPERSTRUCTURE  (22). 

16.  Except  for  the  flagships  on  which  an  after  bridge  and  an 
emergency  cabin  is  an  essential,  all  flying  bridges  and  after  bridges 
are  unnecessary  and  are  a  menace  in  action.  Under  “  Conning  tow¬ 
ers  ”  I  mention  the  nature  of  bridge  which  would  be  desirable  for¬ 
ward,  viz,  the  present  forward  bridge  with  portable  extension  on 
each  end  extending  out  to  the  side,  the  conning  tower  being  used  as 
the  habitual  steering  position,  with  a  wheel  on  top  and  a  rail  around 
the  conning  tower  to  afford  a  means  of  piloting  the  ship.  The  bridge 
should  preferably  have  a  portable  grating  covering,  and  the  chart 
house  either  be  subject  to  removal  when  war  breaks  out  or  located 
farther  from  the  conning  tower,  on  account  of  fire  in  action.  If 
there  were  no  flying  bridge  forward,  none  would  be  necessary  aft, 
and  the  lower  bridge,  if  made  large  enough  to  accommodate  the 
signal  staff  of  flag-officer,  would  then  be  adequate  as  the  after  bridge 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


W 


of  flagships.  No  stronger  testimony  against  bridge  in  action  can  be 
desired  than  the  frequent  allusions  in  accounts  of  recent  battles  to 
the  splinters,  fires,  and  damage  caused  by  their  presence. 

IT.  I  would  recommend  that  one  ship  of  each  class  only  be  fitted 
as  a  flagship,  the  others  of  the  class  not  to  be  so  fitted.  In  this  con¬ 
nection,  in  order  that  space  aboard  ships  which  are  not  flagships  be 
not  wasted,  it  is  now  time  to  decide,  once  for  all,  on  a  certain  list  of 
ships  to  be  used  as  flagships,  fit  them  not  only  in  regard  to  bridges, 
but  in  all  other  respects  for  that  duty,  and  remove  bridges  and  reallot 
space  on  the  others.  This  would  greatly  increase  the  efficiency  of 
the  fleet,  all  of  which  now  carry  much  superfluous  weight  and  much 
unused  space  owing  to  their  nearly  all  being  fitted  with  flag-officers’ 
accommodations. 


CONNING  TOWERS  (23  to  26). 

18.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  neither  the  present  conning  tower  nor, 
in  toto,  that  recommended  by  any  commanding  officer  in  the  fleet  is 
entirely  adequate,  though  a  number  of  recommendations  embody 
many  features  of  what  I  consider  the  most  efficient  tower,  and  the 
type  suggested  by  Mr.  Robinson  meets  my  approval  in  all  essential 
particulars. 

19.  It  is  my  opinion  that  this  very  important  battle  station  should 
be  large  enough  to  permit  of  its  habitual  use  for  steering  the  ship  at 
all  times,  as  is  the  case  in  certain  foreign  navies;  that  it  should  be 
elliptical  in  shape,  extending  athwartships  far  enough  to  permit  a 
clear  view  directly  astern ;  and  that,  while  for  piloting  a  wheel  should 
be  provided  on  top,  the  conning  tower  should  be  the  only  steering 
station  protected  from  the  weather.  It  should  thus  become,  as  it 
should  be,  the  customary  place  from  which  the  ship  is  maneuvered, 
except  when  entering  a  harbor  or  going  alongside  of  a  dock.  This 
change  would  at  once  do  away  with  the  flying  bridge  and  its  inci¬ 
dental  hamper.  On  ships  similar  to  the  C Connecticut  a  portable  ex¬ 
tension  to  the  lower  bridge  should  be  fitted,  extending  out  to  the 
side,  which  would  be  unrigged  at  “  clear  ship.”  The  conning  tower 
should  be  directly  over  the  central  station  and  connected  to  it  by  a 
thick  armored  tube  at  least  3  feet  in  internal  diameter  in  the  clear, 
in  order  to  permit  a  man  to  pass  through  it.  In  the  central  station 
all  such  gear  as  wheel,  compass,  helm  indicator,  etc.,  should  be  dupli¬ 
cated,  while  the  conning  tower  would  require  all  gear  necessary  to  the 
habitual  handling  of  the  ship.  The  conning  tower  should  have  an 
opening  in  the  after  side  which  can  be  closed  with  an  armored  dooT^ 
otherwise  the  heavy  plate  formerly  fitted  is  necessary,  and  this  is  un¬ 
desirable  both  on  account  of  its  weight  and  the  less  protection  it 
affords. 

20.  I  invite  attention  to  the  frequent  casualties  to  personnel  in 
conning  towers  during  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  and  therefore  can 
not  agree  with  those  officers  who  state  that  no  top  to  the  tower  is 
necessary.  I  consider  a  top  essential  both  as  to  a  protection  against 
gun  fire,  fragments  of  shell,  etc.,  and  against  falling  masts,  etc. 
The  slits  in  the  tower  should  be  beveled  out  on  the  inside  to  give 
a  greater  angle  of  vision  through  the  same-sized  orifice,  and  they 
should  be  somewhat  larger  than  at  present,  but  not  larger  than 
necessary  to  an  unobstructed  view,  and  not  so  large  as  to  weaken  the 


20 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


security  of  the  top  of  the  tower  in  case  it  should  be  hit.  Stanchions 
supporting  the  top  would  not  give  this  strength,  and  are  a  menace. 
It  is  further  suggested  that  the  slit  be  a  little  above  the  head  of  the 
average  man  and  a  runway  provided  around  inside  so  that  only 
those  who  must  peep  out  would  be  exposed  to  splinters.  For  or¬ 
dinary  conditions  a  raised  platform  would  be  used  by  the  helmsman, 
and  if  necessary  this  could  be  used  in  battle. 

21.  A  conning  tower  of  this  nature  would  be  of  real  service.  It 
would  also  be  large  enough  for  the  flag-officer  (at  present  no  armored 
station  is  provided  for  him  although  in  a  modern  engagement  such 
protection  is  of  vital  importance).  Aside  from  the  question  of 
saving  this  weight  by  combining  the  captain’s  station  with  the  one 
required  for  the  flag-officer,  that  officer  should,  in  battle,  be  near 
the  captain  of  the  flagship  to  facilitate  transmission  of  his  orders 
to  the  vessel.  The  estimate  of  three  additional  people  to  accompany 
the  flag-officer  is  thought  to  be  an  adequate  provision. 

22.  It  would  seem  to  be  a  wTise  further  precaution  to  surround  this 
tower  at  a  distance  of  some  6  feet  by  a  1-inch  plate  to  act  as  an  ex¬ 
ploder  of  shell  which  hit  it.  This  space  could  be  utilized  in  peace  as 
a  locker.  It  is  also  thought  that  a  plenum  ventilation  connection 
from  below  could  be  fitted  so  that  in  event  of  fire  the  smoke  could  be 
kept  out  without  closing  the  peepholes. 

23.  No  apparatus  should  be  in  actual  contact  with  the  walls  of  the 
conning  tower.  Woodwork,  except  of  a  temporary  character,  should 
not  be  placed  near  the  conning  tower,  on  account  of  the  danger  of  fire 
in  action,  this  danger  being  mainly  the  obscuring  of  vision  by  smoke, 
or  the  driving  away  of  personnel  by  smoke  and  heat,  and  not  necessa¬ 
rily  of  the  destruction  of  gear. 

TORPEDO  DIRECTING  STATIONS  (2T  and  28). 

24.  The  location  suggested  for  these  stations  by  Naval  Constructor 
Robinson  appear  desirable,  their  only  fault  being  in  their  protection. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  torpedoes  will  not  be  used  until  ships  are  at 
comparatively  short  ranges,  the  thickness  of  the  armor  must  be  ma¬ 
terially  increased  over  that  at  present  in  use,  as  otherwise  the  stations 
would  probably  be  shot  away  before  the  time  came  to  use  them. 

SHELL  STOWAGE  (29). 

25.  I  concur  in  the  belief  that  special  rooms  for  the  stowage  of  the 
ordinary  types  of  shell  are  unnecessary. 

question  of  coal  (30  to  33,  inclusive,  35  and  3G). 

26.  With  reference  to  the  question  of  coaling,  without  entering  into 
details  relating  to  any  individual  ship,  I  desire  to  invite  attention  to 
the  tactical  importance  of  rapid  coaling,  whether  from  a  lighter  or 
from  a  collier.  This  subject  is  of  such  importance  as  to  merit  the 
most  careful  consideration  in  every  feature,  from  bagging  the  coal 
to  its  final  trimming  in  the  bunkers,  and  extends  even  to  designing 
the  colliers  with  a  view  to  their  “  fitting  ”  the  average  battle  ship,  so 
that  the  greatest  number  of  men  and  hoists  may  work  at  the  same 
time.  The  question  of  landing  coal  bags  on  the  gun  deck,  the  men’s 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


21 


living  quarters,  and  messing  apartment  is  one  of  importance,  in  that 
if  the  use  of  it  in  coaling  can  be  avoided  it  vastly  increases  their 
comfort,  but  this  is,  nevertheless,  subsidiary  to  the  question  of  getting 
the  bunkers  trimmed  quickty. 

27.  The  question  of  a  ship’s  ability  to  coal  after  an  engagement 
also  deserves  the  most  careful  consideration.  A  method  of  accom¬ 
plishing  this  is  referred  to  by  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  and  was 
suggested  by  Lieutenant-Commander  Bristol,  and  without  entering 
into  its  merits  I  desire  to  accentuate  the  importance  of  such  a  pro¬ 
vision,  for  it  is  one  on  which  the  chase  and  final  capture  of  an  enemy 
or  even  the  immediate  further  taking  part  in  the  operations  at  hand 
might  depend.  It  therefore  merits  thought  and  study. 

28.  Referring  to  the  question  of  bunker  capacity,  I  agree  with 
Naval  Constructor  Robinson  that  a  modern  battle  ship  should  have 
an  actual  steaming  radius  at  economical  speed  of  6,000  miles,  allow¬ 
ing  for  make-up  feed  and  for  a  small  margin  of  coal  to  be  left  on 
arrival  in  port.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  varia¬ 
ble  performances  of  the  ships  of  this  fleet  would  indicate  that  this  is 
as  much  a  question  of  economy  in  the  design  of  the  engines  and 
boilers  as  is  the  actual  capacity  of  the  bunkers.  Results  thus  far,  for 
example,  show  that  the  Connecticut  steams  about  2.8  miles  per  ton, 
while  vessels  of  considerably  less  displacement  can  not  exceed  from 
2.2  to  2.3. 

29.  Referring  to  economical  speed  itself,  that  is  in  itself  an  impor¬ 
tant  tactical  feature.  If  without  material  sacrifice  of  other  qualities 
an  economical  speed  of  as  much  as  12  knots  could  be  obtained,  it 
would  greatly  facilitate  the  movements  of  a  fleet  when  making  long 
passages  which  demand  the  employment  of  economical  speeds.  Ex¬ 
periments  during  this  trip  show  that  the  economical  speed  of  this 
fleet  is  about  8  knots  (excluding  the  Maine ,  which  has  no  economical 
speed  and  burns  over  30  tons  of  coal  a  day  in  port),  and  I  doubt  if 
even  the  Connecticut  class  would  prove  their  most  economical  speed 
to  be  much  above  that,  although  they  have  a  large  radius  at  10  knots. 

colliers  (31  to  33  inclusive). 

30.  In  connection  with  the  subject  of  colliers,  I  respectfully  call 
attention  to  a  report  made  to  me  by  the  present  Chief  of  Staff,  for¬ 
warded  with  my  approval  under  my  indorsement  of  March  5,  1908, 
which  report  meets  my  own  views.  I  believed  that  the  14  knots  speed 
for  such  vessels,  suggested  in  paragraph  32  of  Naval  Constructor 
Robinson’s  report,  can  not  be  attained  wfithout  sacrificing  more  im¬ 
portant  features  in  design.  Of  course  the  higher  speed  the  better, 
as  is  the  case  in  any  type  of  ship,  but  speed  should  not  be  attained 
by  sacrificing  the  ability  to  discharge  coal  into  a  battle  ship  expedi¬ 
tiously.  Although  this  is  primarily  a  subject  for  the  consideration 
of  ship  designers,  I  believe  12  knots  to  be  about  the  highest  prac¬ 
ticable  speed  for  the  type  of  collier  that  we  must  have.  From  our 
experience  on  this  trip  I  am  convinced  that  it  will  take  nearty  twice 
as  long  to  coal  the  C  onnecticut,  for  instance,  from  the  Vestal  and 
Prometheus  as  it  should,  and  as  it  would  from  a  ship  of  less  length 
and  with  her  hatches  properly  arranged.  Those  two  colliers  are 
about  the  same  length  as  the  Connecticut,  and  as  arranged  it  will  be 


22 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN'  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


possible  for  the  latter  to  coal  from  only  one  end  at  a  time.  This 
defect  is  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  give  these  two  colliers  a  high 
speed,  and,  in  my  opinion,  it  is  vital. 

DOORS  IN  ENGINE  AND  FIRE  ROOM  BULKHEADS  (34). 

31.  The  omission  of  these  doors  is  generally  opposed  by  the  engineer 
officers  of  the  fleet.  Nevertheless  it  would  undoubtedly  add  to  the 
safety  of  the  ship,  and  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  be¬ 
lief  that  the  engineer’s  force  would  soon  accommodate  themselves  to 
the  new  conditions  were  the  doors  omitted.  Their  omission  in  future 
designs  from  all  war-ship  bulkheads  in  the  machinery  spaces  is  there¬ 
fore  recommended. 


FIRE-CONTROL  MASTS  (37). 

32.  These  present  masts,  not  having  been  designed  for  this  pur¬ 
pose,  are  not  well  adapted  to  fire  control;  aside  from  the  excessive 
vibration,  which  may  tie  a  necessary  evil,  one  shot,  either  direct  or 
ricochet,  would  bring  them  down.  A  cage-work  mast  especially  con¬ 
structed  to  resist  being  cut  down  and,  so  far  as  possible,  to  resist 
vibration,  would  probably  be  satisfactory. 

33.  The  cutting  of  the  communications  from  the  fire-control  sta¬ 
tion  by  a  fragment  of  a  shell  in  the  recent  English  experiments  with 
the  Hero  suggests  the  advisability  of  running  such  communications 
through  a  small  armored  tube  extending  from  the  spotter’s  station 
down  to  armor.  This  should  be  heavy  enough  to  protect  the  wires, 
etc.,  from  fragments  and  splinters,  even  though  it  might  not  be  prac¬ 
ticable  to  make  it  a  protection  against  direct  impact. 

SEARCHLIGHTS  (37). 

34.  The  searchlights  aboard  the  ships  of  this  fleet  are  not  suitably 
located.  A  searchlight  on  a  bridge,  or  so  located  elsewhere  that  the 
rays  strike  any  part  of  the  ship,  is  of  little  value.  It  is  believed  that, 
so  far  as  practicable,  they  should  be  in  elevated  positions  and  on  the 
center  line  of  the  ship.  Further  study  and  experiment  with  this 
subject  is  an  absolute  essential. 

tltrrets  (38  to  41,  inclusive). 

35.  The  turret-turning  gear  as  mounted  aboard  the  Maine  is  be¬ 
lieved  to  be  the  best  electric  gear  yet  installed,  and  even  that  is 
considered  less  satisfactory  than  the  Williams- Jannev  gear  as  in¬ 
stalled  aboard  the  Illinois ,  so  far  as  experience  of  one  year  with  the 
latter  indicates.  The  present  turrets  kick  off  ”  during  firing,  in 
some  ships  to  an  annoying  extent,  sufficient  in  fact  to  materially 
decrease  efficiency ;  and  in  some  ships  this  increases  materially  during 
the  short  string  of  shots  allowed  on  target  practice.  This  “  kicking 
off  ”  has  been  minimized  by  rusting  the  disks  and  setting  up  as 
hard  as  possible,  in  some  cases  to  the  extent  of  putting  a  wrench 
on  the  nuts  and  training  the  turret  against  it.  While  these  expedi¬ 
ents  in  some  cases  practically  remove  the  difficulty,  they  are  accom¬ 
panied  by  the  danger  of  disabling  the  turret,  and  are  at  best  a  make- 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


23 


shift  to  circumvent  a  difficulty  which  should,  if  possible,  be  corrected 
in  the  design. 

36.  Unless  the  compressed-air  system  of  loading  turret  guns 
proves  to  be  successful,  the  two-stage  hoist  is  believed  to  be  the 
best,  both  regarding  safety  and  rapidity,  which  now  offers. 

37.  The  question  of  placing  turrets  under  air  pressure  to  assist  in 
expelling  gases  is  heartily  approved. 

38.  I  again  invite  attention  to  the  importance  of  fitting  adequate 
means  for  hoisting  turret  ammunition  by  hand.  The  turret  guns 
can  be  trained,  elevated,  and  loaded  by  hand,  but  burning  out  a 
hoist  motor  now  puts  a  turret  gun  out  of  commission. 

funnels  (42). 

39.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  recommendation  as 
to  shortening  funnels. 

torpedo  defense  (43  to  46,  inclusive) . 

40.  The  torpedo  defense  of  all  ships  in  our  service  is  inadequate. 
This  matter  has  recently  been  made  the  subject  of  an  exhaustive  re¬ 
port  by  the  board  to  which  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  refers,  but 
I  have  not  seen  that  report  and  therefore  can  not  pass  judgment  upon 
his  references  made  herein  to  its  contents.  Except  for  the  suggestions 
already  made  relative  to  the  best  location  of  certain  guns  of  the  tor¬ 
pedo-defense  battery  and  for  the  statement  that  the  searchlights  are 
at  present  not  effectively  located,  I  refrain  from  further  remark. 

PROPELLING  MACHINERY  (47). 

41.  While  believing  that  the  adoption  of  the  turbine  machinery 
must  soon  come,  I  approve  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks  as 
to  the  care  which  must  be  taken  in  adopting  it  not  to  sacrifice  tactical 
and  maneuvering  qualities  that  are  essential  to  the  proper  handling 
of  ships,  not  only  as  a  single  vessel  but  as  a  unit  in  a  fleet. 

INTURNING  SCREWS  (48). 

42.  No  words  that  can  here  be  recorded  can  add  to  my  already 
often  expressed  opinion  as  to  the  enormity  of  the  error  committed 
when  ships  were  built  with  inturning  screws. 

43.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  recommendations, 
and  most  strongly  urge  that  this  engine  be  placed  behind  armor 
or  below  the  protective  deck.  All  that  was  said  under  44  coaling  ” 
with  reference  to  the  necessity  of  protecting  the  hoists  and  gear 
apply  even  with  increased  force  to  the  anchor  engines.  While  the 
wild-cats  and  shafting  must  probably  remain  exposed,  it  would  seem 
practicable  to  place  the  engine  behind  armor  and  bring  the  power  to 
the  wild-cats  by  shafting.  In  time  of  war  spare  parts  could  be  carried 
to  replace  those  portions  of  mechanism  which  must  necessarily  remain 
exposed. 

steering  engine  (50  to  52,  inclusive). 

44.  Although  in  their  replies  to  the  queries  put  to  them  the  com¬ 
manding  officers,  as  a  rule,  stated  that  the  steering  apparatus  is  sat¬ 
isfactory,  it  is  nevertheless  a  fact  that  some  minor  faults,  usually  in 


^>4 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


the  transmission  gear  and  not  in  the  engine,  are  the  most  common 
causes  of  the  exhibition  of  the  breakdown  flag  in  the  fleet.  This  has 
occurred  so  often  that  I  have  called  for  a  special  report  from  each 
commanding  officer  relative  to  every  such  failure  aboard  the  ship 
under  his  command  occurring  between  Hampton  Roads  and  Magda¬ 
lena  Bay.  The  statements  in  these  reports  will  be  tabulated  when 
received,  and  I  will  then  make  some  further  statements  and  recom¬ 
mendations  in  regard  to  this  most  vital  point. 

45.  The  above  facts,  combined  with  the  heating  of  some  of  the 
after  magazines,  due  to  steam  pipes  in  or  near  such  magazines,  are 
the  worst  features  of  the  present  design,  and  Naval  Constructor  Rob¬ 
inson’s  remarks  are  approved.  Some  steps  should  be  taken  to  over¬ 
come  both  troubles,  as  unreliability  of  the  transmission  gear  always 
jeopardizes  a  ship  when  she  is  in  close  waters,  and  the  heating  of  the 
magazines  is  a  serious  menace  to  the  ballastic  qualities  and  stability 
of  the  ammunition. 


WINCHES.  (53). 

46.  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks  on  the  lack  of  the  power 
of  the  winches  are  correct.  Although  the  winches  perhaps  now  do 
all  that  it  was  intended  that  they  should,  at  the  same  time  experience 
has  shown  that  if  the  fleet  is  to  be  efficient  as  a  fighting  force  they  must 
meet  the  requirements  that  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  lays  down  in 
his  report.  Nothing  short  of  that  will  answer,  if  the  fleet  is  to  spend 
no  more  time  in  coaling  than  would  be  desirable  in  time  of  war. 
In  the  consideration  of  this  vital  point  it  must  be  constantly  borne 
in  mind  that  a  fleet  coaling  is  not,  for  the  time  so  occupied,  a  fleet 
in  being,  and  that  every  hour  that  can  be  cut  off  from  the  time  taken 
to  coal  is  an  enormous  gain  in  efficiency.  This  point  should  be  re¬ 
membered  in  the  design  of  colliers  also. 

47.  And  again  I  desire  to  call  attention  to  the  necessity  for  getting 
the  operating  apparatus  for  the  winches  behind  armor  or  below  the 
protective  deck,  and  for  carrying  spare  parts  in  time  of  war  to  re¬ 
place  those  that  will  inevitably  be  shot  away,  in  order  that  the  fleet 
may  coal  rapidly  after  action  and  be  at  sea  again  as  soon,  or  if  pos¬ 
sible  sooner,  than  the  enemy. 

FANS  FOR  VENTILATION  (54). 

48.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

doors  (55). 

49.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

BOAT  CRANES  (56). 

50.  It  is  noted  that  out  of  the  16  executive  officers  11  prefer  the 
crane,  while  5  believe  it  to  be  a  menace  in  action  which  its  convenience 
and  facility  of  operation  in  peace  does  not  counterbalance.  The  fact 
that  cranes  are  ideally  adapted  to  their  purpose  under  peace  condi¬ 
tions,  and  the  fact  that  it  is  at  times  of  primary  importance  to  hoist 
boats  quickly,  is  fully  recognized ;  but  nevertheless  they  are  such  a 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


25 


menace  to  the  ship  and  to  the  guns  and  their  crews  during  action  that 
I  am  of  the  opinion  that  some  other  method  of  hoisting  boats  is 
necessary  for  battle  efficiency.  If,  therefore,  the  choice  rested  be¬ 
tween  cranes  or  booms,  I  should  be  forced  to  recommend  booms,  but 
I  am  informed  that  the  collapsible  crane  suggested  in  the  accompany¬ 
ing  report,  which  combines  the  desirable  features  of  both  systems,  has 
actually  been  designed.  This  would  appear  to  be  satisfactory. 

ICE  MACHINES  (57). 

51.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor’s  remarks. 

piping  systems  (58  to  67,  inclusive) . 

52.  I  concur  in  general  with  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  re¬ 
marks,  especially  in  regard  to  the  importance  of  having  no  inter¬ 
communication  between  the  fresh  and  salt  water  systems.  It  has 
always  been  an  open  question  whether  the  existence  of  such  inter¬ 
communication  aboard  the  Connecticut  was  not  the  cause  of  the  out¬ 
break  of  a  serious  epidemic  of  typhoid  fever  aboard  that  vessel  about 
a  year  ago. 

53.  In  regard  to  paragraph  63  of  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s 
reports,  relative  to  magazine  floods,  I  have  to  state  that  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  ordnance  officers  of  the  fleet  state 
that  the  flooding  arrangements  are  satisfactory,  I  am  convinced  that 
as  a  quick  safety  precaution  (that  is,  as  a  precaution  which  in  an 
emergency  will  act  quickly  enough  to  prevent  disaster),  the  design 
itself  is  unsatisfactory.  The  compartment  should  be  deluged 
rapidly,  preferably  from  an  overhead  spray  of  generous  capacity, 
with  a  quick-opening  valve,  as  was  recommended  by  Lieutenant-Com¬ 
mander  Upham,  Lieutenant-Commander  Fullinwider,  and  by  certain 
other  officers  of  the  fleet,  and  which  is  referred  to  in  Naval  Con¬ 
structor  Robinson’s  report  as  having  been  provided  in  latest  ships. 
It  is  believed  that  this  is  a  feature  in  which  improvement  is  urgently 
needed. 

SCUPPERS  (68),  VENTILATING  SYSTEM  (69),  HEATING  SYSTEM  (70), 
PLUMBING  FIXTURES  (71). 

54.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson's  remarks. 

INTERIOR  SUBDIVISION  AND  ARRANGEMENT.  (72  and  following). 

55.  When  discussing  the  question  of  assignment  of  space  on  board 
a  battle  ship,  one  general  criterion  should  govern,  Adz.,  all  features  of 
a  ship  which  wdll  be  necessary  during  Avar,  both  before  and  after  an 
action,  that  can  be  reasonably  placed  behind  armor,  should  be  so 
located.  As  mentioned  above,  coaling  is  one  such  feature,  and  the 
essentials  of  coaling,  both  gear  and  winches,  should  if  practicable  be 
protected ;  messing  is  another — the  galleys  must  of  necessity  be  above 
decks,  but  the  pantry  should  be  behind  armor;  similarly  as  to  the 
armory,  which  should  be  so  located  that  men  could  approach  from 
any  direction  and  after  receiving  rifles  return  to  the  deck  by  another 
route.  The  important  feature  of  economical  distribution  of  space 
aboard  ship  is  also  frequently  not  given  sufficient  attention. 


26 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


STOREROOMS  (74). 

56.  The  Connecticut  and  Virginia  classes  of  ships  appear  to  have 
inadequate  storeroom  capacity.  The  paymaster  of  the  Connecticut 
states  that  he  can  carry  but  one  month’s  provisions.  This  is  believed 
to  be  inadequate  to  war  efficiency,  as  it  is  believed  that  every  ship 
should  be  capable,  in  an  emergency,  of  stowing  three  months’  provi¬ 
sions. 

shops  (75). 

57.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

DYNAMO  ROOMS  (77). 

58.  The  importance  of  electricity  in  a  modern  action  renders  it 
desirable  and  prudent  to  install  two  widely  separated  dynamo  rooms 
even  at  a  somewhat  increased  expense  of  installation.  I  approve  of 
the  remarks  of  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  on  this  subject,  but  in¬ 
vite  attention  to  the  importance  of  absolutely  guaranteeing  to  the 
ship  up  to  the  last  minute  that  supply  of  electrical  power  which  is 
her  very  life. 

magazines  (78  to  80,  inclusive). 

59.  In  view  of  the  frequency  of  heating  of  magazines,  which  was 
experienced  in  the  fleet  when  passing  through  the  Tropics,  I  recently 
deemed  it  advisable  to  forward  for  the  information  of  the  Depart¬ 
ment,  in  case  of  future  designs,  a  considerable  number  of  magazine- 
temperature  cards,  'which  explain,  in  various  cases,  the  causes  of  the 
high  temperatures  reported.  It  was  noted  that  the  heating  was 
usually  ascribed  to  near-by  steam  pipes.  Particularly  was  this  the 
case  with  the  steam  pipe  leading  to  the  steering-engine  room.  It  is 
believed  that  with  greater  care  devoted  to  this  feature  the  magazines 
will  rarely  rise  above  95°,  and  that  the  temperatures  in  excess  of  90° 
will  be  experienced  only  in  very  hot  weather.  Therefore  it  is  not 
believed  that  magazine  refrigeration  is  a  necessitv.  It  would  be  a 
very  desirable  feature,  but  it  is  thought  that  the  accruing  advantages 
would  probably  not  offset  the  increased  weight  and  expense  of 
operation. 

stowage  of  magazines. 

60.  The  present  stowage  of  magazines  can  not  be  regarded  as 
altogether  satisfactory,  for  the  reasons  that — 

(a)  There  are  large  quantities  of  wood  in  all  magazines  and  shell 
rooms.  No  wood  whatever,  nor  anything  else  inflammable,  should  be 
in  a  magazine,  nor,  so  far  as  practicable,  in  immediate  contact  with 
it.  More  than  one  instance  is  on  record  of  charred  wood  in  maga¬ 
zines  due  to  the  heat  in  an  adjoining  apartment,  and  while  danger 
from  this  cause  is  remote,  it  exists,  and  such  existence  seems  to  be 
entirely  unnecessary.  It  is  possible  that  explosions  of  magazines  in 
action  may  have  been  frequently  due  to  fires  in  the  immediate  adja¬ 
cent  compartments,  and  hence  the  presence  of  combustible  material 
in  such  compartments  should  be  forbidden,  or  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
or  else  the  magazines  should  be  protected  by  double  bulkheads.  These 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


27 


double  bulkheads  should  invariably  separate  magazines  from  coal 
bunkers,  and  in  this  case  means  of  artificial  ventilation  should  be 
supplied  in  the  separating  compartment. 

(5)  The  space  is  frequently  not  used  to  the  best  advantage.  When 
preparing  the  fleet  for  the  Pacific  cruise  one  of  my  first  thoughts 
was,  “  What  amount  of  ammunition  can  we  carry  ?  ”  This  question 
would,  in  case  of  threatened  hostilities,  come  all  the  more  prominently 
to  the  front.  On  requesting  estimates  I  found  the  widest  divergence 
to  exist,  even  among  the  ships  of  the  same  class,  but  in  nearly  every 
case  the  replies  stated  that  considerably  more  ammunition  than  the 
habitual  allowance  could  be  carried,  by  certain  minor  changes  in 
stowage  or  arrangement.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  extra  ammunition 
was  not  available,  the  subject  was  not  carried  further,  but  as  this  is  a 
question,  and  one  of  much  importance,  which  will  come  up  again  at 
the  first  prospect  of  war  (for  the  present  normal  allowance  for  the 
ships  of  the  fleet  is  small),  it  is  a  subject  which  should  be  taken  up 
for  all  the  ships  as  soon  as  possible  and  each  magazine  and  shell 
room  arranged  to  hold  its  greatest  capacity  of  ammunition  in  an 
emergency. 

AMMUNITION  SUPPLY. 

61.  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  only  touches  upon  this  subject 
incidentally.  It  is  an  important  one,  and  while  it  is  believed  that  in 
one  or  two  instances  ordnance  officers  have  requested  a  supply  in 
excess  of  the  actual  demands,  it  is  unquestionable  that  the  ships  now 
in  commission  can  only  in  special  cases  supply  ammunition  at  the 
various  guns  as  rapidly  as  it  can  be  fired.  This  is  largely  due  to  the 
increase  of  the  rapidity  of  fire  since  the  ammunition-supply  systems 
were  designed.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  fact  does  not  in  all  cases  lie 
only  in  the  hoist  itself,  but  frequently  in  the  difficulties  and  interfer¬ 
ence  attendant  on  getting  the  ammunition  to  the  hoist,  as  is  the  case 
aboard  the  Maine.  The  ammunition-supply  tests  held  after  each 
practice  give  the  maximum  rate  of  supply  for  ten  minutes  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances,  while  the  report  of  the  target  practice 
each  year  shows  the  average  rapidity  of  fire  under  the  most  favorable 
circumstances.  While  undoubtedly  the  rapidity  of  fire  in  battle 
would  be  materially  reduced,  as  compared  with  that  attained  on 
target  practice,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  target  practice  score 
is  an  average  of  all  the  pointers  and  not  the  maximum  attainable; 
and  also  that  the  supply  test  was  made  under  the  best  conditions  and 
that  it,  too,  would  be  reduced  in  rapidity  of  action.  It  would  there¬ 
fore  seem  reasonable  to  attempt  to  provide  an  ammunition-supply 
system  which,  on  a  short  test,  would  supply  ammunition  at  a  rate 
equal  to  the  average  shots  per  minute  on  the  record  practice.  If  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  approves  the  recommendation  made  by  Naval 
Constructor  Robinson  in  paragraph  29  of  his  report,  that  shell  of  or¬ 
dinary  type  may  be  stowed  in  the  open,  the  question  of  ammunition 
stowage  and  supply  will  be  greatly  simplified. 

hospital  spaces  (81  to  85,  inclusive). 

62.  The  medical  officers  of  the  fleet  are  unanimous  in  desiring  to 
have  the  sick  bay  on  the  upper  deck,  and  that  it  may  be  more  com¬ 
modious,  some  of  them  even  going  so  far  as  to  compare  sick  bays 


28 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


with  hospitals  on  shore.  While  realizing  the  desirability  of  showing 
every  consideration  to  the  sick,  it  must  be  remembered  that  hospitals 
are  primarily  for  the  accommodation  of  the  sick,  while  a  ship  is 
primarily  for  the  accommodation  of  the  well.  When  this  fact  is 
considered,  in  connection  with  the  multitudinous  requirements  for 
available  space  on  board  ship,  especially  on  the  upper  deck,  I  am  of 
the  opinion  that  sick  bays  on  vessels  of  this  fleet  are,  as  a  rule,  com¬ 
modious  in  the  extreme,  and  that  it  would  be  an  injustice  to  the  well 
to  permit  a  greater  assignment  of  space  for  the  possible  comfort  of 
a  large  number  of  sick;  and  especially  is  this  the  case  when  really 
sick  patients  are  invariably  transferred  to  a  hospital  at  the  first 
opportunity.  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  no  increase  of  space 
be  allotted  to  the  sick  bay  aboard  vessels  of  the  fleet  or  other  vessels 
to  be  designed,  and  that  the  sick  bay  be  not  placed  above  the  berth 
deck,  because  of  the  necessity  of  reserving  the  space  there  for  ship 
use.  It  is  important  to  efficiency  that  careful  consideration  be  given 
to  the  arrangement  of  the  space  at  present  allowed  for  the  sick  bay 
with  a  view  to  having  the  most  suitable  accommodation  practicable. 
Referring  to  the  provision  of  a  “  dressing  station,”  mentioned  in  the 
accompanying  report,  ships  of  the  fleet  habitually  make  use  of  the 
junior  officers"  mess  room  and  the  chief  petty  officers’  quarters,  which 
appear  satisfactory,  except  that  in  some  cases  proper  facilities  for 
getting  the  wounded  to  them  have  not  been  provided : 

GALLEYS,  ETC.  (86),  GENERAL  MESS  PANTRY  (87),  BAKERY  (88),  SHIPS 

WATER  TANKS  (89),  MACHINERY  SPACES  AND  ARRANGEMENTS  (90), 

engineer’s  storerooms  (91-92),  general  workshop  (93). 

63.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

LAUNDRY  (94). 

64.  I  disagree  with  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  conclusion  that 
the  laundry  could  well  be  omitted  from  a  ship.  His  statement  as  to 
the  difference  in  the  necessity  for  this  fitting  between  a  ship  acting 
singly  and  when  with  a  large  fleet  is  correct,  but  his  final  conclusion 
is,  in  my  opinion,  wrong.  If  the  service  of  the  fleet  during  a  winter 
at  Guantanamo  be  considered,  it  will  at  once  be  seen  that  officers 
could  have  no  clothing  whatever  washed  from  the  time  of  leaving 
the  United  States  until  returning  thereto — a  period  of  four  to  six 
months.  Similarly,  on  the  present  trip,  some  few  officers  have  tried 
to  get  clothes  washed  ashore,  but  even  the  few  that  have  done  so 
have  overcrowded  the  local  facilities.  Without  laundries  aboard  the 
ships  practically  no  washing  could  have  been  done  for  the  officers 
since  leaving  Hampton  Roads;  many  of  them  would  have  lost  cloth¬ 
ing  in  an  effort  to  get  it  washed,  and  by  the  time  we  reached  Callao, 
a  tropical  port,  probably  no  officer  would  have  had  any  clothing  fit 
to  be  seen  in  which  to  appear  at  the  many  official  functions  that  took 
place  there.  The  acceptance  of  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  rec¬ 
ommendation  would  simply  mean  that  the  officers  of  cruising  ships 
would  live  in  deck-washed  and  rough-dried  clothes  three-quarters  of 
the  time,  and  would  never  be  fit  to  appear  anywhere ;  or,  as  another 
alternative,  the  fleet  would  have  to  visit  good  laundry  ports  at  fre¬ 
quent  intervals  and  remain  in  them  as  long  as  the  local  laundries 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  ,  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


29 


chose  to  keep  them  there.  While  it  is  true  that  some  difficulty  is 
experienced  in  getting  good  laundry  operators  aboard  ship,  at  the 
same  time  steady  improvement  in  this  particular  may  reasonably 
be  expected ;  and  in  spite  of  this  trouble  the  work  aboard  ship  during 
this  cruise  has  been  at  least  as  good,  if  not  better,  than  that  which 
was  done  on  shore. 


CHAIN  LOCKERS  (95). 

65.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

CENTRAL  STATION  AND  FIRE-CONTROL  SUBSTATIONS  (96). 

66.  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks  on  this  subject  are 
approved.  I  desire  to  invite  special  attention  to  the  importance  of 
being  able  to  steer  from  the  central  station  in  battle.  With  the  com¬ 
pass  in  that  station  near  the  dynamos,  as  is  ordinarity  the  case,  it  is 
now  generally  impracticable  to  even  steady  a  ship  by  compass  in  that 
station.  A  special  report  on  substations  will  be  submitted  at  an  early 
date. 

COMPASS  LOCATIONS  (97  to  99). 

67.  The  remarks  in  the  preceding  paragraph  apply  in  part  to  one, 
phase  of  this  question.  So  far  as  standard  and  steering  compasses 
aboard  our  battle  ships  are  concerned,  there  ;s  no  doubt  that  the 
magnetic  conditions  which  surround  them  are  about  as  bad  as  could 
well  be  contrived.  This  matter  is  an  exceedingly  serious  one,  and  one 
which,  in  my  opinion,  should  be  made  the  subject  of  special  investiga¬ 
tion  by  one  or  more  officers  who  are  particularly  qualified  in  this 
subject. 

SHOWER  SPACES  (100)  ;  BATH  ROOMS  (101)  ;  CHART  HOUSES  AND  EMER¬ 
GENCY  CABINS  (102)  ;  MISCELLANEOUS  FITTINGS  (104,  105)  ;  LIFE 

BUOYS  (106)  ;  BAG  RAILS,  ETC.  (107)  ;  GUN  PORT  SHUTTERS  (108)  ; 

COALING  BOOMS  AND  SPARS  (109)  ;  NUTS  AND  BOLTS  (HO,  111)  ;  HEAVY 

STEEL  BUCKLERS  (112)  ;  HAWSE-PIPE  BUCKLERS  (113). 

68.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

anchors  (114). 

69.  I  concur  in  the  recommendation  that  only  patent  anchors  be 
carried.  The  question  of  carrying  the  anchor  davit  or  crane  forward 
is  probably  one  of  weight  as  opposed  to  convenience.  With  the 
modern  anchor  the  davit  is  rarely  necessary,  but  in  case  of  a  foul 
anchor  it  is  a  great  convenience.  However,  a  pair  of  shear  legs  prop¬ 
erly  rigged  would  accomplish  the  same  purpose,  though  at  the  ex¬ 
pense  of  time  and  convenience. 

LADDERS  (115)  ;  SIDE  LADDERS  (116)  ;  WOOD  FITTINGS  (117)  ;  CHOCKS 
(118)  ;  bitts  (119)  ;  boat  davits  (120)  ;  boat  cradles  (121). 


70.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 


30 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


SECONDARY  AMMUNITION  HOISTS  AND  CONVEYERS  (122). 

71.  Subject  to  the  remarks  contained  in  paragraph  61  of  this  let¬ 
ter,  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

FURNITURE  (123). 

72.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson's  remarks. 

boats  (124). 

73.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks.  In  regard 
to  the  question  of  racing  cutters  my  experience,  both  before  and  since 
racing  cutters  were  introduced,  convinces  me  that  they  are  exceed¬ 
ingly  desirable.  It  is  important  that  they  be  exactly  alike.  Hereto¬ 
fore  there  has  been  so  much  variation  in  their  weight  as  to  almost 
defeat  their  object,  but,  general^  speaking,  they  have  encouraged 
racing  and  have  minimized  the  stress  heretofore  laid  upon  the  merits 
of  the  particular  boats,  which  resulted  in  extensive  changes  to  the 
regular  boats  or  the  purchase  of  special  race  boats. 

ALLOWANCE  OF  STORES  (125)  ;  CONDUIT  (126)  ;  SHEATHING  FOR  INSULAT¬ 
ING  (127)  ;  air  ports  (128)  ;  waterway  gratings  (129) ;  signal 

LOCKERS  (130)  ;  COAL  BAGS  AND  GEAR  (131)  J  HAMMOCKS  (132)  ; 

TOILET  FIXTURES  (133)  ;  BOWT  ORNAMENT  (134)  ;  ASH  CHUTES  (135). 

74.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson’s  remarks. 

paint  (136). 

75.  I  agree  with  Naval  Constructor  Robinson  that  the  present  spar- 
color  paint  is  entirely  unfit  for  the  use  to  which  it  is  put,  for  the 
reason  which  he  gives.  I  earnestly  recommend  that  where  spar  color 
is  now  employed  such  a  blue  gray  as  he  has  suggested  may  be  sub¬ 
stituted. 

BATTLE  LIGHTING  CIRCUIT  (137)  ;  INTERNAL  DRAFT  GAUGES  (138)  ;  TAR¬ 
PAULIN  BATTENS  (139)  ;  SAND  AND  WASH  DECK  GEAR  LOCKERS  (140) ; 

POST-OFFICE  (142) ;  BOOKCASES  (144). 

76.  I  concur  in  Naval  Constructor  Robinson's  remarks. 

BATTALION  LOCKERS  (141)  ;  ABANDON  SHIP  LOCKERS  (143). 

77.  These  lockers  are  of  great  convenience,  but  are  not  absolutely 
essential.  Where  no  great  gain  would  result  from  their  abolition,  I 
recommend  that  they  be  retained,  but  where  the  space  they  occupy  is 
needed  for  other  purposes  they  should  go. 

Very  respectfully,  R.  D.  Evans, 

Rear-Admiral ,  U.  S.  Navy , 
Commander  in  Chief  United  States  Atlantic  Fleet. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

Navy  Department ,  Washington ,  D.  C. 

(Through  Bureau  of  Navigation.) 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


31 


5. 


U.  S.  S.  Connecticut,  Flagship, 

At  sea ,  March  h,  1908. 

Sir:  1.  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  for  your 
consideration  and  that  of  the  Navy  Department  in  connection  with 
matters  of  ship  design,  arrangements,  and  htt'h'&s-:— 

2.  The  comments  made  herein  are  the  results  of  observation  and 
inquiry  on  my  part  as  to  the  ships  of  this  fleet  and  frejfr consideration 
of  opinions  expressed  by  the  various  officer  *of  the  fleet  in  reply  to 
the  queries  contained  in  your  circular  iettef  No.,  5,„  of  ffanuary  6, 


1908.  i  A  ; :•/ 

3.  I  have  divided  the  items  into  two  genera:  headings: 

(a)  Items  affecting  the  general  character  of  ships  and  their  salient 
features. 

(b)  Items  affecting  the  detail  of  internal  arrangements  and  fittings 
of  battle  ships  of  United  States  fleet. 

4.  The  remarks  submitted  here  have  general  application  to  new 
design  work,  but,  so  far  as  the  types  of  ships  permit,  also  apply  to 
overhauling  of  existing  ships  when  that  is  undertaken. 


ITEMS  AFFECTING  THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  SHIPS  AND  THEIR  SALIENT 

FEATURES. 

5.  The  desirability  of  homogeneity  between  vessels  operating  to¬ 
gether  has  been  impressed  upon  me.  Such  homogeneity  should  in¬ 
clude  economical  speed  and  coal  capacity  from  strategical  considera¬ 
tion,  and  turning  and  maneuvering  qualities  and  arcs  over  which 
guns  may  be  brought  to  bear  from  tactical  considerations. 

6.  That  fittings  and  auxiliaries  should  be  interchangeable  is  de¬ 
sirable,  but  not  so  necessary  as  that  the  ships  should  be  similar  in  the 
above  qualities. 

7.  To  what  extent  absolute  homogeneity  should  be  carried  is  a 
question  open  to  argument,  but  I  believe  that  units  of  four  should  be 
the  minimum  and  that  in  progressing  from  unit  to  unit  the  most 
careful  considerations  should  be  given  to  the  large  questions  of 
endurance  and  maneuvering  qualities,  so  that  the  various  units  may 
be  combined  into  a  fleet  whose  operation  is  not  impeded  by  the 
weakness  of  a  small  part. 

8.  The  excessive  coal  consumption  of  the  Maine  and  the  small  coal 
capacity  of  the  Alabama  and  Illinois  bring  out  these  points. 

9.  In  battle  ships  of  considerable  length  and  speeds,  in  any  but 
the  smoothest  sea,  some  water  is  taken  on  board  forward  with  the 
freeboards  that  exist  in  the  vessels  of  this  fleet.  Ordinarily  the 
amount  of  water  is  not  such  as  to  prevent  the  use  of  bow  turrets 
under  reasonable  conditions.  A  flaring  of  the  bow  sections,  omission 
of  excrescences,  such  as  bill  boards,  bow  sponsons,  and,  where  possible, 
increase  of  freeboard  forward  are  advisable,  and,  if  length  and  speed 
are  to  be  increased,  imperative.  Bow  guns  mounted  similarly  to 
the  forward  3 -inch  guns  on  the  Connecticut  class  are  useless  under¬ 
way  at  any  speed  in  practically  any  sea. 

10.  The  flukes  of  patent  anchors  when  carried  low  down  contribute 
to  this  throwing  of  water  and  should  be  raised,  as  it  is  understood 
to  have  been  done  on  latest  designs  by  making  inclination  of  hawse 


32  ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 

pipes  to  horizontal  much  less.  A  low  breakwater  some  distance 
abaft  the  bow  diagonally  inclined  to  thwartship  line  and  having 
freeing  ports  of  some  size  at  sides  would  contribute  to  dryness. 

11.  I  have  seen  no  weather  on  this  trip  where  'turret  guns  would 
be  out  of  action,  except  so  far  as  flying  spray  in  a  few  cases  might 
affect  the  sights.  Quarter-decks  as  low  as  the  Maine  type  do  not 
appear  desirable,,  being  frequently  flooded  by  a  quartering  sea  of 
any  size,  though  I  have  seen  no  weather  on  this  trip  to  put  the  after 
turret  out  of  commission. 

12.  (funs  mounted  in  broadside  in  positions  corresponding  to  the 
7-inch  battery  of  the  Connecticut  are  liable  to  be  thrown  out  of  ac¬ 
tion  on  the  weather  side  at  any  considerable  speed  under  trade-wind 
conditions,  or,  Worse,  Jdbe  to  water. 

13.  If  the  amount  of  water  getting  through  the  port  is  not  suffi¬ 
cient  to  cause  serious  trouble,  it  will,  under  these  conditions,  interfere 
with  drill,  make  the  service  of  the  gun  difficult  by  making  decks 
slippery,  and  impair  the  use  of  the  telescope. 

14.  The  effect  on  the  lee  guns  is  much  less  but,  due  to  refraction 
from  gases  of  gun  in  firing  and  its  effect  on  sighting,  the  lee  gauge  is 
probably  the  one  that  will  be  chosen  and  is  certainly  the  best  from 
a  gunnery  standpoint. 

15.  With  the  present  acceptation  of  the  all-big-gun  ship  any  bat¬ 
tery  likely  to  be  on  this  deck  in  future  will  be  for  torpedo  defense 
only  and  would  probably  not  be  manned  during  the  main  action. 

16.  A  torpedo  attack  may  be  expected  from  any  direction  and,  if 
it  is  to  be  repelled  while  the  ship  is  steaming  at  some  speed  under 
the  conditions  mentioned  above,  it  would  seem  that  some,  at  least,  of 
these  torpedo-defense  guns  should  be  mounted  higher  than  the  gun- 
deck  level. 

17.  It  is  essential  that  such  torpedo-defense  guns  be  protected  by 
armor  in  order  that  they  may  not  be  expended  in  the  action  and  may 
be  ready  when  wanted.  To  raise  the  whole  torpedo-defense  battery 
and  armor  it  properly  is  a  difficult  matter  without  raising  the  main 
battery,  which  immediately  affects  the  stability  and  causes  increase 
of  beam  and  further  complication. 

18.  It  therefore  seems  that  part  of  such  guns  should  be  kept  on  the 
gun  deck  suitably  protected,  and  a  few  might  be  mounted  on  tops  of 
turrets  or  in  the  high  and  exposed  positions,  or,  if  possible,  a  suitable 
design  of  special  quick-acting  type  of  disappearing  gun  mount  de¬ 
veloped  so  that  the  torpedo- defense  guns  might  be  stowed  behind 
armor  during  the  main  action  and  quickly  brought  to  battery  after¬ 
wards. 

19.  As  to  the  much-vexed  question  of  armor-belt  location,  the 
weather  and  sea  conditions  of  this  trip  have  been  unusually  good, 
but  even  under  these  conditions  the  bottom  of  the  belt  of  the  various 
ships  has  been  frequently  visible,  due  to  the  pitching  and  rolling,  and 
it  would  seem  that  the  location  of  the  bottom  of  the  belt  was  not 
excessively  low,  as  an  injury  below  the  belt  would  be  much  more 
serious  than  one  above  it,  and  could  be  made  by  a  shell  of  any  caliber 
when  the  bottom  of  the  belt  is  exposed. 

20.  It  is  realized  that  the  conditions,  of  loading  of  the  various  ves¬ 
sels  of  the  fleet  were  unusual,  the  single  item  of  reserve  feed  water 
ranging  from  300  tons  in  several  ships  to  as  high  as  800  tons  in  one 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


33 


ship;  in  addition  to  which  are  unusual  spare  parts,  target- practice 
ammunition,  etc. 

21.  It  would  hardly  be  denied  by  anyone  that  it  is  desirable  to  have 
the  greatest  area  and  thickness  of  armor  possible,  and  it  would  seem 
that  a  belt  starting  at  the  level  of  the  bottom  of  the  present  belt,  and 
made  at  the  maximum  width  and  thickness  possible,  at  the  same  time 
assigning  proper  protection  to  the  turrets  and  gun  emplacements,  is 
a  reasonable  compromise.  Armor  at  the  bow  should  be  arranged 
with  regard  to  form  of  wave  profile,  unless  the  fineness  of  bow  lines 
and  arrangement  of  internal  subdivisions  is  such  as  to  make  excessive 
trim  and  loss  of  stability  from  bow  damages  impossible.  Similar 
remarks  apply  to  the  stern,  with  the  additional  fact  that  protection 
for  the  steering  gear  is  imperative. 

22.  A  reduction  in  the  number  and  size  of  superstructures  and 
bridges  should  be  made.  One  bridge  forward  of  a  generous  size,  at 
about  the  level  of  conning  tower  floor,  with  no  flying  bridge,  is  de¬ 
sirable,  and  a  concentration  of  superstructure  forward  in  the  form  of 
a  high  bow  and  forecastle  will  tend  to  efficiency  in  many  ways.  The 
present  type  of  superstructure  is  undesirable. 

23.  The  conning  tower  should  have  the  fundamental  requisite  of 
adequate  protection  and  size  and  unobstructed  view,  and  the  dimen¬ 
sions  should  be  decided  on  with  these  features  in  view.  Many  of  the 
present  towers  have  obstructions  to  view  in  the  form  of  supports  for 
structures  above  the  tower,  boats,  stacks,  etc.,  many  of  which  could 
be  removed  with  removal  of  bridge  above.  Access  from  the  bottom 
is  necessary,  but  the  door  should  be  retained  for  use  under  ordinary 
circumstances  if  we  are  to  do  what  the  consensus  of  opinion  now 
demands,  namely,  handle  the  ship  from  a  bridge  on  the  same  level, 
by  using  the  wheel,  etc.,  in  the  conning  tower. 

24.  This  tower  should  be  of  a  size  sufficient  to  accommodate  the 
captain,  navigator,  and  three  of  four  other  men  stationed  at  the 
wheel,  instruments,  and  voice  tubes.  For  a  flagship  the  question  of 
protection  to  the  admiral  and  his  staff  is  also  involved.  This  brings 
out  the  fact  that  decision  should  be  made  at  time  of  design  as  to 
Avhether  the  ship  is  to  be  used  as  a  flagship  or  not.  It  is,  ordinarily, 
reasonably  simple  to  make  some  sort  of  living  provisions  for  the 
admiral  and  his  staff,  though  even  that  results  in  a  makeshift  if  not 
originally  provided;  but  the  question  of  battle  station  is  another 
matter.  It  does  not  appear  desirable  to  make  all  battle  ships  flag¬ 
ships,  as  has  been  the  practice  in  the  past,  but  certain  ones  will  nat¬ 
urally  be  required  to  be  so  fitted. 

25.  It  seems  that  for  ships  so  selected  to  serve  as  flagships  a  special 
sized  conning  tower  to  accommodate  the  admiral  and  three  of  his 
staff  in  addition  to  the  ship’s  people  would  be  more  efficient  and 
lighter  than  a  separate  signal  station  at  the  after  end  of  the  ship. 

26.  The  type  of  tower  at  present  fitted  seems  well  suited,  though 
the  peepholes  should  be  made  larger  and  the  size  and  surroundings 
of  towers  determined  by  the  general  considerations  mentioned  above. 

TORPEDO  DIRECTING  STATIONS. 

27.  Any  place  reasonably  high  up  and  suitably  protected  forward 
and  aft.  having  a  clear  and  unobstructed  view  over  as  great  a  part 

S.  Doc.  506,  60-1 - 3 


34 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


of  the  horizon  as  possible,  will  serve  well  as  a  torpedo-directing 
station. 

28.  The  present  type  on  front  of  conning  tower  seems  well  for  for¬ 
ward  station  and  an  armored  tube  in  center  line  aft,  about  where 
present  signal  tower  is  placed,  will  serve  well  aft  if  the  view  is  clear. 
Such  an  after  tower  is  not  necessary  if  after  tubes  are  not  fitted. 
The  armor  of  this  station  should  be  thicker  than  is  now  the  case. 

29.  From  inquiry  and  observation  I  believe  we  have  in  the  past 
made  a  wrong  assumption  that  all  shell  require  closed  rooms  for 
stowage.  Provision  for  storage  of  intermediate  and  other  shell  in 
passages,  at  base  of  hoists,  in  rear  of  guns,  etc.,  will  simplify  the 
problem  of  ammunition  stowage  and  supply  and  give  more  space  for 
powder.  This  does  not  apply  to  fixed  ammunition  or  to  high  ex¬ 
plosive  sensitive  fuse  shell,  which  should  have  separate  storage. 

30.  The  problem  of  coal  is  one  that  has  confronted  the  fleet  particu¬ 
larly  on  this  trip.  The  principal  general  difficulties  experienced  are 
inaccessibility  of  bunker  chutes  (inherent  in  ships  with  side  turrets 
and  superstructures),  interference  of  deck  fittings  with  thwartship 
transportation,  which  may  be  removed,  and  inconvenient  location  of 
chutes  for  delivery  to  bunkers,  which  should  be  guarded  against  in 
the  future.  Chutes  should  be  arranged  to  deliver  in  middle  of 
bunkers  instead  of  at  sides  or  corners.  Some  comments  on  the  de¬ 
tails  of  coaling  booms  and  fittings  are  made  under  class  B. 

COLLIERS. 

31.  The  colliers  used  on  this  trip  were  in  most  cases  ordinary  mer¬ 
chant  colliers,  and  are  not  altogether  suited  for  naval  purposes  in 
that  when  they  come  alongside  their  hatches  do  not  fall  abreast  the 
battle  ship  where  the  bunker  chutes  and  coaling  arrangements  are 
located.  In  all  battle  ships  the  bunkers  are  now  and  probably  will 
continue  to  be  some  distance  from  bow  and  stern.  This,  then,  implies 
that  the  collier’s  hatches  should  be  in  the  middle  of  her  length,  the 
machinery  being  in  the  stern  and  the  living  spaces,  etc.,  in  the  bow. 

32.  It  is  not  believed  that  a  speed  of  more  than  12  to  14  knots  is 
necessary  for  the  majority  of  colliers  to  serve  the  fleet.  The  type 
of  masts,  booms,  and  winches  on  these  colliers  will  serve. 

33.  The  sides  of  the  collier’s  hatches  should  be  smooth  and  free 
from  anything  to  catch  or  tear  the  bags. 

34.  It  is  the  generally  expressed  sentiment  of  the  engineer  officers 
of  the  fleet  that  through  access  within  machinery  spaces  by  doors 
in  bulkheads  is  essential  to  proper  operation  of  the  machinery. 
It  is  unquestionably  easier,  but  equally  unquestionably  is  the  fact 
that  it  is  more  dangerous  in  laying  open  to  possible  bilging  by  sub¬ 
marine  mine  or  torpedo  boat'  the  whole  of  the  machinery  space. 
Foreign  services  have  adopted  the  idea  of  no  doors  in  the  thwart- 
ship  bulkheads  in  machinery  spaces  and  find  it  possible  to  operate 
their  machinery,  and  it  is  believed  that  doors  in  thwartship  bulk¬ 
heads  should  be  omitted,  but  that  doors  in  center-line  bulkheads 
when  such  are  fitted  are  not  objectionable. 

COAL  CAPACITY. 

35.  Should  be  sufficient  to  give  a  radius  of  action  at  economical 
speed  of  10  or  12  knots  of  at  least  6,000  miles. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


35 


CONSUMPTION  FOR  ORDINARY  PURPOSES. 

36.  Every  endeavor  should  be  made  to  procure  machinery,  both 
main  and  auxiliary,  of  greater  coal  economy,  and  to  install  in  a 
manner  best  suited  to  economical  working. 

FIRE  CONTROL  PROVISIONS  AND  SEARCHLIGHTS. 

37.  The  present  type  of  masts  is  for  modern  purposes  entirely 
incorrect.  It  involves  an  excessive  weight  for  the  purpose  with 
inadequate  return.  The  present  spotter’s  platform  is  supported 
by  a  wooden  pole  which  can  be  carried  away  by  a  single  shot,  direct 
or  ricochet.  The  wooden  pole  should  be  replaced  by  lattice  masts 
combining  the  function  of  supports  for  range-finder’s  and  spotter’s 
platforms,  and  searchlights  and  signal  yards,  with  a  pole  extension 
for  wireless  aerial. 


TURRETS. 

38.  The  features  of  the  present  turret  open  to  the  most  improve¬ 
ment  are  (a)  the  sighting  hood,  (b)  the  turning  gear  speed,  (c)  the 
jumping  off  of  turret  as  guns  fire,  ( d )  the  ammunition  hoist,  (a) 
has  been  overcome  by  trunnion  sights  on  South  Carolina  and  Michi¬ 
gan  turrets,  which  sights  are  strongly  recommended.  ( b )  has  been 
solved  with  reasonable  satisfaction  on  two  ships  of  the  fleet,  the 
Maine ,  with  the  rotary  compensator  electric  system,  and  the  Illi¬ 
nois ,  with  the  Williams  hydraulic  speed  gear  controlling  a  constant- 
speed  electric  motor.  Either  of  these  will,  so  far  as  present  experi¬ 
ence  goes,  give  suitable  results.  ( c )  is  a  matter  that  should  receive 
careful  consideration,  as  some  of  the  present  turrets  jump  the  sights 
entirely  off  the  target  in  firing,  (d)  The  turret  ammunition  hoist 
of  the  present  type  necessarily  involves  an  opening  of  some  size  for 
the  passage  of  the  hoist  rope.  Either  the  pneumatic  hoist  under  con¬ 
struction  for  test  or  the  two-stage  hoist  seem  to  present  reasonable 

solutions  of  this  question. 

39.  In  addition  to  the  above,  I  believe  that  the  turret  should  be  kept 
under  air  pressure  to  act  as  a  gas-expelling  device,  and  the  port  open¬ 
ing  closed  by  a  suitable  flexible  cover  serving  as  a  means  of  excluding 
water  as  well  as  retaining  the  air. 

40.  Provision  should  be  made  for  hoisting  ammunition  by  hand 
in  addition  to  the  hand-turning  and  hand-elevating  gears  now  fitted. 

41.  The  tops  of  turrets  and  the  arrangements  of  gun  mounts,  etc., 
should  be  so  made  that  they  may  be  easily  removed  and  new  guns 
installed  quickly  as  may  be  necessary  in  time  of  war. 

SMOKESTACKS. 

42.  In  the  point  of  view  of  target  and  of  interference  with  fire 
control  these  stacks  are  too  high,  and  it  is  believed  they  should  be 
reduced  in  height  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  commensurate  with 
suitable  draft. 

TORPEDO  DEFENSES. 

43.  I  am  impressed  with  the  fact  of  the  apparent  helplessness  of 
the  fleet  against  a  concentrated  and  energetic  night  attack  by  torpedo 
boats. 


36 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


44.  This  subject  was  dealt  with  recently  bv  a  special  board  of  which 
I  had  the  honor  to  be  a  member. 

45.  The  general  conclusions  of  that  board  were  that  more  destroyers 
were  needed,  nets  should  be  fitted,  searchlights  and  torpedo  defense 
batteries  rearranged,  and,  if  experiments  which  were  recommended 
indicated  the  necessity,  internal  protection  as  part  of  the  hull 
structure. 

46.  I  see  no  reason  to  modify  the  views  expressed  in  the  report  of 
that  board,  and  I  respectfully  invite  attention  to  that  report  as  em¬ 
bodying  what  in  my  opinion  is  necessary  in  that  respect. 

PROPELLING  MACHINERY. 

47.  The  necessity  for  wide  radius  of  action  for  strategic  pur¬ 
poses  and  for  fine  control  for  station  keeping  in  fleet  tactical  maneu¬ 
vers  require  careful  consideration  in  determining  the  type  of  pro¬ 
pelling  machinery,  and  a  turbine  installation  which  sacrificed  these 
two  fundamentally  essential  elements  is  believed  inferior  to  recip¬ 
rocating  machinery. 

IN-TURNING  SCREWS. 

48.  From  observation  of  the  length  of  time  required  in  turning 
and  maneuvering,  particularly  from  an  anchorage,  I  think  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  the  superiority  of  out -turning  screws. 

Class  B. — Items  affecting  the  detail  of  internal  arrangements  and 
] fittings  of  battle  ships. 

ANCHOR  WINDLASS. 

49.  Generally  satisfactory  in  power  and  operation.  It  is  believed 
that  the  vertical  spindle,  horizontal  wild-cat  type,  of  late  designs,  is 
preferable  to  the  horizontal-spindle  type  now  in  the  fleet,  and  it 
would  seem  wise  to  put  the  driving  mechanism  behind  adequate 
protection,  extending  the  spindle  up  as  necessary,  which  with  this 
type  is  quite  practicable. 


STEERING  ENGINE. 

50.  In  general  functions  satisfactory  as  an  engine,  but  the  system 
as  a  whole  has  two  objections: 

(a)  The  transmission  by  rope  subject  to  loosening  and  stranding 
and  which  is  generally  inaccessible. 

(b)  Heating  of  magazines  by  steering-engine  steam  pipes.  The 
development  of  the  electric  gear  of  the  Tacoma  type  or  placing  the 
engine  in  the  engine  room  with  extension  of  operating  screw  shaft 
seem  possible  solutions  of  this  difficulty. 

51.  Wire  rope  transmission  when  fitted  should  have  the  finest 
flexible  plow  steel  rope  or  the  special  hemp-covered  steel  rope, 
which  has  given  such  good  service  on  torpedo  boats;  it  should  be  run 
in  large  and  easily  accessible  tubes,  with  generous  slip  couplings  for 
access. 

52.  Special  care  should  be  given  to  keys  and  pins  of  clutches  and 
bevel  gears,  which  should  be  so  located  and  fitted  as  not  to  be  subject 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


37 


to  jarring  out,  shearing,  or  being  tampered  with  by  unauthorized 
parties. 

WINCHES. 

53.  Are  in  a  number  of  cases  deficient  in  power  for  modern  coaling 
operations  requiring  the  simultaneous  hoisting  of  four  or  more  bags 
of  800  pounds  each,  and  constant  running  under  rapidly  varying 
loads  for  periods  of  from  twelve  to  twenty-four  hours.  If  the  driv¬ 
ing  motor  could  be  located  below  decks  and  operated  from  above 
they  would  be  less  liable  to  injury  of  action,  and  probably  would  be 
available  for  coaling  afterward,  which  might  be  essential. 

FANS  FOR  VENTILATION. 

54.  Satisfactory,  generally,  in  principle  and  operation,  sometimes 
defective  in  construction.  Ventilation  should  be  provided  for  spaces 
corresponding  to  gun  deck  of  Connecticut  class,  and  something  equiv¬ 
alent  to  present  coaling  skylights  for  natural  exhaust  and  light.  It 
is  believed  that  all  ventilation  fans  of  considerable  size  should,  when 
possible,  be  mounted  with  axis  of  armature  fore  and  aft. 

DOORS. 

55.  The  principle  of  the  electric  long-arm  door  seems  good.  The 
pneumatic  type  of  the  Maine  class  is  worse  than  useless  and  should 
be  removed.  The  electric  type  of  the  Connecticut  class  seems  to  have 
one  drawback  of  delicacy,  but  by  care  is  kept  in  shape.  The  latter 
models  of  this  type  will  undoubtedly  overcome  many  of  the  difficul¬ 
ties  with  this  door,  but  the  power  of  motors  should  be  increased. 
With  the  exception  of  doors  in  machinery  spaces  and  for  access  to 
coal  bunkers,  the  use  of  this  system  is  not  desirable.  Heavy  hatches 
should  be  of  the  balanced  type,  for  hand  operation. 

BOAT  CRANES. 

56.  The  generally  expressed  sentiment  of  the  executive  officers  of 
the  fleet  is  that  the  boat  cranes  are  preferable  to  booms.  This  is  un¬ 
doubtedly  the  case  so  far  as  ease  of  manipulation  is  concerned.  They 
are,  however,  believed  to  be  a  menace  in  action,  and  a  collapsible 
crane  capable  of  lowering  to  deck  would  be  a  great  advance,  combin¬ 
ing  the  ease  of  manipulation  of  the  present  cranes  with  reasonable 
immunity  from  damage  by  falling  weights.  An  arrangement  for 
singling  the  fall  for  use  in  coaling  would  be  advantageous. 

ICE  MACHINES. 

57.  Two  2-ton  ice  machines,  or  at  most  one  2-ton  and  one  3-ton 
machine  should  be  ample  capacity  for  the  cold-storage  requirements 
and  ice  for  a  battle  ship  crew.  Further  installation  is  a  waste  of 
weight,  space,  and  coal. 

PIPING  SYSTEM. 

58.  ( a )  Fire  main  is,  as  fitted  in  more  recent  ships,  suitable  as  a 
type.  It  should,  however,  in  no  case  be  used  as  a  flushing  system, 
either  for  water-closets  or  ash  chutes,  and  should  be  made  of  some 
material  less  subject  to  continual  breakdowns  by  corrosion  than  the 


38 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


present  material.  The  lead-lined  steel  pipe  fitted  for  experiment  on 
several  ships  is  recommended.  Trouble  is  experienced  with  gate 
valves  and  with  stems  of  valves  exposed  to  salt  water  disintegrating. 

(b)  Flushing  system  is  in  principle  suitable.  Flushing  of  crew’s 
head,  if  done  by  a  separate  pump,  should  have  larger  capacity  and 
greater  reliability  than  obtains  with  electric  installation  now  in¬ 
stalled  in  the  fleet,  or  otherwise  be  connected  with  the  main  system 
from  the  fireroom  and  engine  room  pumps.  No  connection  to  con¬ 
denser  or  distiller  circulating  water  should  be  fitted,  which  condition 
is  understood  to  be  fulfilled  in  late  ships. 

FRESH  AND  SALT  WATER  SYSTEMS. 

59.  Salt  water  connections  to  pantries  are  useless  and  should  be 
omitted. 

60.  Salt  water  shower  connections  should  be  to  separate  showers 
and  not  interconnected  with  fresh  water  system.  They  are  seldom 
used  and  one  for  each  bathroom  is  believed  to  be  ample. 

61.  No  interconnection  by  three-way  plugs  or  cross  leads  between 
fresh  and  salt  water  should  be  fitted. 

62.  Instead  of  having  one  gravity  tank  of  considerable  size  for 
fresh  water,  several  tanks  assigned  to  individual  parts  of  ship  will 
permit  accounting  for  the  use  of  fresh  water  and  consequent  economy 
of  coal. 

63.  Magazine  floods  should  be  of  sprinkler  type,  flooding  from  the 
top  down,  as  in  latest  designs,  instead  of  from  the  bottom  up,  and 
should  be  operated  by  a  quick- acting  valve  and  provision  made  that 
valves  may  not  be  operated  at  any  point  intermediate  between  maga¬ 
zine  and  protective  deck  plates. 

64.  Location  of  plugs  should  be  made  with  great  care  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  greatest  accessibility,  with  least  disturbance  of  stowage  facili¬ 
ties  and  space. 


DRAINAGE  SYSTEM. 

65.  The  secondary  drain,  which  is  used  for  the  ordinary  purposes 
of  the  ship,  is  satisfactory. 

66.  The  main  drain,  used  for  removing  considerable  bodies  of 
water,  depends  on  the  main  condenser  circulating  pumps,  which  are 
placed  low  down. 

67.  To  use  it,  the  injector  must  first  be  closed,  and  in  doing  this 
the  suction  may  be  lost  until  the  engine  itself  is  flooded.  The  vertical 
spindle  electric  motor  compartment  system  used  on  the  Russian  Ret- 
vizan  seems  a  solution  of  this  possible  difficulty.  In  any  case,  the 
locking  arrangements  to  valves  should  be  modified  so  that  while 
preserving  some  safety  the  pump  can  be  sooner  brought  into  use. 


scuppers. 

68.  Generally  satisfactory,  except  as  to  check,  which  does  not  always 
function  as  a  nonreturn.  Tops  and  bridges  should  be  connected  to 
ship’s  scuppers,  and  all  deck  drains  should  be  put  at  lowest  point  of 
space  to  be  drained. 


ALLEGED  STKU CTTJRAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


39 


VENTILATION  SYSTEM. 

69.  On  the  latest  ships,  where  systems  are  isolated  between  intact 
watertight  bulkheads,  is  generally  satisfactory.  Adjacent  watertight 
magazines  should  not  connect  through  ventilation  leads.  A  simple 
form  of  cinder  catcher  may  well  be  installed  in  leads  to  quarters  and 
engine-room  spaces.  Cowls  of  the  standard  type  on  forecastle  and 
quarterdeck  may  well  be  replaced  by  mushrooms  with  movable  head 
quickly  closed. 

HEATERS. 

70.  The  number  and  weight  of  steam  heaters  is  excessive.  The  com¬ 
bined  heating  and  ventilation  system  on  the  Vermont  is  highly  spoken 
of,  is  lighter,  and  better  from  a  sanitary  point  of  view,  and  strongly 
recommended  for  future  United  States  ships. 

PLUMBING  FIXTURES. 

71.  The  late  types  are  generally  satisfactory.  Fundamentally, 
when  possible,  fittings  and  spaces  requiring  drainage  should  be  at 
least  at  height  of  present  gun  deck.,  (1)  Tip  basins  of  present  type 
are  suitable  and  satisfactory  for  firemen,  but  buckets  are  preferable 
for  crew,  with  trough  drainage.  (2)  Present  system  of  trough 
water-closets  for  crew,  with  continual  flush,  is  satisfactory,  but 
wooden  seats  of  present  type  should  be  discontinued  in  favor  of  par¬ 
allel  bearers  for  the  buttocks,  preferably  of  some  nonporous  material. 
(3)  The  needle  type  of  shower  is  unsuitable  for.  low  spaces  or  for 
salt  water.  (4)  No  lavatories  should  be  fitted  in  water-closets  or 
bath  spaces  other  than  in  individual  bathroom  for  admiral,  captain, 
and  executive.  (5)  A  bathroom  for  executive  officer  should  be  pro¬ 
vided.  (6)  A  urinal  should  be  fitted  on  the  bridge.  (7)  Bath  heat¬ 
ers  should  not  have  both  fresh  and  salt  water  connections.  (8)  A 
urinal  should  be  provided  in  bathroom  spaces  unless  a  urinal  space 
is  immediately  adjacent  to  the  bathroom.  (9)  The  provision  of  sep¬ 
arate  water-closets  for  venereal  patients  is  recommended  by  many 
medical  officers,  but  it  is  doubted  if  the  men  would  comply  with  any 
such  arrangement,  and  a  certain  number  of  seats  may  be  marked  out 
for  this  in  ordinary  installation  if  necessity  seems  to  indicate. 

INTERNAL  SUBDIVISION  AND  ARRANGEMENT. 

72.  Offices.  Flag  office  of  type,  size,  and  furnishing  of  that  on 
Connecticut  is  generally  suitable.  Captain’s  office  of  size  and  ar¬ 
rangement  of  that  on  Connecticut  is  generally  suitable.  Executive 
officer’s  office  of  size  and  arrangement  of  that  on  C  onnecticut  is  gen¬ 
erally  suitable.  Engineer’s  office  of  size  and  arrangement  of  that  on 
C onnecticut  is  generally  suitable.  Paymaster’s  office  of  Connecticut 
is  too  small  and  is  so  pronounced  on  most  of  our  battle  ships.  The 
paymaster’s  office  should  have  two  windows  for  paying  off;  a  long, 
high  desk  to  take  the  rolls,  desks  for  the  paymaster  and  three  writers 
in  addition,  with  usual  spaces  for  files,  blanks,  safe,  copying  press, 
etc.  The  use  of  the  office  as  a  sleeping  space  for  the  pay  clerk  or 
yeoman  is  objectionable.  The  office  should  be  near  the  executive 
officer’s  office.  Ordnance  office  of  Connecticut  type  is  generally  suit- 


40 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


able.  Navigator’s  office  may  well  be  combined  with  chart  house  and 
emergency  cabin. 

73.  In  general,  where  practicable,  offices  should  be  located  to  have 
natural  light  and  air.  The  flag  office  and  captain’s  office  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  quarters  of  those  officers.  The  executive  officer’s  office 
should  be  on  the  main  deck  of  vessels  having  superstructure  or  on  gun 
deck  of  one  not  so  fitted  and  accessible  to  crew  and  near  paymaster’s 
office.  The  navigator’s  office  may  well  be  in  the  chart  house  and  the 
ordnance  office  forward.  The  engineer’s  office  near  engine  room 
access  hatch. 

STOREROOMS. 

74.  Storerooms  are  of  course  preferably  rectilinear,  but  any  reason¬ 
able  space  may  be  used  for  stores  and  naturally  would  be.  Suitable 
provision  should  be  made  for  access  to  and  from  such  rooms  by  direct 
leads  from  weather  decks  and  to  decks  on  which  issuing  room  and  gal¬ 
leys  are  located.  The  triangular  spaces  between  protective  and  berth 
decks  are  very  inaccessible,  and,  if  practicable,  should  not  be  counted 
in  the  regular  available  stowage  space,  particularly  for  food  stores. 
Storerooms  having  flat  bottoms  do  Dot  need  wood  floors  in  walking 
spaces,  and  ordinarily,  if  anything  at  all  is  required,  gratings  will 
suffice  to  keep  stores  from  damage  by  dampness  on  decks. 

SHOPS. 

75.  A  separate  carpenter’s  shop  as  an  inclosure  is  not  necessary. 

76.  A  separate  blacksmith  shop  is  desirable  as  permitting  the 
stowage  of  blacksmith’s  tools  and  forges,  pipe  fitting  tools,  etc.,  which 
are  in  constant  use,  in  an  accessible  place. 

DYNAMO  ROOMS. 

77.  Two  widely  separate  rooms  are  desirable  if  they  can  be  arranged 
without  undue  increase  in  complication  of  wiring,  difficulty  of  opera¬ 
tion,  and  weight.  The  advantages  and  disadvantages  should  be  care¬ 
fully  weighed,  and  it  is  difficult  to  advance  a  positive  opinion  on  the 
subject  without  careful  preliminary  study  of  the  details  of  wiring 
in  the  two  systems  and  other  matters  involved. 

MAGAZINES. 

78.  After  experience  on  this  trip  where  the  weather  conditions 
have  ranged  from  extreme  heat  to  considerable  cold,  I  do  not  feel 
that  magazine  refrigeration  is  necessary.  A  number  of  cases  of  heat 
above  90°  have  been  reported,  but  only  a  few  above  95°;  these  few 
directly  traceable  to  metallic  contact  with  hot  steam  pipes,  etc. 

79.  The  installation  of  such  a  system  would  involve  considerable 
weight  and  added  complication.  It  is  rightly  urged  that  powder 
should  be  kept  at  a  uniform  temperature,  which  would  mean  that  if 
a  system  were  installed  it  should  operate  as  a  heating  system  in  cold 
weather  and  a  refrigerating  system  in  hot  weather.  It  is  believepl 
that  the  disadvantages  outweigh  the  advantages,  an  opinion  in  which 
the  ordnance  officers  of  the  fleet  seem  to  concur. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


41 


80.  Powder  could  well  be  stowed  in  built-in  copper  tubes,  and  shell 
if  stowed  in  shell  rooms  on  inclines  to  facilitate  handling  to  hoist  by 
gravity. 

HOSPITAL  SPACES. 

81.  For  ordinary  service  the  amount  of  space  provided  on  the  Con¬ 
necticut  class  since  alteration  seems  ample. 

82.  The  operating  room  should  be  behind  armor  for  use  in  battle, 
and  so  that  it  will  be  available  after  battle. 

88.  Provision  should  be  made  for  a  surgeon’s  examining  room  or 
space  to  obtain  some  privacy  for  examinations,  and  a  separate  urinal, 
lavatory,  and  shelves  for  treatment  of  venereal  patients  in  addition 
to  the  provision  for  toilet  facilities  now  made. 

84.  The  fittings  of  the  type  in  sick  bays  and  hospital  places  gen¬ 
erally  of  C onnecticut  class  are  suitable, 

85.  Some  space  forward  and  aft  suitably  located  behind  armor 
should  be  chosen  as  battle  stations  and  ready  access  from  battery 
decks  provided.  These  spaces  should  not  be  reserved  for  this  pur¬ 
pose  solely,  but  should  have  running  water  available. 

GALLEYS,  ETC. 

86.  The  galleys  of  the  general  type  and  location  as  fitted  on  the 
Connecticut  seem  satisfactory.  The  provision  of  a  separate  butcher 
shop  is  recommended  by  many  officers,  but  the  extension  of  the  gal¬ 
ley  space  with  provision  for  hanging  meat  would  seem  to  make  all 
necessary  provision  without  the  expenditure  of  additional  weight  and 
space.  It  is  so  fitted  on  the  C onnecticut ,  and  functions  satisfactorily. 


GENERAL  MESS  PANTRY. 

87.  The  general  arrangement  and  type  on  the  Connecticut  class  is 
suitable.  The  stowage  of  condiment  boxes  adjacent  to  this  space 
would  probably  result  in  saving  of  weight.  Incidentally  the  condi¬ 
ment  boxes  seem  excessively  and  unnecessarily  large  and  heavy. 

BAKERY. 

88.  The  size  and  arrangements  provided  on  the  Connecticut  class 
are  suitable.  It  should,  however,  like  the  galley,  be  located  with 
reference  to  light  and  air  and  where  it  will  not  heat  up  valuable  living 
spaces  surrounding  it,  and  where  it  will  not  have  an  excessive  tem¬ 
perature  itself.  Forced  ventilation  is  necessary  and  natural  exhaust. 
Ample  stowage  for  bread  after  baking  should  also  be  made. 

ship’s  water  tanks. 

♦ 

89.  Should  form  part  of  the  ship’s  structure  and  not  be  separate 
tanks  built  in,  which  results  in  a  waste  of  space  and  weight. 

MACHINERY  SPACES  AND  ARRANGEMENTS. 

90.  Ash  ejectors:  A  desirable  fitting,  but  would  not  do  away  at  all 
with  necessity  for  present  type  of  ash  hoists.  Ejectors  are  desirable 


42 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


when  running  forced  draft,  and  if  weight  can  be  spared,  should  be 
titted.  If  the  type  selected  for  the  Delaware  functions  as  it  is  claimed, 
it  seems  to  have  many  advantages  over  the  type  now  fitted  in  several 
of  our  ships.  The  present  type  of  ash  hoists  should  be  fitted  to 
deliver  on  main  deck  and  not  through  crew’s  space.  Overhead  trol¬ 
leys  or  special  deck  trucks  for  handling  buckets  are  not  necessary, 
the  ordinary  form  of  baggage  truck  serving  well. 

STOREROOMS. 

91.  The  engineer’s  stores  are  an  important  asset  on  the  ship  and 
ample  provision  should  be  made  therefor,  with  issuing  room  for 
waste,  packing,  tools,  etc.,  immediately  adjacent  to  engine  room. 

92.  Bar  metals  and  similar  material  may  well  be  stored  in  the  up¬ 
take  inclosures,  but  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  readily  accessible  and 
removable  for  transportation  to  deck  or  workshop  as  required. 

GENERAL  WORKSHOP. 

93.  This  is  in  continued  use  and  as  to  size  and  the  general  arrange¬ 
ment  on  the  Connecticut  is  satisfactory.  The  question  of  handling 
material  to  and  from  this  shop  is  important,  and  the  access  should  be 
as  easy  as  water-tight  subdivision  and  location  will  permit.  A  large 
amount  of  ordnance  work  requires  to  be  done  in  this  shop  and  the 
selection  and  installation  of  machine  tools  should  be  made  having 
this  requirement  in  view. 

LAUNDRY. 

94.  This  is  an  item  about  which  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion. 
It  is  something  which  ships  have  done  without  for  many  years j  is 
expensive  in  water  consumption;  it  is  hard  to  get  satisfactory  op¬ 
eratives,  and  its  use  is  confined  to  officers.  Considering  the  ship  as 
operating  individually,  its  drawbacks  would  seem  to  be  greater  than 
its  advantage.  Considering  the  fleet  as  a  whole,  the  volume  of  work 
to  be  done  on  shore  is  apt  to  overwhelm  any  but  a  place  of  consider¬ 
able  size.  I  am,  however,  of  the  opinion  that  the  laundry  is  not  a 
military  necessity  and  that  it  should  be  omitted,  and  washing  done  on 
shore,  as  it  has  been  in  the  past.  When  fitted  it  should  not  be  low 
down,  should  have  ready  and  independent  drainage,  and  good  air 
supply,  with  exhaust  arrangements  for  taking  off  escaping  steam. 

CHAIN  LOCKERS. 

95.  Should  have  chain  pipes  leading  into  middle  of  a  more  or  less 
square  locker,  and  not  into  the  end  of  a  long  narrow  locker,  so  that 
the  tiering  of  the  chain  will  be  simplified. 

CENTRAL  STATION  COMMUNICATION  ROOMS  AND  FIRE-CONTROL  BOOTHS. 

96.  The  present  system  of  fire  control  having  been  developed  since 
the  design  of  any  ship  now  in  the  fleet,  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising 
that  these  spaces  on  ships  are  more  or  less  makeshifts.  The  construc¬ 
tion  as  to  size  and  sound-proofing  of  booths  now  in  suits  very  well, 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


43 


but  in  a  new  design  they  should  be  laid  out  in  accordance  with  the  fire- 
control  board’s  report,  and  in  so  doing  get  the  station  for  lower  steer¬ 
ing  compass  free  from  any  stray  fields  of  dynamos. 

COMPASS  LOCATIONS. 

97.  In  the  few  ships  of  the  fleet  where  it  has  been  possible  to  com¬ 
pensate  properly  the  central  station  compass,  which  is  generally  not 
possible  on  account  of  its  proximity  to  the  dynamos,  it  has  been  found 
possible  to  maneuver  the  ship  from  this  compass  and  therefore,  if 
suitable  provision  for  locating  the  compass  is  made,  its  principle  is 
correct  and  valuable. 

98.  The  steering  engine  room  compass  is  entirely  practicable. 

99.  A  special  study  of  the  location  of  standard  and  deck  compasses 
as  well  should  be  made,  as  much  trouble  is  experienced  in  the  changes 
in  directive  force  due  to  movable  masses  of  steel,  heating  of  stacks,  etc. 

SHOWER  SPACES. 

100.  Should  be  arranged  so  that  after  bathing  there  is  space  suffi¬ 
cient  to  get  away  from  shower  head  and  dry  down. 

BATHROOMS. 

101.  Not  more  than  two  tubs  for  wardroom  officers,  one  for  junior 
officers,  and  one  for  warrant  officers  should  be  fitted  with  not  more 
than  four  showers  for  wardroom  officers,  three  for  junior  officers,  two 
for  warrant  officers,  including  those  fitted  over  the  tubs. 

CHART  HOUSES  AND  EMERGENCY  CABINS. 

102.  With  the  commanding  officer’s  quarters  forward,  there  seems 
to  be  some  doubt  as  to  whether  such  an  emergency  cabin  is  necessary. 
With  the  quarters  aft,  it  is  a  necessity. 

103.  If  it  is  provided,  a  similar  space  should  be  provided  for  the 
navigator,  the  chart  house  being  in  front  of  the  two  spaces  for  offi¬ 
cers,  and  the  whole  made  as  one  structure. 

MISCELLANEOUS  FITTINGS. 

104.  Awnings  may  well  be  confined  to  those  for  quarter-deck  and 
forecastle  and  operating  bridge.  These  should  be  rigged  to  haul  out 
to  davits  and  stanchions  so  placed  that  all  turret  guns  may  be  swung 
without  each  time  striking  awning  stanchions. 

105.  As  this  will  probably  result  in  very  wide  spacing  of  such 
stanchions,  rail  stanchions  should  be  independent  and  designed  so 
as  to  be  easily  struck. 

LIFE  BUOYS. 

106.  The  forward  life  buoy  as  located  on  the  Connecticut  is  useless. 
It  is  so  low  that  the  sea  washes  it  away.  The  after  one  is  generally 
allright,  and  if  another  one  is  to  be  provided  it  should  well  be  located 
about  at  after  break  of  superstructure. 


44 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


BAG  RESTS,  ETC. 

107.  The  general  type  of  bag  racks  and  ditty-box  racks  and  lockers 
on  recent  ships  is  O.  K. 


GUN-PORT  SHUTTERS. 

108.  The  circular  type  of  gun-port  shutter,  with  external  bearing, 
does  not  operate  with  entire  satisfaction.  I  have  asked  for  sugges¬ 
tions  from  officers  having  these  guns  and  shutters  to  operate,  and  have 
endeavored  to  work  out  an  improved  scheme  myself,  but  have  not 
succeeded  without  embodying  some  drawback  more  serious  than  the 
present  leaks.  The  shutters  should  be  in  parts  small  enough  to  be 
readily  handled  and  the  details  of  fastening  made  with  a  view  to 
quick  and  accurate  adjustment. 

COALING  BOOMS  AND  SPANS. 

109.  The  general  type  and  rigging  of  booms  on  the  Connecticut , 
Kansas ,  Vermont ,  and  Louisiana  is  suitable.  Trouble  is  experienced 
in  a  few  cases  with  weakness  of  booms  and  in  a  few  cases  with  cutting 
of  boom  bands  and  pinns  into  material  of  booms.  Both  these  should 
be  provided  against.  The  spread  of  backstays  of  post  on  cranes  of 
Connecticut  should  be  greater.  Where  a  coaling  span  can  be  rigged 
it  is  found  to  be  anvantageous,  particularly  for  coaling  from  a  collier, 
and  should  be  provided. 


NUTS  AND  BOLTS. 

110.  Nuts  and  bolts  in  cabin  gun  ports  should  be  of  brass. 

111.  The  number  of  different  sizes  on  fittings  such  as  air  ports, 
gun- port  shutters,  and  hatches  should  be  decreased  so  that  one  wrench 
may  serve  where  several  are  now  required. 

HEAVY  STEEL  BUCKLERS. 

112.  Heavy  steel  bucklers  for  12  and  8  inch  turrets  are  not  used, 
and  may  well  be  omitted,  retaining  the  canvas  and  wood  bucklers, 
or  a  special  type  of  canvas  cover  provided,  acting  as  water  excluder 
and  air  retainer  referred  to  above. 

HAWSE-PIPE  BUCKLERS. 

113.  Hawse-pipe  bucklers  are  seldom  used  now  and,  with  the 
greater  inclination  of  hawse  pipe  recommended,  may  be  omitted. 

ANCHORS. 

114.  Only  patent  anchors  should  be  fitted,  and  anchor  cranes  may 
be  omitted,  or  at  most  only  one  fitted. 

LADDERS. 

115.  If  a  ladder  as  light  as  the  Stanwood  tread  ladder  can  be 
designed  with  a  closed  tread,  it  would  be  desirable.  The  present  type 
is  dirty  and  undesirable  for  barefooted  men. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


45 


SIDE  LADDERS. 

116.  Side  ladders  should  be  of  ash.  as  teak  is  too  brittle,  and 
should  have  a  heavy  rubbing  strip  of  pine  on  the  outboard  side  of 
present  type. 

WOOD  FITTINGS. 

117.  Wood  fittings  should  be  reduced.  Bottoms,  where  necessary 
to  fit  at  all  in  storeroom,  should  be  made  portable  so  as  to  permit 
cleaning  behind.  Wood  shutters  on  magazine  and  storeroom  floors 
should  be  omitted  where  such  floors  are  flat,  and  all  wood  fittings  in 
magazines  omitted. 

CHOCKS. 

118.  Chocks  should  be  made  with  greater  swallow  and  with  larger 
radius  to  prevent  the  short  nip  on  hawsers  given  by  present  type. 
One  specially  large  swallow  chock  aft  and  one  forward  should  be 
fitted  for  towing  purposes  with  a  large  radius  of  bearing. 

BITTS. 

119.  The  bitts  fitted  on  late  ships  are  generally  satisfactory.  One 
set  of  the  larger  size  on  each  side  forward,  suitably  placed  with  ref¬ 
erence  to  towing  chock,  and  a  similar  set  each  side  aft  should  be  fitted 
with  proper  intermediate  bitts  elsewhere. 

BOAT  DAVITS. 

120.  Boat  davits  of  present  type  are  generally  satisfactory,  but 
should  be  provided  only  for  lifeboats  and  dingeys,  and  should  be 
fitted  with  lowering  gear  so  that  they  can  be  quickly  and  easily 
struck. 

BOAT  CRADLES. 

121.  Generally  are  of  satisfactory  type.  Deck  fittings  on  decks 
used  for  coaling  should  be  made  removable,  so  that  decks  may  be 
flushed  for  purpose  of  trucking.  Bearing  pads  for  50-foot  boats 
should  be  broader  and  turn-buckle  stronger  than  in  case  of  these  boats 
fitted  on  C onnecticut.  Stowage  of  boats  on  skids,  which  are  remov¬ 
able  in  time  of  action,  is  suggested. 

SECONDARY  AMMUNITION  HOISTS  AND  CONVEYORS. 

122.  The  variable-speed  arrangement  most  recently  provided,  hav¬ 
ing  a  maximum  speed  equal  to  the  maximum  rate  of  fire  of  guns,  will 
be  a  decided  improvement.  The  hoisting  and  delivery  of  ammuni¬ 
tion  in  horizontal  position  when  possible  will  tend  to  efficiency. 
Sending  up  powder  tanks  which  have  to  be  disposed  of  seems  an 
undesirable  way  if  suitably  rigid  bag  can  be  obtained. 

FURNITURE. 

128.  Metallic  furniture  is  recommended.  The  omission  of  foot 
tubs  and  carling  boxes,  the  provision  of  a  special  drawer  to  take  the 


46 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


place  of  carling  box,  and  the  fitting  of  a  wardrobe  so  that  a  reason¬ 
able  number  of  coats  and  trousers  in  hangers  may  be  accommodated. 
Wardroom  chairs  should  have  backs  modified  so  that  buttons  of  the 
dress  coat  do  not  foul.  Lockers,  bookcases,  and  sideboards  should 
have  spring  catches  to  all  swinging  doors. 

BOATS. 

124.  Exclusive  of  boats  required  for  staff  purposes,  the  following 
seems  a  suitable  outfit:  One  50-foot  steamer;  two  40-foot  steamers; 
two  36-foot  sailing  launches,  with  reliable  gasoline  engines  for  aux¬ 
iliary  purposes;  two  30- foot  cutters;  one  racing  cutter;  two  whale¬ 
boats  for  lifeboats  (one  fitted  as  gig),  and  one  wherry  or  dingey. 

ALLOWANCE. 

125.  In  the  matter  of  shellac,  there  is  a  general  agreement  as  to  its 
insufficiency,  in  which  opinion  I  concur.  It  should,  be  increased  50 
per  cent.  An  extension  of  the  amount  allowed  in  some  other  items 
and  reduction  of  still  others  seems  desirable,  though  it  seems  an  open 
question  as  to  whether  the  ships  should  be  expected  to  carry  at  one 
time  all  the  items  allowed  for  a  considerable  period,  and  a  system  of 
credits  permitting  a  ship  wherever  she  may  be  to  draw  up  to  a  cer¬ 
tain  amount,  as  required,  would  probably  reduce  the  requirements  as 
to  carrying  an  excessive  amount. 

CONDUIT. 

126.  The  use  of  conduit  to  the  extent  heretofore  practiced  is  to  be 
deplored;  except  where  the  wire  is  exposed  to  mechanical  injury  con¬ 
duit  were  better  omitted,  as  is  constantly  evidenced  in  service.  A 
recent  limitation  of  the  use  is  a  step  forward. 

SHEATHING  FOR  INSULATION. 

127.  On  the  most  recent  ships  seems  to  fulfill  its  intended  func¬ 
tion  satisfactorily  and  should  be  provided,  as  now,  for  spaces  exposed 
to  extreme  heat  or  cold.  Suitable  hand-holes  for  examination  behind 
such  sheathing  and  behind  mantlet  plates  are  desirable. 

AIR  PORTS. 

128.  Some  trouble  with  breakage  of  glasses  has  been  experienced, 
indicating  an  uneven  strain  due  to  two-dog  ports.  It  is  suggested 
that  a  three-dog  port  might  be  designed,  giving  a  more  even  bearing. 
This  port  should  not  use  hinge  as  a  point  of  closure. 

WATERWAY  GRATINGS. 

129.  Should  be  omitted  except  in  wake  of  gangways  and  leads¬ 
man’s  platforms. 

SIGNAL  LOCKERS. 

130.  Latest  developed  type  as  fitted  on  after- bridge  of  Connecticut 
seems  satisfactory. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


47 


COAL  BAGS  AND  GEAR. 

131.  Stowage  for  these  should  be  provided,  including  shovels, 
blocks,  and  gear,  in  a  suitable  space  in  the  hold  or  in  part  of  one  of 
the  coal  bunkers  and  an  inclosed  direct  trunk  to  weather  deck  pro¬ 
vided.  This  provision  is  recommended  so  that  the  gear  may  not  be 
expended  in  action,  cause  trouble  by  fire,  or  scatter  dirt  through  the 
living  spaces  when  handling  to  and  from  place  of  stowage. 

HAMMOCKS. 

132.  Many  years  ago  hammocks  were  stowed  along  the  rail  for 
two  reasons:  One  to  prevent  splinters,  and  the  other  because  this 
stowage  did  not  interfere  with  other  things.  Neither  reason  gen¬ 
erally  obtains  now,  and  there  is  a  further  drawback  that  hammocks 
so  stowed  are  liable  to  ignition  from  exploding  shell  and  cause 
trouble  from  smoke.  Stowage  behind  armor  where  easily  accessible 
for  serving  out  and  stowage  is  desirable. 


TOILET  FIXTURES. 


133.  The  stateroom  toilet  fixtures  of  most  recent  ships  are  of  very 
suitable  type. 


BOW  ORNAMENT. 


134.  This  is  a  fitting  heavy,  expensive,  and  serving  no  other  pur¬ 
pose  than  decoration,  and  should  be  omiited,  or  reduced  to  some¬ 
thing  smaller  than  is  generally  fitted.  The  Kansas  has  a  very  suit¬ 
able  type. 

ASH  CHUTES. 


135.  Should  extend  to  upper  deck. 


PAINT. 

136.  The  spar  color  paint  now  used  for  upper  works  is  not  a  de¬ 
sirable  paint.  It  has  no  body,  quickly  washes  away,  and  will  not 
stand  scrubbing.  I  recommend  the  use  of  a  blue-gray  paint  in  its 
place,  believing  that  the  color  is  more  suitable  and  that  with  the 
constituents  required  for  such  a  color  a  more  durable  paint  may  be 
obtained. 

BATTLE  LIGHTING  CIRCUIT. 

137.  It  would  seem  that  an  arrangement  of  such  circuits  should 
be  made  so  that  the  lights  behind  armor  and  below  protective  deck 
where  they  can  not  show  from  outside  may  burn  freely  in  battle,  as 
it  is  essential  that  these  places  be  well  lighted  at  such  times. 

INTERNAL  DRAFT  GAUGES. 

138.  Where  suitably  located  are  very  desirable. 


48 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


TARPAULIN  BATTENS. 

139.  I  believe  tarpaulin  battens  should  be  fitted  to  all  gun-deck 
hatches  on  ships  having  a  gun-deck  battery  unless  metal  covers  are 
fitted.  The  number  of  gratings  for  hatches  may  be  materially 
reduced  with  advantage. 

SAND  AND  WASH  DECK  GEAR  LOCKERS. 

140.  Should  be  located  high  up  in  convenient  locations  and  dis¬ 
tributed  to  various  parts  of  ship  so  as  to  be  readily  accessible  for 
use  in  peace  times  and  so  that  the  gear  may  be  thrown  overboard 
in  time  of  war. 


BATTALION  LOCKERS. 

141.  Are  not  believed  to  be  necessary.  The  use  of  the  ship’s  com¬ 
pany  as  a  landing  party  in  the  case  of  a  battle  ship  is  probably  so 
remote  a  contingency  that  due  warning  would  be  had  so  that  the 
stowage  of  such  gear  in  a  regular  storeroom  below  would  serve  all 
purposes. 

POST-OFFICE. 


142.  The  provision  of  a  set  of  pigeonholes  adjacent  to  or  part  of 
canteen  (one  pigeonhole  for  each  initial  letter)  will  facilitate  dis¬ 
tribution  of  mail. 


ABANDON  SHIP  LOCKERS. 

143.  I  do  not  believe  that  special  provision  for  those  above  decks 
is  necessary.  There  are  not  enough  boats  to  abandon  ship  now  and 
the  provision  of  special  lockers  seems  to  cause  unnecessary  and  un¬ 
warranted  use  of  space  above  decks,  where  they  might  be  stowed  in 
a  suitable  storeroom  below  with  straight  lead  to  weather  deck. 


BOOKCASES. 

144.  The  present  type  of,  generally  O.  K.,  but  should  be  so  con¬ 
structed  as  to  be  readily  and  quickly  thrown  overboard. 

Very  respectfully, 

R.  H.  Eobinson, 

Naval  C onstructor,  U.  S.  Navy.. 

The  Commander  in  Chief  United  States  Atlantic  Fleet, 

U.  8.  8.  C  onnecticut,  Flagship. 


[First  indorsement.] 


Respectfully  forwarded  to  the  Navy  Department  in  connection 
with  my  letter  No.  639,  of  this  date. 

R.  D.  Evans, 

Rear-Admiral ,  TJ .  8.  Navy , 
Commander  in  Chief  United  States  Atlantic  Fleet. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


49 


6. 

Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  transmitting  supplementary 
statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor  of  the  Navy  in  relation  to  al¬ 
leged  structural  defects  in  battle  ships. 

Navy  Department, 

W ashington,  April  15 , 1908. 

My  Dear  Senator  Hale  :  There  is  forwarded  herewith  the  supple¬ 
mentary  statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor  in  relation  to  certain 
alleged  defects  in  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy.  The  De¬ 
partment’s  letter  to  you.  under  date  of  March  9,  1908,  fully  expressed 
its  views  concerning  this  subject,  and  subsequent  report  received  from 
the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  the  naval  con¬ 
structor  attached  to  his  staff  has  strengthed  the  conviction  which  I 
previously  entertained  with  respect  to  the  location  of  water-line 
armor,  height  of  freeboard,  height  of  gun  axes,  etc.  Admiral  Evans 
in  his  recent  report  makes  allusion  to  the  inability  to  fight  the  broad¬ 
side  guns  under  certain  conditions  of  wreather,  and  states  that  such 
guns  are  not  high  enough  for  efficiency  under  all  cpnditions.  This 
criticism  is  likewise  applicable  to  the  majority  of  broadside  guns 
of  battle  ships  of  all  navies  wherever  such  guns  are  mounted  below 
the  main  deck,  as  in  the  case  of  the  British,  Japanese,  and  German 
navies.  It  may  be  remarked,  in  passing,  that  such  a  location  is  the 
only  available  one  for  the  majority  of  guns  of  the  intermediate  bat¬ 
tery  on  all  battle  ships  built  or  building,  and  in  the  United  States 
Navy  the  height  of  such  secondary  battery  guns  above  the  water  is 
somewhat  greater  than  the  height  of  similarly  located  guns  in  the 
majority  of  battle  ships  of  the  British,  German,  and  Japanese  navies. 
In  our  battle  ships  of  the  Delaware  and  South  Carolina  classes  now 
in  course  of  construction  this  criticism  concerning  intermediate  bat¬ 
tery  guns  has  little  force,  inasmuch  as  the  main  battery  is  concen¬ 
trated  in  heavy  guns  mounted  in  turrets  on  the  upper  decks,  the  inter¬ 
mediate  battery  being  required  solely  for  defense  against  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  and  torpedo  boats. 

In  view  of  the  misunderstanding  which  seems  to  exist  in  some 
quarters  as  to  the  degree  of  responsibility  of  Admiral  Converse  and 
the  Chief  Constructor  for  alleged  defects  in  battle  ships  now  attached 
to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  it  seems  proper  for  me  to  emphasize  defi¬ 
nitely  the  fact  that  neither  Admiral  Converse  nor  Admiral  Capps 
had  any  responsibilty  whatever  for  the  designs  of  battle  ships  now 
in  active  service,  and  therefore  the  exhaustive  reports  of  those  officers 
concerning  alleged  defects  in  naval  materiel  should  be  accepted 
without  qualification  as  being  the  impartial  report  of  officers  who 
have  no  personal  responsibility  for  the  designs  •  of  the  ships  of  the 
fleet  recently  under  criticism,  but  whose  official  position  gives  them 
unusual  opportunity  to  know  all  the  facts  pertaining  to  the  method 
of  developing  designs  of  those  vessels  and  the  good  results  which 
have  so  far  been  obtained  in  their  subsequent  construction. 

There  are  also  forwarded  herewith,  for  the  information  of  your 
committee,  copies  of  the  recent  reports  of  Admiral  Evans  and  Naval 
Constructor  Iiobinson  concerning  the  behavior  of  vessels  of  the  At¬ 
lantic  Fleet  during  the  passage  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Magdalena 

S.  Doc.  506,  60-1 - 4 


50 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


Bay,  also  their  comment  for  the  information  of  the  Department  in 
connection  with  future  design  work.  Practically  all  of  the  criticism 
contained  in  these  reports  had  already  been  discounted  and  disposed 
of  in  the  designs  of  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota  class.  Although 
detailed  comment  upon  the  above-noted  report  is  now  in  course  of 
preparation  by  the  Board  on  Construction,  I  have  deemed  it  advis¬ 
able  to  forward  the  report  at  this  time  for  the  general  information 
of  the  committee,  although  it  is  my  opinion  that  they  should  not 
be  published,  and  certainly  not  in  advance  of  the  preparation  of  the 
detailed  comments  thereon. 

Very  truly,  yours, 

Y.  H.  Metcalf, 

Secretary. 

Hon.  Eugene  Hale, 

Chairman  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs , 

United  States  Senate. 


7. 


Supplemental  statement  of  the  Chief  Constructor  of  the  Navy  in 
relation  to  alleged  defects  in  naval  vessels. 


Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair, 

Navy  Department, 

W  ashington,  D.  C .,  April  13,  1908. 

Sir  :  In  conformity  with  the  request  of  the  committee,  I  have  the 
honor  to  submit  the  following  supplemental  statement  concerning 
certain  matters  relating  to  naval  materiel.  In  order  that  this  state¬ 
ment  may  be  as  brief  as  possible,  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  cover 
ground  which  has  already  been  fully  covered,  except  where  further 
comment  may  appear  to  be  necessary  for  the  complete  and  compre¬ 
hensive  disposition  of  such  criticism  as  may  not  have  been  already 
disposed  of.  No  attempt  will  be  made  to  traverse  in  detail  the  evi¬ 
dence  of  critics  who  have  appeared  before  the  committee,  since  it  is 
understood  that  this  is  not  desired.  Failure,  therefore  to  take  note 
of  such  criticism  should  not  be  construed  as  indicating  that  such  criti¬ 
cism  is  founded  on  fact. 

It  also  appears  to  be  desirable,  at  the  very  beginning  of  this  supple¬ 
mentary  statement,  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  practically  all  pf  the 
criticism  to  which  our  battle  ships  have  recently  been  subjected  is 
directed  against  completed  vessels,  and  does  not  apply  to  any  material 
extent  to  vessels  which  have  been  designed  during  the  past  four  years. 
The  only  criticism  directed  at  the  vessels  of  the  Delaumre  class,  for 
instance,  is  that  affecting  the  submergence  of  the  lower  edge  of  the 
main  water-line  belt  armor,  and  the  original  criticism  with  respect 
to  the  location  of  this  armor  has  been  so  materially  modified  as  to  be 
negligible,  and  would  appear  to  have  been  fully  and  completely  dis¬ 
posed  of  by  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  the  chairman  of 
the  Senate  naval  committee  under  date  of  March  9,  1908,  and  by  sub¬ 
sequent  specific  comment  of  Admiral  Evans,  commander  in  chief  of 
the  Atlantic  Fleet,  in  his  letter  of  March  6,  1908. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


51 


The  location  of  the  water-line  belt  armor  on  the  South  Carolina 
and  Michigan  being  practically  identical  with  that  of  similar  armor 
on  the  Delaware  and  North  Dakota ,  the  disposition  of  such  criticism 
with  respect  to  the  Delaware  necessarily  includes  the  South  Carolina 
and  Michigan. 

It  is  true  that  the  freeboard  forward  on  the  South  Carolina  is 
lower  than  that  on  the  Delaware ,  and  the  freeboard  aft  is  one  deck 
height  less  than  the  after  freeboard  on  the  Delaware.  It  should  be 
specifically  noted,  however,  that  the  South  Carolina  and  Michigan 
were  designed  to  meet  the  specific  provision  of  the  act  of  Congress 
for  the  most  powerful  battle  ship  on  a  trial  displacement  of  16,000 
tons.  That  the  designers  of  the  South  Carolina  and  Michigan  met 
these  requirements  of  Congress  in  a  most  satisfactory  manner  would 
seem  to  be  fully  proved  by  the  unusually  commendatory  comments 
concerning  this  design,  which  have  appeared  in  foreign  publications 
already  quoted  in  the  Chief  Constructor’s  special  report  of  February 
14, 1908,  and  by  specific  and  direct  approval  of  seagoing  officers  of  our 
own  Navy.  A  recent  evaluation  (prepared  by  a  foreign  naval 
officer)  of  the  fighting  strength  of  battle  ships  of  the  principal  navies 
of  the  world  ascribes  to  the  South  Carolina  the  maximum  fighting 
efficiency  of  any  ship 'considered,  the  U.  S.  S.  South  Carolina  being 
placed  as  No.  1,  with  the!  British  Dreadnought  No.  2.  This  will 
doubtless  be  considered  by  certain  critics  as  a  too  partial  judgment  of 
the  good  points  of  the  South  Carolina  as  compared  with  the  Dread¬ 
nought.  It  is  well  to  remember,  however,  that  the  broadside  battery 
of  the  South  Carolina  is  equal  to  that  of  the  Dreadnought ,  the  target 
area  is  less,  and  the  armor  protection  unquestionably  greater,  the 
points  of  inferiority  being  those  of  speed,  and,  in  a  heavy  seaway,  a 
freeboard  which  would  place  the  South  Carolina  at  a  slight  disad¬ 
vantage  as  compared  with  the  Dreadnought. 

With  regard  to  the  freeboard  of  the  South  Carolina ,  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  freeboard  forward  is  practically  identical  with  that 
of  the  latest  Japanese  battle  ships,  and  also  almost  identical  with  that 
of  battle  ships  of  the  highest  freeboard  now  attached  to  the  Atlantic 
Battle  Ship  Fleet.  It  is  also  equal,  or  superior,  to  that  of  all  battle 
ships  of  the  Japanese  navy  which  participated  in  the  battle  of  the 
Sea  of  Japan,  and  is  approximately  equal  to  the  freeboard  of  the 
large  majority  of  the  battle  ships  of  the  British  navy  designed  prior 
to  1905.  The  freeboard  aft  is  in  conformity  with  the  design  of  bat¬ 
tle  ship  most  highly  approved  by  the  Walker  board  in  1896,  also  by 
the  General  Board  in  1903  and  1904,  so  that  the  general  features  of 
the  South  Carolina  class,  so  far  as  concerns  freeboard,  both  forward 
and  aft,  would  appear  to  have  met  with  the  entire  approval  of  some 
of  the  most  distinguished  officers  (seagoing)  of  the  United  States 
Navy. 

The  battery  arrangements  of  the  South  Carolina  and  Delaware 
classes  are  such  as  to  give  the  maximum  broadside  fire  for  the  heavy 
guns,  and  in  this  respect  these  vessels  have  a  distinct  advantage  over 
foreign  battle  ships  whose  battery  arrangement  has  been  developed 
on  different  lines. 

In  view  of  the  very  complete  data  already  submitted  for  the  con¬ 
sideration  of  your  committee,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  necessary  to 
devote  further  attention  to  the  characteristics  of  the  South  Carolina 
and  Delaware  classes. 


52 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


With  respect  to  the  general  criticisms  which  have  been  made  con- 
.  cerning  the  disposition  of  water-line  belt  armor,  freeboard,  height 
of  gun  axes,  etc.,  on  battle  ships  now  attached  to  the  fleet,  it  would 
seem  that  the  committee  had  already  been  fully  advised  as  to  the 
facts.  It  appears,  however,  that  there  are  those  who  lay  special  stress 
upon  the  insufficient  height  of  the  after  heavy  guns  of  vessels  of  the 
Iowa ,  Alabama ,  Maine ,  Mississippi ,  and  South  Carolina  classes,  and 
who  claim  that  that  feature  of  those  vessels  is  gravely  in  error.  In 
this  connection  it  seems  only  necessary  to  invite  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Walker  board  in  1896  specially  commended  the  arrangement 
of  freeboard  on  the  Iowa ,  and  for  the  battle  ships  then  under  con¬ 
sideration  by  that  board  recommended  that — 

They  should  have  high  freeboard  forward  and  low  freeboard  aft.  substantially 
like  the  Iowa 

Also,  the  General  Board,  in  a  communication  dated  December  15, 
1903,  in  which  it  set  forth  the  characteristics  which  should  be  em¬ 
bodied  in  battle  ships  of  about  16,000  tons,  stated  specifically  that 
they  should — 

Have  high  freeboard  forward.  In  this  respect  the  Iowa  type  impresses  favor¬ 
ably. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  all  the  military  and  seagoing  character¬ 
istics  of  each  battle  ship  built  for  the  United  States  Navy  have 
been  passed  upon  by  a  board  of  officers  a  majority  of  whose  mem¬ 
bers  belong  to  the  seagoing  branch  of  the  Navy,  and  that  the  de¬ 
signs  of  each  battle  ship  are  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
before  advertisement  for  their  construction  is  made. 

It  may  also  be  noted  that  officers  who  have  commanded  vessels 
of  this  type  have  reported  that  all  the  guns  of  the  main  battery 
could  be  fought  in  any  weather  in  which  battles  are  likely  to  be 
fought.  Reports  have  also  been  recently  received  from  the  com¬ 
mander  in  chief  of  the  Atlantic  Battle  Ship  Fleet  and  the  naval 
constructor  attached  to  his  staff  which  state  that  while  a  somewhat 
higher  turret  gun  forward  would  be  desirable  to  fight  with  full 
efficiency  at  15  knots  in  a  trade-wind  sea,  no  weather  was  encoun¬ 
tered  on  the  recent  voyage  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  where  turret  guns 
would  be  out  of  action,  except  so  far  as  flying  spray  in  a  few  cases 
might  have  affected  the  gun  sights,  this  last  condition,  however,  being 
one  which  a  few  additional  feet  freeboard  forward  would  not 
remedy. 

The  report  of  the  Chief  Constructor  of  February  14,  1908,  and  the 
appendixes  thereto,  which  are  part  of  the  testimony  before  your  com¬ 
mittee,  give  in  considerable  detail  the  principal  characteristics  of  the 
battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy,  as  well  as  those  of  typical 
battle  ships  of  foreign  navies.  The  heights  of  freeboard,  heights  of 
gun  axes,  and  location  of  water-line  armor  therein  set  forth  were  de¬ 
termined  with  the  greatest  accuracy  possible,  and,  subject  to  the  cor¬ 
rection  of  minor  errors,  principally  typographical,  the  data  therein 
contained  is  believed  to  be  as  accurate  as  can  be  determined  from  the 
information  accessible  to  the  Navy  Department  and  its  bureaus  and 
officers. 

The  tables  above  referred  to  show  that  the  battle  ships  now  in 
commission  in  the  United  States  Navy  are  in  no  sense  at  a  disadvan¬ 
tage  as  to  freeboard,  gun  heights,  and  arrangement  of  armor  as  com¬ 
pared  with  vessels  of  the  principal  foreign  navies. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


53 


As  distinctly  stated,  the  data  given  in  the  tables  was  for  the  “  de¬ 
signed  ”  displacement,  in  as  much  as  the  most  accurate  information 
available  concerning  foreign  ships  was  based  upon  that  displacement. 
The  “  deep  load  ”  characteristics  for  battle  ships  of  our  own  and 
foreign  services  would  vary  in  approximately  the  same  degree  as 
those  given  for  the  “  designed  ”  displacement  in  the  table. 

It  is  believed  that  in  certain  foreign  designs  full  allowance  of  am¬ 
munition  and  stores  is  provided,  instead  of  the  two-thirds  allowance 
provided  for  American  vessels,  but  this  would  not  ordinarily  involve 
a  difference  in  draft,  freeboard,  etc.,  of  more  than  4  inches.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  coal  carried  at  designed  displacement  in  the  very 
large  majority  of  foreign  battle  ships  is  no  greater  than  that  carried 
by  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy,  and  is  in  many  cases  less, 
as  is  fully  set  forth  in  the  table  given  in  Appendix  A. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  any  attempt  to  determine  the  over¬ 
drafts  of  vessels  by  taking  the  recorded  “  log  ”  drafts  and  making 
allowance  for  the  difference  between  the  actual  coal  reported  on  board 
and  the  coal  provided  to  be  carried  on  the  designed  displacement  is 
entirely  misleading  and  inaccurate.  Such  a  method,  as  ordinarily 
carried  out,  involves  errors  due  to  inaccuracies  in  the  recorded  log 
draft;  errors  due  to  differences  in  density  of  water;  errors  due  to 
failure  to  take  into  consideration  the  actual  stores,  ammunition,  etc., 
on  board;  errors  due  to  inaccurate  log  reports  as  to  coal  actually  on 
board;  failure  to  take  into  account  the  excess  water  in  trimming 
tanks,  double  bottoms,  etc. — this  last-named  item  alone  on  certain 
battle  ships  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  during  the  recent  voyage  to  the 
Pacific  coast  having  involved  as  much  as  500  to  800  tons  additional 
weight.  Any  estimate  of  overdraft,  therefore,  based  upon  the  draft 
of  the  ship  and  the  amount  of  coal  on  board,  as  recorded  in  the  log, 
would  seem  to  be  too  obviously  inaccurate  to  require  further  comment. 

The  actual  overdraft  of  vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy,  as  com¬ 
pared  with  their  designed  drafts,  are  carefully  and  accurately  deter¬ 
mined  immediately  after  delivery  of  the  vessels  to  the  Government, 
so  that  the  errors  noted  in  the  preceding  paragraph  are  entirely 
eliminated.  Accurate  data  so  obtained  shows  that  of  the  battle  ships 
now  attached  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  the  Virginia  had  the  greatest  over¬ 
draft,  as  compared  with  her  designed  draft,  the  overdraft  in  the  case 
of  the  Virginia  being  11  inches.  The  maximum  overdraft  of  the  other 
vessels  of  the  Virginia  class  was  9J  inches.  The  overdraft  of  the  five 
vessels  of  the  Connecticut  class  varied  from  4^  to  6  inches.  The 
overdraft  of  the  other  seven  battle  ships  of  the  fleet  was  3J  inches  for 
the  Alabama ,  3f  inches  for  the  Missouri,  and  6  inches  for  the  Ohio , 
7£  inches  for  the  Kearsarge ,  Kentucky ,  and  Illinois ,  and  9f  inches 
for  the  Maine. 

As  noted  in  previous  reports  and  testimony,  the  overdrafts  of 
United  States  battle  ships  were  largely  due  to  changes  and  additions 
which  were  made  after  the  approval  of  the  designs,  and,  in  many 
instances,  after  the  actual  construction  of  the  vessels  had  been  ad¬ 
vanced  to  a  considerable  extent;  and  where  there  were  differences  in 
overdrafts  on  sister  ships  these  differences  were  largely  attributable 
to  difference  in  type  of  boilers  and  details  of  machinery  installation. 

Before  dismissing  the  subject  of  overdrafts  of  battle  ships  it  is 
worthy  of  special  note  that  the  last  three  battle  ships  completed, 
namely,  the  New  Hampshire,  Idaho,  and  Mississippi,  have  been  con- 


54  ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 

structed  quite  within  the  designed  estimate  of  weight,  so  that  those 
vessels  will  be  slightly  underdraft  instead  of  overdraft.  In  explana¬ 
tion  of  this  condition  it  is  merely  necessary  to  state  that  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  details  and  the  changes  authorized  on  those  vessels  subse¬ 
quent  to  the  approval  of  the  designs  were  such  as  to  not  materially 
increase  the  displacement  of  the  vessels. 

The  completion  of  battle  ships,  or  any  other  class  of  ships,  within 
the  “  designed  ”  displacement  is  almost  entirely  a  question  of  adher¬ 
ing  to  the  original  features  of  design.  If  radical  changes  are  made 
in  this  design,  involving  large  additional  weight,  overdraft  for  the 
completed  vessel  must  inevitably  be  expected. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  statements  and  the  mass  of  evidence 
already  offered  concerning  the  location  of  water-line  armor  on  bat¬ 
tle  ships,  it  would  seem  quite  unnecessary  to  dwell  further  upon  this 
phase  of  recent  naval  criticism,  so  that  I  will  dismiss  it  by  quoting 
the  following  extract  from  the  latest  communication  on  this  subject, 
contained  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  by  the 
commander  in  chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  under  date  of  March  17, 
1908: 

Even  with  smooth  seas  and  practically  no  wind  the  swell  at  times  caused, 
such  rolling  and  pitching  as  to  expose  the  lower  portion  of  the  armor  belt  even 
at  heavy  load,  hence  the  lower  limit  of  armor  should  not  be  raised. 

(Italicizing  not  author’s.) 

The  above  is  too  definite  and  conclusive  to  require  any  comment 
other  than  that  those  vessels  were,  in  many  instances,  heavily  over¬ 
laden,  and  the  lower  edge  of  the  armor  was  therefore  immersed  in 
many  cases  more  than  7  feet. 

FREEBOARD  AND  GUN  HEIGHTS. 

The  data  already  submitted  to  the  committee  with  respect  to  free¬ 
board,  both  on  our  own  and  foreign  battle  ships,  would  seem  to  be 
quite  sufficient  to  preclude  the  necessity  of  making  extensive  allusion 
thereto  in  this  supplementary  statement.  The  present  tendency  in 
battle-ship  design  is  to  concentrate  the  heavy  battery  in  turrets 
mounted  upon  the  upper  deck,  and,  for  our  latest  vessels,  those  of 
the  Delaware  class,  to  have  a  freeboard  forward  one  deck  height 
higher  than  was  formerly  the  case.  The  major  part  of  the  inter¬ 
mediate  battery  for  torpedo  defense  must  of  necessity  be  mounted 
“  between  decks.” 

The  tables  already  submitted  give  accurate  data  concerning  the 
freeboard,  gun  heights,  etc.,  of  United  States  and  typical  foreign 
battle  ships,  and  the  most  casual  inspection  of  such  tables  indicates 
that  the  United  States  is  at  no  disadvantage  with  respect  to  free¬ 
board  and  gun  heights  as  compared  with  battle  ships  of  foreign 
navies.  The  low  freeboard  aft  on  certain  United  States  battle  ships 
has  already  been  considered  and  disposed  of  and  requires  no  further 
attention. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  an  officer  who  has  only  recently  returned 
from  Japan,  and  who  has  had  unusual  opportunity  to  communicate 
with  Japanese  naval  officers,  confirms  the  statement  previously 
made  that  the  most  recent  design  of  Japanese  battle  ships  provides 
for  a  moderate  freeboard,  approximately  equal  to  that  of  the  Con¬ 
necticut  class,  and  that  for  designs  in  prospect,  which  contemplate 
a  vessel  even  larger,  the  Japanese  have  no  intention  of  increasing 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


55 


their  height  of  freeboard.  The  latest  design  of  battle  ship  in  the 
United  States  Navy,  it  may  be  noted,  has  more  than  5  feet  greater 
freeboard  forward  than  the  latest  designed  Japanese  battle  ship. 

TRIAL  TRIPS  OF  NAVAL  VESSELS. 

Judging  from  questions  asked  by  various  members  of  the  com¬ 
mittee,  and  the  replies  thereto  by  witnesses,  there  would  seem  to  be  a 
very  imperfect  understanding  in  the  minds  of  many  as  to  the  con¬ 
tract  requirements  for  trial  trips  of  naval  vessels  and  the  rigor  with 
which  such  contract  requirements  are  enforced.  At  the  request  of 
the  committee  there  are  hereto  attached  a  copy  of  the  contract  for  the 
Delaware  and  a  copy  of  the  contract  for  the  Louisiana .  (Appen¬ 
dixes  B  and  C.) 

Allusion  having  been  made  during  the  progress  of  this  investiga¬ 
tion  to  the  practice  of  the  Navy  Department  of  giving  bonuses  for 
speed  in  excess  of  the  contract  requirements,  it  should  be  noted  that 
the  contracts  for  naval  vessels  have  contained  no  provision  for  the 
granting  of  a  speed  bonus  since  January,  1894 — more  than  fourteen 
years  ago.  None  of  the  battle  ships  now  attached  to  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  were  subject  to  bonuses  for  speed  in  excess  of  the  contract  re¬ 
quirements. 

It  would  also  appear  that  there  are  those  who  believe  that  naval 
vessels  never  attain  in  actual  service  the  speed  called  for  by  the  con¬ 
tracts  for  those  vessels.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  not  only  is  the  contract 
speed  of  United  States  naval  vessels  attained  during  the  official 
trial,  under  the  rigidly  enforced  conditions  specifically  provided  in 
the  contract,  but  with  boilers  and  machinery  in  good  condition  and 
with  clean  bottoms  the  “  contract  speed  ”  has  been  attained  in  actual 
service  by  a  large  number  of  naval  vessels  when  much  more  heavily 
loaded  than  they  were  during  their  contract  trials.  With  hull  and 
machinery  in  the  condition  just  indicated,  and  engines  developing 
the  horsepower  which  was  actually  obtained  on  their  trial  trips,  the 
majority  of  the  United  States  battle  ships  could  attain  their  contract 
speed  with  all  stores  on  board  and  bunkers  full  of  coal.  The  Min¬ 
nesota,  a  representative  of  the  five  most  recently  designed  battle 
ships  now  attached  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  has  since  her  delivery  to  the 
Government,  and  with  a  naval  crew,  exceeded  by  more  than  eight- 
tenths  of  a  knot  the  speed  required  bjr  the  contract — and  this  with  all 
stores  and  ammunition  on  board  and  bunkers  nearly  full  of  coal. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  contract  trials  of  vessels  built  for  the  United 
States  Navy  are  most  carefully  conducted,  the  vessels  being  loaded 
to  such  a  draft  that  the  mean  displacement  during  the  official  trial 
will  be  that  required  by  the  contract.  Judging  by  reports  contained 
in  scientific  journals,  many  vessels  of  the  British  navy  have  been  tried 
at  a  displacement  considerably  less  than  their  designed  displacement. 
Such  a  condition  has  never  obtained  in  the  contract  trials  of  United 
States  naval  vessels,  and  should  a  United  States  naval  vessel,  when 
subjected  to  trial,  be  lacking  in  any  portion  of  the  armor,  armament, 
outfit,  fittings,  ammunition,  stores,  etc.,  allowance  therefor  is  made  by 
the  addition  of  an  equivalent  weight  of  water  in  the  double  bottoms  or 
trimming  tanks  or  by  placing  an  additional  allowance  of  coal  in  the 
bunkers. 

So  far  as  the  designer  is  concerned,  there  would  be  no  difficulty 
whatever  in  having  the  contract  trials  conducted  at  a  deep-load  dis- 


56 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


placement,  with  all  stores  and  ammunition  on  board  and  the  bunkers 
full  of  coal,  rather  than  at  a  less  displacement,  with  a  certain  pro¬ 
portion  of  stores  and  ammunition  on  board  and  an  arbitrary  amount 
of  coal  in  the  bunkers.  If  such  a  method  should  be  adopted,  however, 
the  Navy  Department  would  not  derive  any  benefit  therefrom,  since 
allowance  would  necessarily  be  made  for  the  anticipated  decrease  in 
speed  which  such  an  increase  in  displacement  would  involve.  More¬ 
over,  the  data  so  obtained  would  not  be  comparable  wfith  that  ob¬ 
tained  from  similar  vessels  previously  tried  in  the  United  States 
Navy,  as  well  as  in  foreign  navies,  and  in  any  comparison  resulting 
therefrom  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  Navy,  when  tried  at  their 
deep-load  displacement,  would  appear  at  a  disadvantage  as  compared 
with  foreign  vessels  tried  at  a  displacement  considerably  less  than  the 
deep-load  displacement. 

It  is  worthy  of  special  note,  however,  that  the  difference  in  speed 
due  to  the  difference  in  displacement  of  the  vessel  at  trial  load  and 
deep  load  would  not  be  the  “  2  or  3  knots  ”  mentioned  in  the  tes¬ 
timony  before  the  committee.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  for  battle  ships 
now  attached  to  the  United  States  Atlantic  Fleet,  as  well  as  those  in 
course  of  construction,  the  speed  at  deep-load  displacement,  with  all 
stores,  ammunition  etc.,  on  board,  and  bunkers  full  of  coal,  would 
rarely  be  as  much  as  one-third  of  a  knot  below  that  at  the  trial  dis¬ 
placement  when  the  engines  were  developing  the  same  horsepower. 
This  reduction  of  one-third  of  a  knot  in  speed  would  be  approxi¬ 
mately  the  maximum  and  would  only  occur  at  high  speeds.  At  low 
speeds  the  reduction,  due  to  increase  in  displacement,  would  be  pro¬ 
portionately  less,  the  horsepower,  of  course,  being  assumed  to  remain 
the  same  at  the  trial  and  deep-load  displacements. 

In  this  supplementary  statement  I  have  merely  attempted  to  bring 
out  more  clearly  facts  which  would  assist  the  committee  in  arriving 
at  correct  conclusions  concerning  the  characteristics  of  battle  ships 
of  the  United  States  Navy  and  the  conditions  under  which  their 
designs  have  been  developed.  The  somewhat  extensive  allusion  that 
has  been  made  in  previous  reports  and  in  the  testimony  to  foreign 
practice,  and  especially  to  the  case  of  the  Royal  Sovereign ,  was 
deemed  necessary  in  order  that  the  committee  might  fully  understand 
foreign  procedure  in  such  matters.  The  case  of  the  Royal  Sovereign 
was  given  particular  prominence  on  account  of  the  very  extensive 
technical  criticism  which  the  designs  of  that  vessel  received.  The 
comment  contained  in  the  report  of  the  Chief  Constructor,  of  Febru¬ 
ary  14,  1908,  and  the  diagrams  and  tables  thereto  attached  should 
leave  no  possible  doubt  in  the  mind  of  anyone  as  to  the  characteristics 
which  it  was  desired  to  specially  emphasize  in  connection  with  the 
consideration  of  the  designs  of  the  Royal  Sovereign  class.  These 
were  obviously  “  height  of  freeboard,”  “  height  of  gun  axes,”  and 
“  location  of  the  lower  edge  of  the  water-line  belt  armor.”  That  the 
vessels  of  the  Alabama ,  Maine ,  Idaho ,  and  South  Carolina  classes  had 
low  freeboard  aft  had  no  particular  bearing  upon  the  case,  especially 
since  the  fact  that  these  vessels  had  a  low  freebroad  aft  was  fully 
set  forth  in  the  tables.  Nor  was  it  a  matter  requiring  special  note 
that  the  upper  belt  armor  of  certain  groups  of  battle  ships  in  the 
British  navy  was  of  the  same  thickness  as  the  lower  belt  armor, 
especially  when  12  battle  ships  in  the  British  navy  whose  upper 
belt  was  of  the  same  thickness  as  the  lower  belt  had  main  water-line 
armor  whose  maximum  thickness  was  just  equal  to  or  less  than  the 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


57 


upper  belt  armor  of  the  Vermont  class.  All  the  pertinent  facts  in 
the  case  were  fully  set  forth  in  the  text  or  the  tabular  statements; 
and  unless  the  text  of  the  report  had  been  extended  to  quite  unjustifi¬ 
able  length,  it  had  to  be  assumed  that  those  who  may  desire  to  indulge 
in  criticism  will  take  the  trouble  to  look  over  the  tabular  data  and 
appendices  as  well  as  the  body  of  any  report  whenever  in  doubt  as  to 
the  exact  meaning  of  the  text. 

In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  repeat  the  brief  summary  statement  con¬ 
tained  on  pages  70  and  71  of  the  Chief  Constructor’s  hearing  before 
the  Senate  Naval  Committee  on  Senate  bill  No.  3335,  as  follows : 

To  make  a  very  brief  summary  of  tlie  salient  points  of  this  morning’s  bearing, 
I  should  like  to  state  that  the  principal  subjects  of  criticism,  so  far  as  they 
concern  the  Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair,  were  the  “  height  of  freeboard,” 
the  “  height  of  gun  axes,”  and  the  “  distribution  of  water-line  belt  armor.” 

I  showed,  I  think,  conclusively,  and  made  reference  to  reports  and  previous 
hearings,  that  these  three  subjects  have  already  been  given  the  most  serious 
consideration  not  only  in  our  own,  but  in  foreign  navies ;  that  a  very  eminent 
Board  of  Admiralty,  fortified  by  the  unanimous  opinion  of  some  of  the  most 
distinguishd  officers  of  the  British  navy,  had  fully  passed  upon  these  subjects; 
that  an  equally  conspicuous  board  in  our  own  service,  presided  over  by  the 
late  Admiral  John  G.  Walker,  had  in  1896  given  a  most  positive  statement  as 
to  the  essential  characteristics  of  a  battle  ship,  making  specific  comment  con¬ 
cerning  “freeboard,”  “gun  heights,”  and  location  of  water-line  armor  belt; 
that  the  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  as  recently  as  1903-4,  had  still  further  re¬ 
enforced  previous  service  opinion  as  to  the  freeboard  requisite  in  a  battle  ship 
and  had  named  the  Iowa  as  a  type  which  impressed  favorably ;  the  Iowa,  be 
it  noted,  having  less  freeboard  than  any  of  the  battle  ships  of  the  present 
Atlantic  Fleet  except  the  Kearsarge  and  Kentucky,  also  that  the  question  of 
distribution  of  water-line  armor  had  been  given  the  most  careful  consideration 
in  connection  with  each  design  of  battle  ship  developed;  that  the  designs  of 
all  United  States  battle  ships  were  passed  upon  by  the  Board  on  Construction, 
the  majority  of  whose  members  were  seagoing  officers ;  that  at  all  times  the 
Construction  Bureau  of  the  Navy  Department  has  been  in  the  closest  touch 
with  the  seagoing  element  of  the  service;  that  the  officers  of  the  construction 
corps  are  selected  from  specially  qualified  officers  of  the  line,  are  then  given 
additional  instruction  in  naval  architecture,  and  ultimately  transferred  to 
the  construction -corps,  full  details  as  to  the  method  of  selection  and  subsequent 
training  being  given  in  the  special  reports  heretofore  alluded  to;  that  all  of 
the  ships  of  the  British  navy  and  the  Japanese  navy,  with  the  exception  of 
the  latest  type,  the  Dreadnought,  and  possibly  the  Majesties,  had  approximately 
the  same  height  of  freeboard,  height  of  gun  axes,  etc.,  as  American  vessels 
of  approximately  the  same  date ;  that  the  Japanese  battle  ships  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  were  designed  and  built  in  England  and  followed 
in  their  design  the  British  school,  having  moderate  freeboard;  that  the  Japan¬ 
ese  battle  ships  in  the  battle  of  the  Sea  of  Japan  appeared  to  have  no  difficulty 
whatever  in  fighting  their  batteries  to  great  advantage  in  spite  of  the  character 
of  the  weather,  which  was  described  by  Mr.  Reuterdahl  himself  as  being 
“nearly  a  gale.” 

There  seems,  therefore,  no  possible  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the  “free¬ 
boards,”  “  heights  of  gun  axes,”  “  water-line  distribution  of  armor,”  etc.,  of 
battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy  have  been  based  upon  the  best  possible 
judgment  of  representative  officers  of  the  seagoing  branch  of  our  own  and  for¬ 
eign  service,  and  that  the  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy  are  in  these 
respects  fully  equal  to  similar  vessels  in  the  British  and  Japanese  navies. 

The  most  recent  information  received  from  the  commander  in 
chief  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  from  the  naval  constructor  attached  to 
his  staff,  and  from  an  officer  who  has  recently  returned  from  an  in¬ 
spection  of  certain  foreign  dockyards  fully  convinces  me  of  the  ac¬ 
curacy  of  statements  heretofore  made  in  my  reports  and  the  testi¬ 
mony  before  the  committees  of  Congress  concerning  the  general  ex¬ 
cellence  of  battle  ships  of  the  United  States  Navy,  not  only  as  re¬ 
gards  vessels  in  course  of  construction,  but  those  in  commission  and 


58 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


attached  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  due  allowance  being  made,  of  course, 
for  those  developments  in  naval  materiel  subsequent  to  the  com¬ 
pletion  of  certain  battle  ships  now  in  active  service. 

There  are  attached  hereto,  as  requested  by  the  committee,  copies 
of  the  contracts  for  the  Delaware  and  Louisiana ,  a  copy  of  the  report 
of  the  Board  of  which  Admiral  J.  G.  Walker,  U.  S.  Navy,  was  presi¬ 
dent,  submitted  to  the  Navy  Department  under  date  of  May  18,  1896, 
and  a  copy  of  the  report  of  the  special  turret  board;  also  tabular 
statement  giving  lengths  and  widths  of  side  armor  on  United  States 
battle  ships. 

Very  respectfully,  W.  L.  Capps, 

Chief  Constructor ,  U.  S.  Navy , 

Chief  of  Bureau. 

Hon.  Eugene  Hale, 

Chairman  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs , 

United  States  Senate. 

(Through  Secretary  of  the  Navy.) 


[Appendix  to  accompany  supplemental  report  of  Chief  Constructor  of  the  Navy,  dated 

April  13,  1908.] 

Table  of  normal  coal  and  full  coal  for  United  States  and  various  foreign  battle 

ships. 


Nation  and  ship. 

Displace¬ 

ment. 

Normal 

coal. 

Full  coal. 

Per  cent 
of  full 
coal. 

United  States: 

Delaware  (2  vessels) _ 

20,000 

1,000 

2,500 

40.0 

Michigan  (2  vessels) _  j 

16,000 

900 

2,200 

40.9 

Kansas  (4  vessels). _  _ _  . 

16,000 

900 

2,200 

40.9 

Idaho  (2  vessels)  _  _ 

13,000 

600 

1,750 

34.3 

Connecticut  (2  vessels)  _  _ 

16,000 

900 

2,200 

40.9 

New  Jersey  (5  vessels) _  _  _  J 

14,948 

900 

1,900 

47.4 

Maine  (3  vessels).  _ 

12,500 

1,000 

2,000 

50.0 

Alabama  (3  vessels) _  _ 

11,552 

11,500 

850 

1,200 

66.7 

Kearsarge  (2  vessels) _ _ 

410 

1,210 

33.9 

Tow  a 

11,410 

625 

1,780 

35.1 

Indiana  (3  vessels) _  _ 

10,288 

400 

1,800 

22.2 

England: 

St.  Vincent  (3  vessels) - 

19,250 

900 

2,700 

33.0 

Bellerophon  (3  vessels) _ 

18,600 

900 

2,700 

33.0 

Lord  Nelson  (2  vessels)  _ _ 

16,500 

900 

2,500 

36.0 

King  Edward  (8  vessels)...  _ 

16,350 

950 

2,150 

44.0 

Stviftshure  (2  vessels) _ 

11,800 

800 

2,000 

40.0 

Duncan  (5  vessels) _ _ 

14,000 

900 

2,000 

45.0 

London  (3  vessels) _  ._  _  ... _ 

15,000 

900 

2,100 

43.0 

Formidable  (3  vessels) _ _ _ 

15,000 

900 

2,200 

41.0 

Canopus  (6  vessels) _ ’ 

13,000 

800 

1,850 

43.0 

Majestic  (9  vessels) _  _ 

14,900 

900 

2,200 

41.0 

Royal  Sovereign  (7  vessels) - 

14,100 

900 

1,800 

50.0 

France: 

Liberte  (4  vessels) _ 

13,865 

905 

1,825 

49.5 

Danton  (6  vessels) _ 

18,400 

965 

2,052 

47.0 

Republique  (2  vessels)  _ _ _ 

14,635 

905 

1,825 

49.5 

Suffren _ 

12,530 

1,100 

1,820 

60.0 

Gaulois  (3  vessels) - - - 

11,108 

680 

1,100 

62.0 

Bouvet _  _  _ — 

12,000 

620 

800 

78.0 

Japan: 

25.0 

Aki  (2  vessels)  _ 

19,800 

750 

3,000 

Katori  (2  vessels) _ 

16,400 

750 

2,100 

36.0 

Mikasa..  _ _ _ _ _ _. 

15,300 

700 

1,600 

44.0 

Shikishima  (2  vessels) - 

15,200 

13,300 

700 

1,550 

45.0 

Iwami  ° _ _  _ _ 

600 

1,200 

50.0 

Germany: 

1,650 

50.0 

Braunschweig  (5  vessels) _  _ 

13,200 

700 

Deutschland  (5  vessels)  _ _  _ 

13,200 

850 

1,700 

44.0 

Wittlesback  (5  vessels) _ _  _ 

11,830 

650 

1,750 

47.0 

Kaiser  Class  (5  vessels)  _ _ 

11,150 

10,060 

650 

1,050 

62.0 

Brandenburg  ..  .  _ _ _ _  _ _ 

600 

1,050 

57.0 

a  Ex-Russian  Orel. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


59 


8. 

Department  or  the  Navy, 

General  Board, 

W ashing  ton,  April  16 ,  1908. 

Sir:  In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your  letter 
of  the  14th  instant,  No.  26000-6,  to  submit  a  brief  communication 
embodying  the  substance  of  the  statements  with  respect  to  the  loca¬ 
tion  of  the  water-line  armor  on  our  battle  ships  and  the  general 
excellence  of  our  battle  ships,  as  made  to  you  in  conversation,  I  have 
the  honor  to  submit  the  following : 

1.  During  the  recent  voyage  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  it  was  observed 
on  many  occasions  in  the  moderate  seas  which  were  met  with,  par¬ 
ticularly  in  the  trade-wind  sea  from  Trinidad  to  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
that  the  whole  of  the  armor  belts  below  the  water  line  on  the  ships  of 
the  fleet  was  exposed.  In  discussion  of  this  fact  with  other  officers 
of  the  fleet  it  was  the  consensus  of  opinion,  so  far  as  I  know  it,  that 
the  position  of  the  lower  limit  of  the  armor  belts  should  not  be 
raised  for  the  reason  that  if  in  a  moderate  trade-wind  sea  the  lower 
edge  of  the  armor  belt  is  exposed,  the  damage  possible  by  a  shot 
under  the  armor  belt  would  be  enormously  greater  than  a  much 
heavier  projectile  could  inflict  striking  above  the  water-line  belt. 
That  is  to  say,  that  the  protection  afforded  by  the  present  width  of 
armor  belt  in  its  present  position  is  greater  than  if  it  were  raised. 

2.  The  exposure  of  the  lower  edge  of  the  armor  belt  was  notice¬ 
able  even  when  the  ships  were  deeply  laden  with  coal  and  stores,  as 
well  as  with  double  bottoms  filled  with  fresh  feed  water  for  boilers. 

3.  In  my  opinion  our  ships,  class  for  class  and  of  corresponding 
date  of  construction,  are  the  equals  of  the  ships  of  any  other  nation, 
and  in  many  respects  the  superiors.  They  are  as  well  protected  by 
armor,  have  rather  more  offensive  power,  are  as  fast,  and  have  as 
great  a  steaming  radius  as  ships  of  the  same  date  and  class  in  other 
navies. 

4.  In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  emphasize  my  belief  that  our  ships  are 
as  efficient  in  design  and  construction  as  those  of  the  same  date  in 
other  navies. 

Very  respectfully,  R.  R.  Ingersoll, 

Captain ,  United  States  Navy. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


9. 


[Boston  Evening  Transcript,  Tuesday,  April  21,  1908.] 

AMERICAN  NAVY  SECOND - SIR  WILLIAM  HENRY  WHITE  PAYS  TRIBUTE. 

Sir  William  Henry  White,  K.  C.  B.,  F.  R.  S.,  was  in  Boston  yes¬ 
terday  and  last  evening  attended  a  dinner  at  the  Tavern  Club,  ten¬ 
dered  him  by  Josiah  B.  Millet,  at  which  prominent  naval  officers  of 
Boston  were  present.  Sir  William  was  for  nearly  twenty  years,  or 
up  to  1902,  the  responsible  designer  of  all  British  war  ships,  and  in 
knowledge  of  naval  construction  he  is  not  surpassed  by  any  man  in 


60 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


the  world.  He  is  also  deeply  interested  in  American  naval  affairs 
and  naval  officers.  Rear-Admiral  F.  T.  Bowles,  former  Chief  Con¬ 
structor,  United  States  Navy,  and  now  president  of  the  Fore  River 
Engine  Company,  and  Rear-Admiral  Capps,  present  Chief  Con¬ 
structor,  were  both  his  pupils  in  naval  construction.  It  was  this 
interest  in  our  naval  programme  that  induced  Sir  William  to  reply 
at  length  to  a  reporter’s  questions  regarding  the  faults  in  our  Navy 
as  outlined  by  Henry  Reuterdahl  in  McClures  Magazine.  He  plunged 
at  once  in  medias  res : 

Reuterdahl  says  in  his  article  that  the  American  ships  are  greatly  inferior  to 
foreign  ships.  He  says  that  the  thick  armor  in  the  water-line  region,  called 
the  armor  belt,  is  the  life  of  the  ship,  and  that,  in  the  American  ships,  is  only 
6  to  9  inches  above  the  water  when  they  are  loaded  up  for  sea,  while  in  foreign 
ships  the  corresponding  belt  armor  is  better  placed.  And  he  speaks  of  the 
British  Dreadnought  as  being  in  every  way  superior,  as  far  as  belt  armor 
defense  is  concerned,  to  the  American  ships. 

Now,  I  say  he  is  all  wrong  as  to  his  facts.  The  American  ships,  when  they 
are  floating  at  what  is  called  their  normal  water  line  in  still  water  and  upright, 
have  their  belt  armor  about  2§  to  3  feet  above  that  water  line.  You  see  that 
is  the  hypothetical  water  line — when  the  ship  has  certain  weights  on  board, 
not  representing  her  full  load.  The  American  official  reports  show  that  when 
the  ships  of  the  American  Navy  are  fully  laden  they  are  about  27  inches  deeper 
than  that.  And  then  the  thick  armor  belt  in  the  region  of  that  water  line 
still  is  about  from  6  to  9  inches  above  water.  So  far  Reuterdahl  is  correct. 
But  he  is  absolutely  wrong  in  regard  to  the  Dreadnought' s  thick  armor  belt. 
When  the  Dreadnought  is  fully  laden  she  is  drawing  from  4  to  4|  feet  more 
than  at  her  normal  water  line,  and  her  thick  armor  belt  is  then  a  foot  to  18 
inches  below  water,  and  she  is  left  with  a  height  of  armor  only  4  to  4£  feet 
above  the  surface  in  still  water. 

The  American  ships  when  fully  laden  are  about  27  inches  deeper  than  at  the 
normal  line.  The  Dreadnought  is  4  to  4^  feet  deeper — about  twice.  The  Amer¬ 
ican  ships  fully  laden  have  their  thick  armor  belt  6  to  9  inches  still  above  water. 
The  English  ship  has  her  corresponding  thick  armor  a  foot  to  18  inches  below 
water.  And  the  English  ship’s  defense  on  the  sides  is  then  restricted  to  armor 
that  rises  4  to  4^  feet  above  water  and  is  only  8  inches  thick.  The  American 
ships  of  the  Connecticut  class  have  on  their  sides,  for  a  considerable  portion  of 
their  length,  a  vertical  armor  corresponding  to  the  8-inch  armor  of  the  Dread¬ 
nought — it  may  be  a  little  less  than  8  inches — extending  16  feet  above  water. 
So  that  as  far  as  the  Dreadnought  and  the  Connecticut  are  concerned,  the 
Connecticut  is  better  protected  above  the  water  line. 

Now,  this  belt  armor,  in  my  opinion,  is  only  a  fetich.  If  the  ship  is  upright 
and  at  rest  in  still  water,  and  you  have  that  thick  armor  belt  at  the  water  line, 
that  portion  of  the  ship  would  be  of  course  well  protected.  But  that  portion, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  the  most  difficult  to  hit.  If  the  shots  fall  ever  so  little 
short,  they  will  ricochet  and  turn  up.  If  they  are  high  in  elevation,  of  course 
they  will  pass  over  the  thick  armor  belt. 

That  water  line  is  never  the  real  water  line  when  the  ship  is  at  sea.  If  the 
ship  is  moving,  the  waves  formed  by  her  motion  in  still  water  will  bury  that 
thick  armor — that  water  line.  If  there  are  waves  passing  the  ship,  they  rise 
above  that  thick  armor.  If  the  ship  heels  over  ever  so  little,  this  belt  goes  under 
water,  no  matter  where  it  is  placed. 

These  considerations  led  me  twenty  years  ago  to  recommend  to  the  English 
Admiralty  that  they  should  abolish  the  thick  armor.  And  my  design,  which  was 
used  exclusively  for  a  period  of  sixteen  years,  made  the  armor  a  uniform  thick¬ 
ness  from  the  main  deck  down. 

My  first  designs  which  were  accepted  had  the  thick  water-line  belt.  But  in 
1888  I  recommended  the  other  course.  In  the  Royal  Sovereign  class  the  armor 
rose  about  9  to  10  feet  above  the  normal  water  line  and  about  feet  below. 
That  is  to  say,  the  side  armor  was  15  to  16  feet  in  width.  Naval  opinion  of 
that  day  was  exactly  that  which  Reuterdahl  now  holds.  And  so  we  had  armor 
at  the  water  line  10  inches  thick  and  that  went  3  feet  above  the  water  line.  For 
the  rest  of  the  height  it  was  5  inches  thick. 

Previously  there  was  no  armor  above  the  belt.  The  armor  was  all  at  the 
water  line.  The  Germans  have  built  ships  within  the  last  twelve  years  like 
that — simply  a  belt  and  no  side  armor  above. 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


61 


What  I  wanted  to  do  was,  instead  of  having  a  10-inch  armor  belt  at  the  water 
line  and  a  5-inch  armor  above  that,  to  distribute  that  weight  uniformly  over 
the  same  area.  And  in  the  Majestic  class — which  was  the  original  of  all  mod¬ 
ern  battle  ships,  and  which  I  designed  about  1893 — I  was  allowed  to  make  the 
armor  on  the  hull  uniformly  9  inches  thick,  and  did  so.  So  that  there  is  a  wall 
armor  of  the  same  depth  as  in  the  Royal  Sovereign  class  and  of  the  same  weight, 
but  it  had  a  uniform  thickness  of  9  inches  all  the  way  up. 

We  have  followed  that  design  in  England  until  the  Dreadnought  was  built, 
and  of  course  with  her  I  had  nothing  to  do.  In  the  Dreadnought  they  revert  to 
the  thick  water-line  belt,  which,  as  I  have  said,  at  the  normal  line  extends 
about  2i  to  3  feet  above  still  water,  and  when  the  ship  is  deep  laden  1  to  1£ 
feet  under  water.  That  is  to  say,  they  go  back  to  the  arrangement  which  was 
abandoned  fifteen  years  ago. 

This  argument  about  the  water-line  belt  being  the  life  of  the  ship  is  all 
humbug,  because  you  don't  know  where  the  water  line  is.  Directly  she  burns 
out  coal,  or  uses  up  stores,  or  does  anything  to  diminish  her  draft,  that  water 
line  changes.  And  directly  you  put  in  water,  or  the  ship  heels  over,  or  moves 
through  the  water,  it  changes. 

When  you  go  to  sea,  you  may  have  the  ship  rolling  so  that  her  armor  comes 
wholly  out  of  water.  You  never  go  to  sea  with  the  fleet  without  seeing  large 
portions  of  the  unarmored  bottoms  of  the  ships. 

The  fundamental  error  is  in  making  such  a  fetich  of  the  water-line  belt. 
What  you  want  to  do  is  to  get  all  the  vertical  height  of  armor  you  can  on  the 
side  above  the  belt,  or  water  line.  And  then  when  you  have  fixed  on  your  limit 
of  weight  this  must  also  be  considered.  All  experience  proves  that  the  chance 
of  damage  to  the  hull  of  the  ship  increases  with  its  height  above  water. 

In  the  battle  of  Tsushimi  it  was  not  the  armored  sides  of  the  Russian  ships 
that  suffered,  but  their  superstructures.  The  ships  were  not  sunk  by  perfora¬ 
tion  of  their  armor,  but  by  the  perforation  of  their  thin  sides  above  the  armor 
and  the  entrance  of  water  into  the  upper  parts  of  the  ships. 

If  the  armor  of  the  Russian  ships  had  been  the  same  as  the  armor  of  the 
Connecticut,  what  would  have  been  the  result? 

It  would  have  been  vastly  better  for  the  ships.  This  is  the  point.  The  Rus¬ 
sian  ships  had  a  smaller  armored  area  above  the  water  than  the  Connecticut. 
Therefore  they  could  stand  battering  less.  And  the  Dreadnought  has  less  ar¬ 
mored  area  above  the  water  than  the  Connecticut,  taking  both  ships  at  deep 
draft. 

When  people  talk,  as  Reuterdahl  does,  about  the  Dreadnought  being  such  a 
superior  yessel  to  the  Connecticut  in  the  defense,  they  ignore  the  small  vertical 
height  of  armor  when  the  ships  are  at  deep  draft. 

Does  not  the  Connecticut  answer  all  Reuterdahl’s  requirements  as  expressed 

in  his  criticisms? 

No.  What  he  says  is  that  the  life  of  the  ship  depends  upon  the  water-line  belt. 
If  you  admit  that  premise,  then  his  argument  is  all  right.  He  says  a  6-inch 
armor  above  the  water-line  belt  might  be  of  some  value,  but  would  be  quite 
secondary.  I  say  that  all  experience  proves  that  the  increase  in  the  vertical 
expansion  above  water  of  the  side  armor  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  en¬ 
abling  the  ship  to  stand  battering. 

There  are  plenty  of  instances  in  the  case  of  the  Russian  ships  in  the  war  with 
Japan  where  the  armor,  according  to  all  formulae,  should  have  been  penetrated 
and  was  not  penetrated.  And  the  Russians,  w'ho  may  be  supposed  to  know 
what  happened,  have  in  their  later  designs  extended  the  area  of  the  armor 
enormously  and  reduced  the  thickness.  That  has  been  their  answer  to  it. 

What  reasons  were  given  by  the  British  Admiralty  for  reverting  to  an  aban¬ 
doned  type  of  armor  in  the  case  of  the  Dreadnought? 

They  decided  to  have  an  armament  of  ten  12-inch  guns.  They  had  therefore 
to  provide  a  great  weight  of  armor  for  the  redoubts  in  which  these  great  guns 
and  their  turntables  are  placed.  That  was  a  necessity,  you  see,  to  protect  the 
armament.  Then  they  found  that,  with  a  given  size  of  ship,  with  a  given  total 
weight  of  armor  available,  they  could  not  continue  to  protect  so  large  an  area 
on  the  side. 

With  the  Connecticut  or  the  King  Edward  arrangement,  your  armor  serves 
two  purposes — it  protects  the  battery  in  which  you  place  year  smaller  guns, 
and  also  serves  to  maintain  buoyancy  and  stability  by  being  on  the  side  of 
the  ship. 

If  you  have  to  put  in  12-inch  guns,  you  must  protect  with  armor  the  towers 
in  which  they  are  placed.  In  the  Connecticut  or  King  Edward  there  are  four 


62 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


12- inch  guns ;  therefore  you  have  two  towers.  But  when  you  get  ten  12-inch 
guns,  as  in  the  Dreadnought  or  the  North  Dakota,  you  are  obliged  to  take 
armor  from  the  sides  and  put  it  on  the  towers. 

The  total  depth  of  armor  on  the  Dreadnought  along  the  side  is  about  13?  to 
14  feet,  a  little  less  than  before.  And,  again,  the  reversion  to  the  thicker 
water-line  belt  means  you  have  to  concentrate  weight  there — a  thing  to  which 
I  have  always  taken  exception.  I  think  that  is  going  back  to  a  fallacy ;  it  is 
a  mistake.  And  you  know  they  have  not  continued  to  use  the  same  thickness 
of  belt  line  in  the  later  ships  of  the  Dreadnought  class.  They  have  kept  the 
8  inches  above,  but  have  less  than  11  inches  below.  In  other  words,  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  upper  and  belt  armor  is  less  in  the  later  ships. 

There  is  another  thing  which  Mr.  Reuterdahl  criticised,  and  that  is ’the  direct 
hoists  from  the  magazines  to  the  rear  of  the  guns.  Taking  it  as  a  matter  of 
fact  again,  if  you  were  to  take  all  the  armored  ships  of  the  world  at  the  present 
time  on  the  effective  lists  you  would  find  the  very  great  majority  of  them  with 
nothing  but  direct  hoists.  It  is  not  peculiar  to  American  ships  at  all. 

Now,  I  have  been  reading  the  testimony  given  at  that  investigation  in  Wash¬ 
ington,  and  from  that  it  appears  perfectly  clear  that  the  accidents  that  have 
happened  are  only  indirectly  associated  with  the  direct  hoist.  The  primary 
cause  of  accident  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  hoist. 

Having  said  that,  I  ought  to  say  that  I  am  the  man  who  brought  out  the 
broken  hoist — that  is,  lifting  the  ammunition  up  a  certain  height  from  the 
magazines  into  an  ammunition  room  and  there  transferring  it  to  another  hoist 
not  in  a  direct  line.  I  did  that  nearly  twenty  years  ago,  but  I  did  not  do  it  be¬ 
cause  of  the  danger  of  the  direct  hoist.  When  you  have  a  direct  hoist  from 
the  magazine  up  to  the  rear  of  the  guns,  which  may  be  50  feet  if  the  gun  is 
placed  high,  it  takes  an  appreciable  amount  of  time  to  lift  the  charge  from  the 
magazine  to  the  gun  before  you  can  load.  Now,  I  said  if  I  could  put  in  two 
stages,  one  that  would  bring  the  ammunition  to  within  6  or  7  feet  of  the  gun, 
and  then  a  second  set  of  men,  who  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  first  operation, 
to  lift  it  the  remaining  distance  to  the  gun,  I  could  save  considerable  time. 
That  is  the  reason  I  did  that,  and  not  because  of  any  danger. 

The  inexperience  of  the  men  and  the  conditions  of  target  practice  are  to 
blame.  As  long  as  you  give  the  prize  to  the  men  who  fire  the  most  ammunition 
in  a  given  time,  or  hit  the  target  most  frequently  in  a  given  time,  they  will 
play  that  game.  But  you  will  remember  that  the  Japanese  admirals,  Fushimi 
and  Togo,  gave  orders  that  that  practice  was  not  to  be  followed. 

In  the  battle  of  the  10th  of  August  outside  Port  Arthur  the  Japanese  fired 
away  nearly  all  their  ammunition,  and  were  only  saved  by  the  merest  good 
fortune.  And  they  were  not  able  to  follow  up  the  Russians  because  they  did 
not  have  reserve  ammunition. 

Now,  as  to  the  freeboard  and  height  of  guns  above  water,  all  I  need  say 
about  that  is  that  the  facts  are  again  not  in  Mr.  Reuterdahl’s  favor. 

It  is  quite  true  that  in  the  swifter  cruisers  of  the  British  navy  I  introduced 
a  high  forecastle,  because  they  were  going  to  drive  hard  and  fast  against  the 
sea.  But  in  the  battle  ships  I  kept  along  at  a  steady  height  of  freeboard  and 
of  guns  above  water,  and  that  was  practically  maintained  all  the  time  I  was 
there,  because  it  was  proved  to  be  enough  by  experience  at  sea. 

There  are  two  requirements.  There  is  the  maintenance  of  speed.  That  de¬ 
mands  a  high  bow,  whether  it  is  an  Atlantic  liner  or  a  battle  ship.  Then  there 
is  the  fighting  power  in  a  seaway.  And  of  course  there  you  never  wanf  to 
place  your  guns  higher  than  you  are  obliged  to,  because  by  raising  them  you 
raise  your  center  of  gravity  and  reduce  your  stability  accordingly. 

Reuterdahl’s  contention  is  that  the  existing  American  ships  are  disadvan¬ 
tageous^  situated  as  compared  with  European  vessels.  I  say  that  is  not  so. 
The  cruisers  in  your  Navy  have  not  such  great  height  of  freeboard  forward  as 
I  have  given  to  our  cruisers,  but  in  that  respect  it  is  not  a  question  of  power, 
but  simply  a  question  of  the  maintenance  of  speed  at  sea. 

There  is  one  thing  more  that  I  should  like  to  say,  and  I  think  it  is  vital.  I 
have  known  the  American  Navy  from  the  start.  It  is  not  generally  known  that 
the  modern  American  Navy  started  with  the  purchase  of  two  of  my  designs 
from  Armstrong’s.  That  was  in  1885.  From  those  designs  the  Charleston 
and  the  Baltimore  were  built. 

The  first  thing  I  want  to  say  in  thjs  connection  is  that  you  have  in  those  men 
naval  architects  as  capable  as  any,  in  my  judgment,  in  the  world,  because  they 
have  been  properly  trained,  and  besides  they  are  picked  men. 

The  second  thing  I  want  to  say  is  that  your  shipbuilding  yards  are  quite 
equal  to  any  we  have  in  their  equipment  and  management  and  all  that.  They 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


63 


have  come  later  and  they  have  the  advantage  of  all  the  accumulated  experience 
we  have  had  to  go  upon.  And  there  is  American  ingenuity  at  the  back  of  all 
that  on  the  mechanical  side. 

And  the  result  is  that,  in  my  opinion,  you  have  a  fleet  that,  ship  for  ship, 
comparing  the  ships  designed  at  a  given  date — and  that  is  the  only  fair  com¬ 
parison — is  equal  to  anything  the  world  contains.  And  next  to  the  British 
navy  I  think  your  Navy  is  the  best  in  the  world. 

These  wholesale  criticisms  and  severe  condemnation  are  not  justified.  There 
is  no  ship  that  you  can  not  criticise,  but  criticism  to  be  of  value  must  be  the  re¬ 
sult  of  experience.  No  one  would  want  to  avoid  that  kind  of  criticism.  But 
what  I  do  say  is  that  these  are  not  subjects  that  can  be  proper]  y  discussed  in 
the  public  press  or  in  magazine  articles.  They  must  be  dealt  with  dispassion¬ 
ately  and  quietly. 


10. 


[Scientific  American,  New  York,  Saturday,  May  2,  1908.] 

SIR  WILLIAM  WHITE  ON  THE  AMERICAN  NAVY. 

In  the  course  of  a  recent  converastion  with  Sir  William  White  the 
editor  of  the  Scientific  American  asked  the  distinguished  naval  archi¬ 
tect  for  his  estimate  of  the  relative  value  of  the  ships  of  the  United- 
States  Navy  compared  with  those  of  the  leading  navies  of  the  world. 
He  replied  that  if  a  comparison  were  made  of  ships  of  the  same  date 
and  the  same  type,  he  considered  that  the  United  States  vessels  were 
the  equals  of  any  war  ships  afloat. 

Now,  the  value  of  this  approval  lies  in  the  fact  that  Sir  William  has 
had  a  more  intimate  and  extended  experience  in  the  design  of  modern 
war  ships  than  any  living  naval  architect.  For  a  period  of  about 
twenty  years  he  was  the  chief  constructor  of  the  British  navy.  What 
Ericsson  was  to  the  low-freeboard,  coast-defense  monitor  White  is  to 
the  modern,  high- freeboard  seagoing  battle  ship;  and  in  the  Royal 
Sovereign  he  introduced  a  type  wliich,  for  two  decades,  has  formed, 
in  most  of  its  essential  features,  the  standard  battle  ship  for  the  lead¬ 
ing  navies  of  the  world.  In  his  active  career  he  has  designed  a 
greater  number  of  battle  ships  and  cruisers  ♦probably  than  any  three 
naval  architects  combined. 

Sir  William  informed  us  that  he  had  followed  the  Senate  investiga¬ 
tion  of  the  supposed  defects  in  our  ships  with  much  interest  and  that 
he  disagreed  with  the  charges  as  originally  stated  in  the  Reuterdahl 
article.  Taking  the  case  of  the  Dreadnought ,  which  was  cited  as  an 
instance  of  how  our  own  ships  should  have  been  armored,  but  were 
not,  he  made  the  startling  statement  that  whereas,  at  full  load,  the 
American  ships  are  depressed  on  an  average  27  inches  below  the  nom¬ 
inal  flotation  line,  the  Dreadnought ,  when  so  loaded,  was  depressed 
from  4  to  4J  feet;  and  that  whereas  at  full  load  the  American  ships 
show  from  6  to  9  inches  of  the  thick  belt  above  the  water,  the  English 
ship  has  the  corresponding  belt  from  a  foot  to  a  foot  and  a  half  be¬ 
low  water.  He  further  stated  that  whereas  in  the  fully  loaded  con¬ 
dition  the  Dreadnought  shows  only  4  to  4J  feet  of  8-inch  side  armor, 
the  Connecticut  and  class  show  from  15  to  16  feet  of  7-inch  side  armor 
above  the  water.  Therefore,  he  considered,  as  well  he  may,  that  the 
Connecticut  is  better  protected  than  the  Dreadnought. 

Even  more  disastrous  to  the  critics  of  our  Navy  were  the  comments 
of  Sir  William  on  the  question  of  the  direct  versus  the  interrupted 


64 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS. 


hoist.  Mr.  Reuterdahl  and  others  have  stated  time  and  again  that 
the  direct  hoist,  giving  direct  communication  from  the  handling-room 
floor  to  the  breech  of  the  gun,  is  a  type  of  construction  peculiar  to  our 
own  Navy,  which  is  full  of  danger;  and  they  have  urged  that  it 
should  have  been  abandoned  long  ago  in  favor  of  the  interrupted 
hoist,  which,  according  to  them,  was  introduced  in  foreign  navies  to 
avoid  the  dangers  inherent  in  the  direct  hoist.  Thus,  Mr.  Reuterdahl 
in  his  recent  letter  to  the  New  York  Sun,  referred  to  in  another  col¬ 
umn,  states  that  there  is  not  in  any  foreign  turret  a  hoist  of  the  type 
we  use.  Now.  upon  this  point  no  one  is  so  qualified  to  speak  as  Sir 
William,  for  he  informs  us  that  it  was  he  himself  who  designed  the 
interrupted  hoist  nearly  twenty  years  ago — the  critics  have  told  us 
that  this  was  a  comparatively  modern  improvement,  w^hich  our  slow- 
moving  Department  has  refused  to  adopt — and  that  he  did  not  design 
it  because  the  interrupted  hoist  was  less  dangerous,  but  because  he 
believed  it  would  secure  a  faster  service  of  ammunition  to  the  guns. 
He  stated  furthermore  that  the  majority  of  the  armored  ships  of  the 
world  make  use  of  the  direct  hoist,  and  that  it  is  in  no  sense  peculiar 
to  the  United  States  Navy. 

And  thus  once  more  are  the  fallacies  and  the  absurd  exaggerations 
of  this  ill-advised  onslaught  upon  our  Navy  shown  to  be  not  only 
baseless,  but  positively  absurd — this  time  by  one  who  is  at  once  the 
foremost  naval  architect  of  the  day  and  an  outside  critic  of  unques¬ 
tioned  impartiality.  Let  us  hope  that  with  this  final  and  truly  comic 
pricking  of  the  “  open  hoist  ”  turret  bubble,  the  American  public  will 
be  granted  a  well-earned  repose. 


11. 

[Engineering  News,  April  16,  1908 — A  journal  of  civil,  mechanical,  mining,  and 
electrical  engineering,  published  every  Thursday  by  The  Engineering  News 
Publishing  Company,  220  Broadway,  New  York.] 

For  three  months  past,  following  the  publication  of  a  sensational 
magazine  article,  the  press  has  been  filled  with  criticisms  of  the 
United  States  Navy.  We  have  not  thought  it  worth  while  to  give 
space  to  any  of  the  voluminous  discussion.  To  those  who  could  see 
beneath  the  surface  it  has  been  evident  that  these  criticisms  of  the 
Navy  and  of  our  naval  vessels  originated  partly  from  a  desire  to 
make  political  capital,  partly  from  the  desire  to  make  money  by  ex¬ 
ploiting  sensational  articles  in  the  press,  and  partly  from  some 
jealousy  and  prejudice  inside  the  Navy  Department.  Eliminate  all 
these,  and  there  still  remains  doubtless  some  fair  and  reasonable 
criticism  in  all  that  has  been  uttered,  but  it  has  been  so  buried  out 
of  sight  in  the  torrent  of  destructive  slander  and  vituperation  that  it 
might  better  have  been  postponed  to  a  more  suitable  season. 

No  one  supposes  that  the  Navy  organization  is  perfect.  Doubtless 
it  is  true  that  the  different  bureaus  do  work  more  or  less  at  cross¬ 
purposes,  but  we  hear  exactly  the  same  complaint  of  lack  of  depart¬ 
mental  cooperation  from  inside  prominent  railway  and  industrial 
corporations.  Human  nature  is  not  materially  different  in  the  Navy 
and  out  of  the  Navy. 

No  one  supposes,”  either,  that  any  battle  ship  or  other  naval  vessel 
is  perfect.  Far  from  it.  The  modern  naval  vessel  is  in  its  design 


ALLEGED  STRUCTURAL  DEFECTS  IN  BATTLE  SHIPS.  65 

a  compromise  and  must  be,  absolutely,  from  the  necessities  of  the 
case.  Of  course,  the  line  officer  wants  his  vessel  to  have  more  and 
bigger  guns,  thicker  and  wider  and  longer  armor  belt,  higher  speed, 
greater  coal  capacity,  more  roomy  quarters  for  its  crew.  The  naval 
designer  has  to  take  a  certain  limited  number  of  tons  displacement 
and  provide  as  much  speed  and  armor  and  offensive  power  and  all 
the  rest  as  the  conditions  permit. 

A  large  part  of  the  criticisms  which  have  been  aimed  at  our  battle 
ships  and  their  designers  during  the  past  few  months  have  referred 
to  the  location  of  the  armor  belts.  It  has  been  repeated  over  and  over 
again  that  the  armor  belts  were  too  low,  that  the  tops  of  the  belts 
were  under  water  when  the  ships  were  ready  for  sea  with  all  coal 
and  stores  on  board;  and  the  naval  designers  have  been  called  im¬ 
practicable  theorists,  ignoramuses,  bureaucrats,  and  various  other  un¬ 
complimentary  names. 

This  sort  of  criticism  reads  well  in  the  pages  of  a  popular  maga¬ 
zine,  and  perhaps  it  will  make  good  political  campaign  documents, 
but  when  it  is  examined  with  a  little  practical  knowledge,  how  puerile 
it  appears. 

A  ship  may  have  to  fight  a  battle  when  its  coal  and  stores  are  nearly 
exhausted  and  it  stands  high  out  of  the  water  in  consequence.  The 
battle  of  Santiago  was  fought  under  exactly  those  conditions.  Again, 
there  can  be  no  certainty  that  battles  will  be  fought  in  smooth  water, 
and  in  a  seaway  all  ships  roll  more  or  less.  The  critics  who  have  been 
barking  themselves  hoarse  against  our  naval  vessels  have  been  vocif¬ 
erous  in  their  assertions  that  Admiral  Evans  himself  “  had  it  in  ” 
for  the  designers  who  had  placed  the  armor  belts  so  low.  It  was 
freely  asserted  that  when  he  arrived,  after  completing  the  cruise 
around  the  South  American  continent,  he  would  add  the  weight  of  his 
authority  on  the  side  of  the  critics.  But  when  he  at  last  arrived  and 
the  impatient  reporters  sought  to  draw  him  out  on  the  armor-belt 
question,  u  Fighting  Bob  ”  assured  them  that  while  he  would  be  glad 
to  have  the  top  of  the  armor  belt  raised  so  as  to  give  more  protection, 
on  the  other  hand  the  vessels  of  his  fleet  often  rolled  until  the  bottom 
of  the  armor  belt  was  raised  above  the  water  line. 

And  so,  as  Mr.  Dooley  says,  there  you  are !  There  is  absolutely  not 
a  shred  of  evidence  in  all  that  has  been  published,  so  far  as  we  have 
seen,  to  show  that  our  naval  designers  have  not  done  the  best  possible 
within  the  necessary  limitations.  They  appreciate,  what  the  general 
public  and  possibly  the  naval  critics  do  not,  that  every  inch  the  armor 
belt  is  raised  materially  affects  the  stability  of  the  vessel.  They  ap¬ 
preciate,  what  the  critics  of  the  Navy  apparently  do  not,  that  while 
higher  armor  belts,  higher  freeboard,  and  higher  batteries  might  have 
possible  advantages,  the  first  duty  of  a  designer  is  to  guard  the  sta¬ 
bility  of  his  vessel.  A  battle  ship  must  be  safe  against  capsizing  in 
any  ocean  storm.  Besides  this,  if  a  higher  armor  belt  so  decreased 
stability  as  to  cause  greater  rolling,  the  vessel  might  expose  still  more 
of  her  bottom  below  the  armor  to  the  enemy’s  guns  when  fighting  in 
a  seaway. 

O 


S.  Doc.  506,  60-1 


